The Wanganui Chronicle SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1943 THE ROAD TO TOKIO

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 87, Issue 275, 20 November 1943, Page 4

The Wanganui Chronicle SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1943 THE ROAD TO TOKIO

JT is heartening- to be told by the correspondent of The Times at General Headquarters in India that there is likely to, be a marked increase in contacts between Delhi and Chungking. The presence of General de Wiart as a likely liaison between the two headquarters is encouraging; the fact that General Stilwell will be very near Lord Louis Mountbatten makes good reading; and the arrival at Chungking of Brigadier-General Patrick Hurley as President Roosevelt’s personal representative suggests a mission having as its object the smoothing out of the problem of coordinating the Chinese, British and American forces operatingunder Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten’s South-east Asia Command. It all points to a quickening in coming operations against Japan. But let there be no illusions on this point: the road to Tokio is still a long one, the going will be terribly tough, and the price to be paid for victory will be high. The average man thinks that, once Germany is defeated—and that may yet take longer than he estimates—China can be transformed into a gigantic base from which Allied air power can bomb Japan into submission. That idea must be dispelled. Enormous air bases require armies in their defence; otherwise the Japanese divisions in occupation of nearly all the worth-while parts of that country could quickly destroy the airfields. It cannot be expected that fighter planes alone will be able to protect such air basts. But both armies and air forces must be supplied, and it is the problem of supply which is the real one so far as China is concerned. It is accounted as almost insuperable by such a competent observer as Hanson Baldwin, whose anticipations with regard to operations in the Pacific have been proved more nearly correct than those of any other analyst.

Since the Burma Road fell into the hands of the Japanese with their conquest of Burma, and before that-when it was closed for a'time under Japanese pressure, the supply of sufficient war material to China to enable the Chinese Army to fight on equal terms with the invaders has proved a problem that defied complete solution. But a fact not generally appreciated is that just one ground division in active combat will consume about 700 tons of ammunition every day. Thus if this link with the outside world were restored to the Allies—in itself a major proposition—the supply problem could not be solved, even though the capacity of the route be increased three-fold. One ground division of troops would be a pitiful force to send against the Japanese in China. From ten to twenty divisions would be the absolute minimum, and the problem of supply to such a force would be beyond the capacity of any route save that which could be thrown open by combined land, air ajid sea operations. The east coast ports, like Canton, which used to admit from 1000 to 2000 tons a day, are all in the hands of the Japanese. Their recapture could not be carried out without the undertaking of a tremendous amphibious campaign. The conditions for the success of such a campaign would obviously be sufficient naval strength and sea transport to move and cover the landing forces, with sufficient air strength, both land-based and carrier-borne, to dominate the air and fight off any enemy onslaught on the armada from shore. With the Japanese in possession of Burma, the Malay peninsula and Indo-China, as well as of the Netherlands East Indies, it can be appreciated that the route which this armada would have to traverse is strongly protected in favour of the enemy.

One truth emerges from a critical survey of the situation: Japan is already a great continental power. But in appreciating that fact it may be as well to recall that she is also a maritime power, and in that may be found the enemy’s weakness. Comparatively safe from a knock-out blow aimed by land-based forces, unless Russia enters the Pacific war—still a remote consideration —Japan can be attacked from the sea. Here the road to be travelled before a vital blow can be struck is also a long and weary one, but the fact that already successful steps have been taken is heartening. The ring round Japan’s holdings is steadily tightening. The South Pacific operations under the command of General MacArthur and Admiral Halsey, through New Guinea and Hie Solomons, in which the New Zealanders have played their allotted part with distinction, are immediately aimed at the important Japanese base of Rabaul, with the ultimate objective probably Truk..in Ihe Carolines. A campaign from India directed at Burma appears, to be impending in the near future. The expulsion of the Japanese from the Aleutians has scaled the northern Pacific and has made the way clear for a vital blow from that direction. With Siberian bases denied because of Russia's neutrality to Japan, there remains what may yet prove to be the main effort—a direct thrust westward from Hawaii through Midway. AVake ami Guam. Such a thrust may yet enable the United States Navy, reinforced by British ships released from Hie Mediterranean, to strike a decisive blow against the “invisible” Japanese fleet. Inability-so far to force a major naval engagement, however, suggests that this is yet another obstacle to be overcome in the long, hard road to Tokio.