The Wanganui Chronicle MONDAY, MARCH 21, 1938. FRANCE AND FASCISM

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 80, Issue 67, 21 March 1938, Page 6

The Wanganui Chronicle MONDAY, MARCH 21, 1938. FRANCE AND FASCISM

J7RANCE has a natural fear of Fascism, first because it challenges democratic constitutions, second because there is an element within France itself which believes in an elected “strong man” with full powers of administrative activity, third, because of the inability of the people of France, to work efficiently a parliamentary system, and fourthly because dicatorships have always led France to ruin. The attitude of France toward the conflict in Spain is difficult to appreciate from this distance. There is a natural desire not to become engaged in what should be a purely civil conflict. There is also a wish not to enlarge the measure of intervention which Germany and Italy arc engaged in on the Iberian peninsula at the moment, but there is a real fear that Fascist influence may establish itself on the south of the Pyrenees and thereby practically encircle France with Fascist countries. If the intervention of Germany and Italy in Spain is not large, but sufficient to ensure the victory of General Franco, the measure of that intervention does not matter much, for it assures the end which France seeks to avoid. The British view is that a success by General Franco does not necessarily imply that Spain will go Fascist in the German and Italian sense, but the odds are that the pressure which is exerted to win the Spanish War will not be relaxed by either Germany or Italy in order to keep that country Fascist. Neither country s rulers have shown any niceness concerning either sovereignty or other phases of international law when their interests are to be served by ignoring them. * France has, up to now. followed a policy which makes a present of victory to Germany and Italy in Spain. During the campaign against the Basques, whyi German ’planes were bombarding open towns, the Government of France would not permit the passage of aeroplanes from Barcelona to Bilbao, and even escorted back to the frontier those which landed to refuel in the South of France. Further, even the supply of medicinal cotton for the treatment of the wounded was denied on the. ground that it might be used as guncotton. France has therefore done its best to aid its own enemies by encouraging the belief that France will take no overt action until attacked. It is true that France is now more deeply concerned than ever she was, because the lines of communication with her North African possessions are threatened in the Mediterranean, and in the event of a conflict the manpower of the North African countries would be required to defend the soil of France itself. Any attack upon the Mediterranean sea lanes, therefore, is an attack, on France. Italy, by virtually taking possession of the Balcreacs, has laid the foundation for such an attack and severance of the connections with Africa. France, however, wants a one-way trade in its military alliances, and is not prepared to stand by England when the former’s own interests are not involved. “Why should we go to war to save Britain’s Sudan interests?” was the question asked in France when the Abyssinian crisis was at its height. Now that the pincers are closing in on France, however, she is desirous of seeking British assurances that, she will assist Czechoslovakia, but Britain is not willing to allow France the initiative in the European drama of to-day, and consequently British diplomacy will not give to France that assurance which the latter seeks in respect to Czechoslovakia. Unofficially France may now be winking at a larger measure of assistance reaching the Government of Spain. Indeed, this is most probable. This connivance may even go further, and it is not improbable that French staff officers are now assisting the Barcelona Government in respect to the planning of the defences of Catalona Province. During the defence of Bilbao a French military officer presented a daily report to the President, of the Basque Government; the officer in question was Colonel .Taurcghuy, of the Chasseurs Alpins, and a member of Foch’s staff. His work was to point out the weaknesses of the defence, and because of Spanish incompetence there was much for him 1o do and to report on. Jaureghuy’s position was quite unofficial as far as the Government of France was concerned, but doubtless there are more of his kind willing to follow their own professional interest in war and further the interests of their own country by assisting a legal and properly-constituted Government to resist General Franco’s usurpation of power.