WAR IN AMERICAN EYES

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 84, Issue 71, 26 March 1940, Page 5

WAR IN AMERICAN EYES

DECISION IN THE AIR ACHILLES HEEL OF GERMANY WHEX ALLIES CAN TIP THE BALANCE WASHINGTON. March 24. With war news so scanty, the widespread misconceptions ot the European military situation are not surprising. Nevertheless, it is surprising how far the common picture ot the war varies from that of American military and diplomatic experts. These men. whose information is as good as any in the world are unanimous on the vital point. Germany’s only real weakness lies in her inability to reproduce her heavy industrial factories. The | plants making large armaments, un- j processed steel, and, above, the huge | and intricate tools needed by other , plants, lie exposed to attack from the I air at Essen and Dortmund. Pilsen and one or two other centres. The equivalent English and French plants are just as exposed, but the English and French have the resources to rebuild, slow and painful as that process would be. Because of its effect on world opinion, each side has waited for the other to begin the war in the air in dreadful earnest. Sooner or later this caution will be exhausted, and then, as they are still markedly inferior to the Germans in air amaments, the English and French will suffer seriously for a time. Essentially, however, American experts believe the present stalemate will continue until the English and French can build up air striking power to attack the Germans where they are vulnerable. Supplies Vor at Least Two Years In reaching their conclusion, the ex-1 perts begin by brushing aside the large, easy misconceptions which the scarcity of war news has nourished, i They laugh wryly at the notion that I this is, in the distressing language ut Senator Borah, a ’‘Phoney War.”, American military attaches have not received much more news than anyone else, but they know enough to be sure the democracies are fighting for ‘keeps. The twin expectations that. Germany will soon suffer a social crackup or be soon starved out are considered quite groundless. Over a long period, the social crack-up is thought possible. There are foci of discontent, I such as the miners angered by the stretch-out, the Czech population and, curiously enough, ceriain powerful business groups. But three years is the minimum period mentioned by the experts for the discontent to take effect. As for the notion that German resources are inadequate for fairly protracted fig I ing, American General Staff statistics proving the contrary were published several months ago. At that time, the military observers believed that the Germans had supplies for ordinary needs in a war lasting at least a year and probably two. With Rumania’s oil and the raw materials of all Russia al her disposal, Germany has supplies for at least two years and probably three. In making this forecast, the experts take into account the shortage of German tank cars, the difficulties of transport from Prussia into Germany and all the other hopeful factors so much relied on by wishful thinkers. The Germans' inability to replace heavy industrial plants is not affected, however, by their successes in eastern Europe. The Three Wars With these misconceptions out of the way, the experts not two possibilities of a slightly different class. Germany may change the face of the war by going through Holland, Belgium or Switzerland, but is extremely unlikely to do so since these moves would open flanks unprotected by the west wall. jGermany and P.ussia may also join in a drive down through Southern Russia into Asia, endangering Iraq, Iran, French Syria, and even the Suez Canal. But this too 13 thought unlikely. Thus the military picture is reduced to a simple stalemate along the west wall and Maginot Line. As Germany is adequately supplied, the war at sea can only have a delayed effect. The war on the land cannot be decisive. The war in the air must end by tipping the balance one way or the other