The Wanganui Chronicle FRIDAY, MARCH 13, 1942 THE PROMISED OFFENSIVE

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 86, Issue 61, 13 March 1942, Page 4

The Wanganui Chronicle FRIDAY, MARCH 13, 1942 THE PROMISED OFFENSIVE

I ’’THERE arc indications that the Allies will soon < inharh upon offensive action against the enemy. The problem which confronts the High Commands of the Allies is where to strike first. This is no easy decision to arrive at. The Japanese entered the war suddenly ami treacherously: their main object being to secure the spoils for themselves. 1 hey are, nevertheless, well aware that while the initial advantages which they gained by the speed of their attack have led to the, extension of their control over a considerable area, of land and sea they cannot hope to maintain such gains against the Allies if the latter are successful. While- Japan is to-day concerned about her own gains and is not interested to promote the welfare of Germany ami Italy in the post-war world, the Eastern Axis partner is vitally concerned to see that the Allies are defeated. Japan's contribution to the. struggle is to endeavour to distract as much of the Allied military strength as possible, which, from the Axis standpoint, is good tactics. The first principle of strategy, both military and naval, is the concentration of strength, for unless this principle is adhered to the force can be defeated piecemeal. It is because of the Allies’ adherence to the sound principle of concentration of force that it. has been necessary to i apparently forsake some of the areas of conflict. But wars are i not mm by forsaking areas of conflict ; they are won. by annihibitj ing the opposing forces: they are not won by occupying territory, but by a com-ent rat ion of fire power in order to inflict casualties i <ui the enemy. How can the Allies in the present stage of the eonllict move to further this process of annihilation of the \xis I armies: In Hie Mediterranean area tin- obvious move is an attack upon Sicily, from which could be developed the campaign against Italy. This campaign would involve the use of a lot of shipping and the transport in' troops to the Mediterranean. In the Western European area an attack could be made on northern Norway, which ! would involve Hie use of shipping on a shorter sea route, and air ' and naval protection would be much easier to organise than would be (Im ease in the Mediterranean. The northern Norway campaign would, however, be dependent for its success upon the securing and holding of a number of aerodromes from which a sufficient number of tighter and dive-bomber planes could operate. An in- ! vasion of Denmark offers possibilil ii s of further development, j while a landing on the coast of northern Erain-c. if made during I the summer of this year, would compel the Germans to divert a I considerable portion of their aviation ami tank strength from Russia, thereby weakening the (terman drive towards the East. Each of these three plans has advant ages and disadvantages and the ]>rob:'.bility is that the Allied High ('onimand have worked out i alternative plans, the choosing from which will be decided in aeeordanec- with the conditions as they develop. Il is improbable that the Japanese will be allowed to continue on their path unimpeded by no more opposition than they haie hitherto i xperiem-ed. It would be a mistake, however, to expect an immediate dramatic development, because the wide areas over which operations in the I’aeifie. are being carried out pri elude such a development. Nevertheless it is improbable that I the Ameim-an newspapers would have taken on the tone, that they ' have of late without being first assured that American troops haw already garrisoned vital points along the southern fraiis-l’ai-ilic I bridge. American strategy demands that this bridge from east io west be maintained. The allarks on Japanese bases in the Marshall Islands are an earnest that the Americans are determined Io maintain it. This is, however. prt liminary Io the American i-i'l'i usive against Japan. The Americans must look two ways at om-e over the At'antii- ami over the Pacific, but in paying alienl lion l<> the Atlantic ami to the attack against Germany in Europe the U.S.A, can be relied on to permit of no reduction in' lie combined air. sea ami land attack against Japan when if does i-oim . Japan is reputed Io have aecuiitjHlated oil supplies sufficient for twelve months of war operations: she will be making strenuous endeavours to increase that- stock by securing oil from tic Dutch East Indies, Il is for the Allies to strike, and strike hard. ..I Japan before these mw oil supplies can he made available. I Therefore America knows that she must speed up her Wort in I order to exploit the period of advantage which is provided by Japan's presmf limited oil stocks. ’