Thed Wanganui Chronicle. THURSDAY, MARCH 21, 1940. HITLER’S GREAT CONCERN

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 84, Issue 68, 21 March 1940, Page 4

Thed Wanganui Chronicle. THURSDAY, MARCH 21, 1940. HITLER’S GREAT CONCERN

JITLER’S great concern is to avoid placing upon Germany Jhe strain of a major war. This strain, however, now appears to be unavoidable, and Hitler is meeting this situation in a masterly manner; he is presenting to the Genian people that they are to-day engaged in a war of defence. In furthering his suggestion that Germany is being besieged, he is aided by circumstances, for the Allies are actually doing their best to establish siege conditions. Hitler, however, does not feel that such a situation can remain as it is: hence the move to secure either another ally or a peace move which he can accept and so strengthen the will of his people to carry on the fight. When a country is fighting on the defensive it does so with a tremendous energy because self-preservation, being the first law of nature, prompts every effort of the defenders. Further, a defensive war is a war of necessity, there being no escape from it, and so the alternatives of continuing the war are not presented: there is but one course, and that course is to go on fighting. Hitler’s position, however, differs from that occupied by Mr. Chamberlain, in that, while the latter sought by all the means within his power to avoid an outbreak of war, the former deliberately planned both wars and territorial annexations, and lauded his own policy while it carried the appearance of success. The German people, for their part, however, cannot be expected to have forgotten entirely Hitler’s own assertion, made at the close of the Munich conversations, that he sought no other territorial adjustments inside Europe, and the German people cannot be unmindful of the fact that for years Germany and Poland had a non-aggression pact with each other, and that their relationships, other than in respect to tjje Corridor—which was not worth a major war —were pronounced to be wholly cordial by Hitler himself. The German people, therefore, carry in their minds some specific reservations concerning the causes of the war. These mental reservations, nevertheless, will not prevent them from fighting strenuously in defence of their country. But all the time they are fighting there will be a constant mindsearching process going on as to whether it would be possible by a process of restitution to Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland, to avoid the hardship, damage and loss of life which must necessarily be involved in the prosecution of a major war against first-class Powers. It is against the spread of this thought that Hitler has to shape his major policy to-day, and which has impelled him to the Brenner Pass. Prior to the treaty with Russia, Hitler was able to call upon the German people to defend themselves and Europe against the threatening wave of Bolshevism. That thought of the Russian menace remains in the minds of the German people, and they know that Hitler has brought that menace to the backdoor of Germany. The transfer of the German Bank to the Reich territories indicates to the German people the strength of this menace in a personal and intimate way. For Stalin to have effectively uprooted German settlements which were centuries old, and for Hitler to have proved himself unable to prevent this forced migration might—in German eyes—be the initial of many other ejectments. The retreat from Polish territory of German troops in the face of advancing Russian forces, has strengthened this fear of the Bolshevist menace. The desire of Hitler must be to sustain this fear of the Slav menace, because it keeps alive the defence psychology. Should, however, Stalin refuse to play the role which Hitler has assigned t 0 him—a dual and contradictory role of beneficent supplier of all things needful, and also that of the bogey man of Europe—and retire within Russia’s fastnesses, retaining its meagre smplusses, and making peace with her neighbours, then the situation becomes simpler for Hitler, but more hard to bear. Then he would lose economic, military and diplomatic and psychological support. The probability is stronger to-day that the view expressed in this column, namely, that Russia will become inactive, is the correct interpretation of her situation. One of the difficulties which faces Hitler is that he cannot easily frame the picture so that the Allies take on the characteristics of the Big Bad Russian wolf. The democracies, therefore, must undergo a metamorphosis in German eyes, and the method to be pursued to achieve that end is to put forward peace proposals before Mr. Sumner Wells returns 1o the United States and reports to his President. The offer which Hitler would make must be sufficiently attractive to make it appear genuine to German eyes, and so place upon the Allies the responsibility of continuing the war. Mussolini, however, is unlikely to adopt the role of honest broker because he is in the market for his own gain, and in any of his dealings with and for Hitler he will insist upon trading on a profitable basis. It is not surprising, therefore, to learn that when he broke off his conversation he was smiling, while Hitler’s visage was pale and overcast. Hitler’s necessity is Mussolini’s opportunity, and both know it.