The Wanganui Chronicle MONDAY, NOVEMBER 29, 1948. FRANCO—CONFIDENCE MAN

Wanganui Chronicle, 29 November 1948, Page 4

The Wanganui Chronicle MONDAY, NOVEMBER 29, 1948. FRANCO—CONFIDENCE MAN

THE publication of the papers of Count Ciano has revealed in detail what was apparent in a general way all along, that Franco was stringing-along with Hitler and Mussolini for his own ends and not for theirs. Having secured what he wanted he was not foolish enough to throw away his own prize for two men who cared for his fate not at all. He knew the kind of men who aided him to bring down the Government of Spain and drench his homeland in the blood of his countrymen. Why should he not? For he was of like kind with them. All he had to do was to ask himself what he was to gain from bringing Spain into any conflict, no matter on which side. He could only lose and it is not surprising that having ousted the legal government of the country and usurped the reins of office without winning popular support he should string along with Hitler and Mussolini but take good care to keep out of the actual fighting. Franco could never have conducted a successful coup d’etat without foreign aid. To that extent he was a traitor to his country and a traitor he is still. That is why he cannot win legal support and even after years have passed sueh inability still occasions no surprise: for legal support rests upon a moral base which base cannot be dispensed with. It was natural for Franco to turn to Mussolini and then to Hitler, because he needed external support and only immoral men will aid an immoral adventure. He had no reasonable ground for seeking aid elsewhere. But he could not secure sufficient support inside his own country. He knew that were he to allow Mussolini to dominate Spain he, Franco, would soon suffer eclipse. He knew, too, that were he to allow Hitler to occupy part of Spain or to grant his armies passage through the country in order fo attack Gibraltar the question would arise how to get the German garrison if successful out of the Rock. His guess was that the English remaining there would be the lesser of the two evils. The reasons prompting Franco to remain out of the conflict for as long as possible were also the same reasons which should have prompted Mussolini to have followed a similar course. Spain, like Italy,»is an isthmus and for a people occupying such a terrain and having no navy it would be suicidal to oppose the two great maritime powers. So Mussolini found it and so Franco foresaw it. In order to keep clear of the entanglement which would have increased his liabilities without adding to his strength, Franco at first played-off Mussolini against Hitler and then met Hitler and wore him down. Here was a man the Fuhrer with his wonderful eyes could not tame. The Pyrennees stood between Spain and France and France was not Austria while Spain was not Italy. Napoleon, who assuredly had valid claims to genius, found that his invasion of Spain was one of his major mistakes. Every peasant was allied against him, every town was a fortress which he might subdue but he could not win over to his side. The Spaniards may be corrupt, they-may be intolerant and politically incapable, but none need question their bravery. Bravery is a commonplace product among the Spaniards. Why, then, does Franco’s regime continue when it does not command popular support and free elections even for the municipalities are not permitted? The answer is that the Spanish people think slow but think straight. They know that the condition of the country is extremely unsatisfactory from an economic standpoint and that the country could not stand another war. The general appreciation of this economic weakness of the' country puts the damper on all overt action to oust the Caudillo. Whether such action, if tried, would be successful is another matter, for the army has become stronger while the Falange, which hoisted Franco into power, has become weaker. The Monarchists are not willing to risk preciptating a civil war and it may be that to play a waiting game is to make the biggest attack against Franco. Spain is a proud land which would be united either by invasion or by any attempt at dictation from abroad. Meanwhile Franco is requiring his countrymen to make bricks without straw, to -grow crops without fertiliser. It is the economic factor that is revealing him as an empty promiser. If he could get support from abroad once more, this time, not in the military field but in the economic, he would be able to bring about an improvement in the condition of the people. Then, with a schedule of accomplishments, he could risk liberalising the constitution, but without that list of successes he dare not take the first step towards liberalism. The Marshall Plan promised for Franco some support that he sorely needed, but that hope vanished and so he has sought to bring into play the technique which he employed against Mussolini and Hitler. That was tp intimate that he loved the one more than he did the other. Today he is endeavouring to curry favour with the United States of America, claiming that it was the British that were preventing American aid flowing to the coasts of Spain. The return of Truman was a piece of ill luck for Franco. Meanwhile conditions inside the country apparently grow worse. There is no uniformity in conditions inside Spain, but taken by-and-large it does not appear that a country that has smashed its own capital equipment so prodigally can hope to recover sufficiently to enable its people to enjoy a reasonable standard of living. Herein lies the possibility of Franco being unseated. Whence the challenge will come and how or when he cannot see, but with a continuance of adverse economic conditions he must expect the attack to come sooner rather than later. The trouble with the confidence trick lies in that it cannot often be repeated a second time and that is the bitter experience now being suffered by Franco.