The Wanganui Chronicle. MONDAY, JANUARY 26, 1948 THE MARSHALL PLAN

Wanganui Chronicle, 26 January 1948, Page 4

The Wanganui Chronicle. MONDAY, JANUARY 26, 1948 THE MARSHALL PLAN

"piE Marshall Plan is moving forward, and this movement is being challenged by Russia with a vehemence that rises as the plan nears implementation. Why should Rugsia desire that the misery of Europe shall be prolonged? Motives are seldom lonely. Russia’s metives today are manifold. Some of these motives are to be deduced from her own condition and from her rulers’ fear of the future. It is improbable that those who control the destinies of the Russian people today are abk to bring themselves to such a point of malignity that they would willing’y and without purpose inflict starvation and ruin upon many millions of people, whose only crime is that they have survived a destructive war.

The motives which impel Russian policy in respect to the Marshall Plan are those of possible self-protection. The idea that Russia has anything to fear in the world today does exist inside the country. It is as much a part of the Governmental propaganda as is the New Zealand Government’s reiteration to the public to remember the slump that had passed before Labour assumed office in 1935. These psychological rssets which are so assidiously exploited, have, a way of backfiring. Just as in New Zealand the “remember the slump” propaganda is now coming home to disturb the public at a time when confidence should be, and needs to be strong, so in Russia the Beware of Invasion propaganda is causing the public there to be restless. Every effort at alleviating the lot of the'-masses from wartime severity brings up the question as to whether this is not a sacrifice to ease, as compared with the possibilities of the future. If there is a war to be waged from the west, then it is impossible for the country to afford any of the luxuries of peace. The demand for protective measures must proceed from taar.y sections of the country. On the other hand, there must be many people inside Russia who cannot believe the propaganda of the Government any more than all the people of New Zealand can swallow the propaganda of their own Government. Notwithstanding every precaution of a police State, people will think, and they will also find means of communicating one with the other. Every now and again there are whispers that all is not well with the public opinion of Russia, that discontent is deep rooted, and that in the end—how long nobody knows—something will happen which will challenge the regime. There are two good reasons for believing that these whispers have some foundation: the unwillingness to allow Russians to leave the country under any circumstances, including being married to Englishmen, and the abandoning of rationing and the devaluation of the currency. These indicate what is going on behind the iron curtain of secrecy that the Russians so suejessfully maintain. It is safe to assume that all is not well with Russia’s economy today. But what is the effect upon the Russian public? The human mind reacts in remarkable fidelity to certain known laws, and it is not to be expected that Russia’s present population will react in manner different from that which characterised the subjects of the Tsar during the whole of last century. Men who were willing to brave all the horrors of the Tsarist regime will not shrink from similar experience today. The sons of the men who were banished to Siberia for political reasons do not differ very much from their fathers in the face of tyranny. Sooner or later the Russian people will discover the conditions under which the “plutoerasies” of the west are surviving. When they do it will be a much more difficult time for the managers of the Soviet regime. The wider the difference between Soviet conditions and those of Western Europe, the more explosive will be the Russian domestic position, and the more difficult will be the proposition that only the Communistic way of life is satisfactory to the masses. To h vid back the recovery of the west, then, is sound taeties for the preservation of the Soviet’s Communistic regime, and it is also sound from the standpoint of doctrine. It prolongs the Communist experiment’s period of opportunity. The Marshall Plan represents a threat to the Soviet set-up. That is why it is being attacked today. Every country that receives help from the United States of America now will retain a higher standard of living than will be possible for those countries that li’.] up with the Soviet system. Russia has rngde one tremendous mistake in her post-war policy, she has expanded her commitments for doctrinal reasons, but now finds that she is unable to give to the countries that have gone into her fold the things those countries want and will need in increasing measure as the months pass. The immediate material gains were Russia’s: now she has populations upon her hands—even though these peoples have their own Governments, their association with Russia is too close to be denied now—which will become increasingly critical. Poland has a population steeped in a tradition which lauds the fight for freedom. The Czechs and Slovaks have tasted the heady wine of nationalism and freedom; Rumania is a Latin island in a Slav sea, and knows it; Jugoslavia is a country of mountaineers who are seldom doctrinaire, but whom the necessities of life compel to be individualistic; Bulgaria is a peasant Community tied to individualised farms and a family economy. Greece stands with her territory almost untouched because of British and American aid. Turkey is not amenable to Russian threats, and even weak Persia is no longer tractable to Russian bullying. Every enlargement of American support for these countries will be noticed by the countries that are today Russia’s satellites. Every improvement in the former countries will create troubles for the Communists in the latter group of countries. Every movement away from Russia must be presented to the Russian people as the work of the Imperialist Capitalists of America, or more particularly of Wall Street. The iron curtain will be maintained in order to minimise the effects of western recovery, but with radio communication possible there is no telling to what extent the iron curtain will be pierced in the future. In a time of economic stress —which may present itself to Russia at any time—it will take only a spark to set off a big conflagration. The Marshall Plan is being opposed today because it will prepare too much tinder inside Russia in the not-distant future, and provide a strong anti-Moscow pull inside the satellite countries.