The Wanganui Chronicle. FRIDAY, AUGUST 27, 1943 DIPLOMATIC TUG-OF-WAR IN SPAIN

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 87, Issue 202, 27 August 1943, Page 4

The Wanganui Chronicle. F RIDA Y, AUGUST 27, 1943 DIPLOMATIC TUG-OF-WAR IN SPAIN

T ,IE present government of Spain under the leadership of General Franco may be regarded as one of the most efficient barometers of the trends of the war. Spain is not a democracy. Franco’s ride is the rule of a dictator which is influenced by a philosophy similar to that held by Hitler and Mussolini. He has no respect for human personality, and he has no appreciation of the value of freedom as an imperative necessity for the development of human and spiritual values. The soul of man cannot be regimented, but Franco nevertheless makes the attempt to do so alongside of the other dictators. Were the dictators to conquer in the war Franco would count for very little, for the very philosophy which is his would be the justification for his elimination by Hitler and Mussolini or either of them. They made him and they would demand the right to pull the strings which make their puppet jump the way that they wish. Despite Franco’s only hope of success being dependent upon the support in.the economic field which can be accorded to Spain by the democracies, his heart is with the Axis. It is not surprising to learn that the British Ambassador, Sir Samuel Hoare, has been cooling his heels on the outskirts of the Falangist set-up for the past two years. That he has recently been called into conference with the Spanish usurper has an added significance. Usurpers have a great principle which they all follow; it is to worship the rising sun. Were the Spanish usurpers not apprehensive concerning the future fate of the Axis the British Ambassador would still be on the outside of Madrid’s diplomatic circle. Spanish opinion, insofar as it is allowed to be expressed in that land of the redeemed by way of foreign intervention, is dominated by two main ideas—that the Allies may win the war and the consequent possibility of Russian influence again being felt in the Iberian Peninsula. The. second idea, is expressed in the fear of the Red Menace, as though the present regime with its multifarious crimes is not red enough. But the Red Menace is not really Communism: it is the prospect of civil war breaking out again in that country where hatreds burn as brightly as the noon-day sun in Toledo. Franco knows that the assassins of the civil war which Mussolini sent to his aid will not be available, nor will, the “technicians” from Germany to try out the efficiency of their weapons on Spanish populations. His future, then, must depend upon the recognition and the help that he can get from the victors at the coming peace conference. He still clings to the idea that the exploitation of the Red Menace will be a trump card, but as Mussolini has been thrown to the discard that trump card does not appear to have a sufficient® high value in the game in which he is now engaged in. playing for his own life. Franco’s strategic position has been a difficult one throughout the war. The civil war reduced Spain’s economic condition to deplorably low levels, reducing the country’s external purchasing power and thereby making it difficult for her agriculture to secure the manures and fertilisers that are essential in that wind-swept, sun-drenched land. Food has been scarce and even olive oil has been in such demand overseas that it has been drawn away from the essential, needs of the populace. The country still has some million and a-quarter of rifles among- the population, and caches of ammunition exist hidden from the Government. The political condition of the country is unsatisfactory and many politicals are still held in concentration camps because the Government fears that their release may precipitate the challenge which it knows must come sooner or later. A German defeat brings Russia nearer to Spain, but the Germans have appeared at times to desire to march through the peninsula in order to combat the Allies in the Mediterranean area. Whether it was out of affection or whether it was out of fear, the Spanish Cabinet has been holding- the diplomatic candle to the Nazi devil. Invasion would be a terrible catastrophe for Spain, for while the Spaniards could not be relied upon to support their own Government against invaders, the Government has not the means to resist an invasion from French territory of a panzer division. Nor could the Government count upon support from the democracies in any resistance the former may be willing to offer. Further, the German propaganda effort has been so strong that until quite recently there has been no settled conviction that the Germans would lose the war. In the diplomatic field the situation developed along interesting lines. Early in the year Von Stohrer was the German Ambassador in Madrid, but he was recalled for reasons that have not been revealed. The assumption is strongly held that his recall was due to the unwillingness of President Caudillo to move nearer to the Axis fold. "When Von Molke succeeded to the ambassadorship the Spanish Premier was generous in his reference to the united pouring out of Spanish and German blood “in the noble enterprise which is sure of history’s judgment.” But Von Molke died of appendicitis on March 22 and all the members of the Spanish Cabinet attended bis funeral, in Madrid. For all these compliments Spain moved away from the. Axis by some points when she substituted a policy of neutrality for one of non-belligerency when Count Jordana returned to the Foreign Ministry. Senor Arrese, Secretary-General of the Falange, visited Germany in January and was received by Hitler, this visit being apparently designed to efface the irritation caused by the new orientation of Spanish foreign policy. But the Spanish mind thinks slow yet thinks straight, and Spaniards arc unwilling to join the Blue Division for service in Russia or to go to Germany and work in the factories th'erc. Spain’s position will improve as the Nazi Menace grows less, but Spanish minds in charge of the country’s affairs know that despite this casing of the external situation there will be no lessening of those internal tensions which are the natural, outcome of a foreign-enginecred civil war and an- illegal usurpation of the Government of the country.