WARSHIP FOR SELASSIE

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 79, Issue 125, 28 May 1936, Page 7

WARSHIP FOR SELASSIE

SERIOUS ITALIAN VIEW Received May 27. 11.55 p.m. LONDON, May 27. The Morning Post's Rome ‘ correspondent says that the British Government’s action in putting a warship at Haile Selassie's disposal lor the voyage from Haifa to Gibraltar has made the worst pos sible impression in Italian official circles, which forsee the danger ct a sanctionist rally promoted by the Emperor's presence i'-l England. In such event an atmosphere would created in which all chances of conciliation between Italy and England would be hopelessly lose. Italy is aware that many elements are combining to force forward t’-e question of sanctions in readiness for the League Council meeting c-n June 16 and responsible Italians regret that the already complicated situation should thus further be imperilled. It is officially insisted that -Italy cannot even discuss the question of any settlement, nor will any Italian initiative be forthcoming as long as sanctions remain. BOOKED BY ORFORD. GIBRALTAR, May 20. Passages for Haile Selassie and party have been booked on the Orford, sailing for England on Sunday. ABYSSINIAN DEFEAT SERIOUS MISTAKES MADE WAR CORRESPONDENT S VIEWS Received May 27, 11.55 p.m. PERTH, May 27. Reasons for the Abyssinian defeat were outlined by Captain Arnold Wineholt, war correspondent for the CourierMail, Brisbane, who passed through Fremantle on the liner Otranto en route for Brisbane. He said that the Abyssinians failed to grasp the true significance of guerilla warfare and but for the Emperor’s fleeting the Italians would now have had to deal with a well-planned Abyssinian retreat to the west which would have enabled them to hang out until the next rains.” Haile Selassie, added Captain Wineholt, was overwrought mentally and physically and could not b * blamed unduly. He had no strong, patriotic adviser, only cowardly interested persons. The Abyssinian fighting men were very brave and bore their wounds with great fortitude. The leadership among the high-ranking commanders was extraordinarily stupid. They could not learn the lesson of not trying to attack the ’ltalian position. If they had grasped that, or had been ready to learn, the position in Abyssinia would have been very different. The Abyssinian warriors were subjected to long-drawn-out starvation and the murderous operations of native brigands who were stirred by Italian propaganda and money and supplied with rifles and amnuiliition.