JAPAN’S HANDICAP

Wairarapa Times-Age, 7 August 1940, Page 6

JAPAN’S HANDICAP

SHORTAGE OF SHIPPING • I OVERLOOKED FACTOR. EFFECT OF EUROFEAN WAR. Though Japan ranks third in the world among the owners of merchant shipping, with 5.629.845 tons of vessels of over 100 tons, she has experienced an acute shortage of tonnage since the outbreak of Sino-Japanese hostilities, when so large a percentage of her ocean-going vessels were commandeered as military transports (writes the Shanghai correspondent of the “Sydney Morning Herald"). Japan has always been dependent to a large extent upon shipping under foreign flags lor her overseas trade, as the following figures of entries into Japanese ports will show: — 1935: Japanese ships, 13.935 <43.932.000 tons); foreign ships, 7969 (29,872.000 tons). 1938: Japanese ships. 11.456 (36,659.000 Ions); foreign ships, 7034 (25,-i 572.000 tons). 1939 (January-June): Japanese ships. 6117 (20.714.000 tons); foreign ships. 3805 (12.187.000 tons). The position was rendered more acute after lite outbreak of hostilities by the withdrawal from the Pacific trade of much American tonnage (from 3.750.000 in .1935 to 1.182.000 in 1939). WAR’S EFFECTS. The outbreak of European war ag-1 gravated the shortage of tonnage in the Far East. All German shipping services with the Pacific were suspended, and all German vessels in these waters took refuge in neutral ports. Many vessels under Allied flags wore taken off the Far Eastern runs. So that even before the successive invasion of Denmark, Norway, Holland, and Belgium, it was estimated that 1,250,000 tons of merchant shipping had been withdrawn from Oriental seas by neutrals and belligerents. ■ The shipping shortage in these waters became so acute that .despite exchange control, the Japanese Government found it necessary to authorise the purchase of charter of foreign bottoms to make up the deficit. Few ships, however, were for sale. The Allies, of course, would not have recognised the purchase of German shipping, and its transfer to the Japanese flag. They vetoed sales of their own tonnage. Andi neutrals were not in the market. All that Japan was able to do was to charter a small number of neutral ships, chiefly Norwegian. Following the invasion of Norway and Denmark, and the assumption of control over all Norwegian and Danish shipping by the Allies, the situation became more acute. Japanese ocean steamers had to be put on local serI vices, and there were grave fears that the Allied Governments would annul the charters of the twelve Norwegian vessels to Japanese interests. Representations to Britain and France resulted in a temporary arrangement under which charters were to be allowed to run out provided that the Norwegian vessels did not touch at ports in the U.S.S.R.. Scandinavia, the Netherlands East Indies, or Mexico, and certain prescribed routes were adhered to.

PRESENT POSITION. Statistics early in May revealed that the position had become even more serious, largely owing to the high percentage of Japanese shipping in dock, presumably as a result of excessive operation. It was slated that only some 116 ships, aggregating 1.200,6'56 tons, were plying on foreign services. while 507, of 2.865.142 tons, were engaged in "near sea" operations. (These figures applied only to freighters of over 2000 tons). The invasion of Holland and Belgium brought about an even more critical situation, as can be realised when some comparative figures arc given. On the outbreak of war the total tonnage of world shipping (vessels of over 100 tons), was 68.509.432, of which 21.001.925 . sailed under the British flag. French tonnage was 2.933.933. and when Danish <1.129.859). Norwegian (4,853.813), Dutch (2.969.578). and Belgian (408.418) came under Allied control. it raised their total tonnage to 32.277.526. Even making a generous allowance of 2o per cent lor vessels destroyed, damaged, or caught in home ports by the invaders, the Allies would still have control of 26,622.021 tons oi shipping. Of the balance America owns 11.470.177 tons, none of which is available for transport between any part of the world and belligerent ports. Italy's tonnage is 3.424.804. and such of it as is not already in the Mediterranean lias been captured or immobilised since she entered the war against the Allies. The shortage of tonnage in the Far East is likely to become an incrcasingly serious factor in Japan s domestic and" foreign policies. Many services of vital importance to Japan s ovcisc.i trade and supplies have already had to be drastically reduced. The demand for tonnage I' o1 ’ military and commercial use between Japan and Chinn is increasing. Il was admitted early in April that Japan's export trade would be more or less seriously affected unless efl’ective counter-measures could be put into effect. But no one seems to have been able to suggest a remedy. BRITISH SEA POWER'S REACH. Japanese chauvinists who advocate intervention in the Netherlands Last Indies evidently overlook the bear-

ing of the shipping shortage. Not only is Japan's own tonnage insufficient to take care of her own vital requirements; there is not the least doubt that a move against the Dutch possessions would result in the immediate suspension of Allied and American shipping services with Japan. It would, therefore, be a physical impossibility to dispatch a large expeditionary force to these territories by I sea, while at. the same time meeting ( the requirements of the army in China, and carrying on trade with such countries as did not immediately close their . ports to vessels under the Japanese flag or plying with Japan. The exigencies of the European con- i flict prevent Great Britain from send-| ing a strong fleet to the Far East. Bul| ( British sea power is making itself felt p almost as ofl'oetivcly by its control over'; so large a percentage oi' world ship-1 | ping. This i;> a point it is well to re-! member when attention is eoncenlrated , upon land warfare. Nations dependent upon overseas trade, without sufficient tonnage •I. cope with it. can only expect the Al-1‘ lied Governments Io place surplus ton-1 nage al their disposal if their neutral-L ity and goodwill are above suspicion. Unless Japan can manage Io extricate ' herself from her present China adven-1 lure quickly and on honourable terms. 1 her shipping position will daily become |' mon? acute.