The Wanganui Chronicle. WEDNESDAY, JUNE 9, 1937. GERMANY AND ITALY

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 80, Issue 135, 9 June 1937, Page 6

The Wanganui Chronicle. WEDNESDAY, JUNE 9, 1937. GERMANY AND ITALY

JT ALY is in a weak position because, geographically, she is the most vulnerable country in Europe. This possibly is the spur behind Mussolini’s Mediterranean policy, which is to seek and secure sufficient power to seal up both the eastern and the western end of the inland sea. Despite assiduous efforts in both directions, however, it may be doubled whether Italy is capable of carrying out sueh a plan. Were the United Kingdom prepared to acquiesce in Italy’s dominance of the Mediterranean, then possibly Italy could come near to her objective.; but with the United Kingdom definitely accepting the Italian challenge, Italy is compelled to seek allies. In order to protect Venice and the northern Adriatic coast, Italy has patched up her quarrel with Jugoslavia, but that affords but slight protection. The whole of the western coast, os which are situated Italy’s principal towns and cities, still lies open to attack. This attack could be launched against Italy either from Marsailles, if the b'rench were involved, or from Malta and Gibraltar, at the western end, and from Egypt at the eastern end. The prospects of the British Royal Navy launching an attack against Italy are certainly remote, and this attack would not be made, save as a counterstroke. But the vulnerability is there, nevertheless. To afford Italy' an opportunity' to gain tho ascendency in the Mediterranean it would be necessary for the Royal Navy to be committed at the particular time in another theatre. A German challenge to Britain in the North Sea would suit Italy’s purpose very well indeed, but Italy has nothing to offer permany. It is therefore an attempt at a one-sided bargain. In diplomacy' Italy is more than a match for Germany, but even diplomatic ability cannot make for a deficiency in naval and military strength, and Italy has neither of these, nor has she financial resources necessary* to carry* on a large-scale naval or military operation. Further than this, it must be remembered that the treaty which bound Italy and Germany* prior to 1914, only served a limited purpose, namely, the holding in check of Italian demands upon Austria. No such or similar consideration is present to-day, and without that Germany has nothing to gain from an alliance o? a binding nature with Italy. Germany’s position is a fast deteriorating one, and her only hope of re-establishing her economy on sound lines is by outside financial aid. Germany would gladly* welcome a cessation of the armaments race, first, because she bears the financial strain involved with uneasiness, and second, because it would acquit her of being charged with borrowing money* to fight her backers. The prospect of any* nation, other than Great Britain, becoming a lender to Germany', is very* remote, and consequently Germany’s necessities compel her to do all that she can to reestablish a bond of goodwill with England. London is the natural source of Germany’s borrowings, not only* because there is a plentitude of money* at that centre, but also because of previous experience. The coalfields of the Ruhr, for instance, were first developed on British capital. Further, Germany has tried out much of her military equipment in Spain, and in that laboratory of military science several important defects have been revealed, particularly* in aviation. Germany is impressed with the greatly improved standard of British fighting- ’planes, and realises that the machines which Germany* has built will have to be replaced. Obviously, Germany would be unwise to ally herself with a bankrupt and vulnerable neighbour who could offer her no rewards. and as did Austria in 1914. might easily* involve her in an unprofitable military adventure in which the prospects of success were not of the highest.