The Wanganui Chronicle SATURDAY, APRIL 16,1938. CHINA’S GREAT MAN

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 80, Issue 89, 16 April 1938, Page 8

The Wanganui Chronicle SATURDAY, APRIL 16,1938. CHINA’S GREAT MAN

JT will be wen to guard against over-estimating the measure of success attained by the Chinese against the Japanese invader s, because just as the potential dangers in the position of the invaders are great, it is equally true that by executing quick retreats to prepared positions the Japanese may bring off a very successful counter-move. The danger with the Chinese is that they may move so far forward that they will become disorganised. The measure of future success will depend upon the ability of the Chinese -General Staff to maintain comprehensive command during the present phase of operations. To maintain such a command will be an exceedingly difficult task because of the large number of irregulars included in the Chinese armies. These irregulars are exceptionally free in their activities and cooperation is not one of their strong points. On the other hand the effectiveness of mechanised units has been emphasised in recent dispatches from Nanking. These mechanised units can never operate independently: first, because they must be consistently provided with motor fuel; second, because they must move against definite objectives; and third, because they must be directed by a well-informed staff by reason of the speed at which they operate. The staff off the Chinese army is German trained, German staff work has attained to a high order of efficiency, and German staff officers have remained with the Chinese throughout the recent operations. While the German-trained staff of the Chinese army may be expected to be efficient, it is not enough to account for the recent Chinese victories. The essential element in such a struggle is the personality of the leader.

For a long time now the Chinese have been suffering a series of reverses, and yet the defeatist spirit has not been in evidence. Rather has China become the more consolidated by these hammerings from the outside. More important still, the Chinese armies have not only kept in the field, but they have improved in efficiency and in equipment. To whom can these results be attributed"

The success of an army can never be wholly attributed to one man, but the Contribution of a leader to the success or failure of any cause must always be. large. It follows, then, that in viewing the success of the Chinese armies after such a long series of reverses it will be necessary to look to the leader. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek is, without doubt, the most important man in China to-day. Born in 1886, this man of fiftytwo years has sustained the morale of his countrymen. He knows the Japanese mind, having received his military training in the Japaense General Staff College at Tokio. In 1911 he became private secretary to Sun Yat-sen, the Father of the Chinese Republic, for whom Chiang was Commandcr-in-Chief in the campaign against the Northern Militarists. In April, 1927, he organised a counter-revolutionary coup against the Left Wing of the Kuomintang. Since 1928 he has been the real ruler of Nanking, but his power is said to be over-estimated abroad. He is said to require to continually manoeuvre inside his own Cabinet and also among different military rulers. Balancing himself between Left and Right in China, Chiang has followed a similar course in his foreign policy. He realised that the internal condition of China was such that it could not, make any economic advancement without foreign financial aid. At. early as April, 1927. he broke the political bond with Moscow and he turned to the United States of America. The railway construction plans of Sun Fo, who was Minister of Communications in the Nanking Government from 1928 to the, end of 1931, were based on an annual investment of 200.000,000 American dollars (roughly £40,000,000) over a period of fifty years, and during that period Americans were much in evidence, in advisory positions in China. American capitalists had, during the war period, become blooded 1o the Oriental market, and they dreamed of gaining control over the modernisation of China. Chiang’s policy, however, was to use every nation for the benefit of his own, and it was to London that he turned when he desired to supersede silver with a paper currency. On the Japanese invasion commencing, however, China found herself without active support from any country, either communistic or capitalistic. The League of Nations proved for her a bruised reed. China could look to none but herself for salvation, and for this task General Chiang Kai-shek has, up to now, proved himself of be adequate to his country’s needs.-