Science.

Wairarapa Standard, Volume XVIII, Issue 1702, 3 July 1885, Page 2 (Supplement)

Science.

The Genesis of the Human Mind. Two lectures, bearing the title “ Is the Human Mind of Animal Origin ?’’ have been lately delivered at the London Institution by Mr. Georgs John Romanes, M.A , LL.D , F.R.S., Secretary of the Linnaean Society. Assuming the truth of the general theory of evolution, both as regards bodily structure and mental organization, so far as the lower animals are concerned, the lecturer explained in his opening lecture last week that even among evolutionists there was still a difference of opinion on the question whether the mind of man admitted of being wparJe i as the product of a natural genesis—in other words, wbetuer the human mind was of animal origin. Considering the question first on purely a priori grounds, Mr Romanes observed that if it were admitted, in accordance with his original assumption, that the process of organic and of mentalevolution has been continuous throughout the whole region of life and mind, with the one exception of the mind of man. it becomes antecedently improbable that the process of evolution should have been interrupted at its terminal phase. And, indeed, looking to the very large extent of the analogy on which this consideration is founded, he thought that the presumption raised could only be fairly counterbalanced by some very cogent and unmistakable facts proving the virtual impossibility of animal intelligence passing into human. Next he pointed out that in the case of every human being there is presented to actual observation a process of gradual development, ot evolution, extending from a zero level of mental life in infancy and culminating, perhaps, in genius. Moreover, so long as the human mind is passing through the lower phases of its development, it ascends through a scale of mental faculties which are pari passu identical with those that are presented permanently by the psychological speoies of the animal kingdom. Lastly, it is a matter of actual observation that in the history of the human race, as recorded in documents, traditions, antiquarian remains and flint implements, the intelligence of the race has been subject to a steady process of gradual development. Thus, on the whole, a strong prima facie case is made out in favor ot the view that the human mind, like everything else in organic nature, has been evolved. Leaving the a priori side of the question. Mr. Romanes next turned to the side ot direct evidence. _ Here the problem that stood for investigation was that of comparing the faculties of brute witn those of human intelligence, in order to ascertain the points wherein they agree or differ; tor thus only can the probability be finally determined as to whether the one order of intelligence is continuous or discontinuous with the other. If we had regard to the emotional faculties of brutes, we could not fail to be struck by the broad fact that the area of psychology which they cover is nearly coextensive with that which is covered by the emotional faculties of man. After showing that instincts are common to the brute and the man (although preponderating in the former), Mr. Romanes passed on to consider the faculty of reason. He maintained that although this faculty greatly preponderates in man, it is also true, in the words of Milton, that the lower animals " reason not contemptibly.” The only explanation of there being any difference of opinion upon this point is, according to Mr. Romanes, because different writers use the term “reason” in different senses, it being often understood self-consciousness and introspective thought. But if the term were restricted to its only proper meaning, there could be no question as to the rationality of brutes. This meaning is that of ratiocination, or the drawing of inferences from the perceived equality of relations, i.c., of inferring results from past experience. The lecture was profusely illustrated with examples of emotional and rational actions on the part of animals. The second lecture, which was delivered yesterday evening, was devoted to a consideration of all the points of difference between : animal and homaninteU^^^Ju|jJMij

which was cha- a cteriall(! Ui LUU Uliimill IUiL.., and which consented the basis of all the other differences. The question, therefore, for evolutionists was to explain the growth of abstraction; and, as all psychologists were agreed that abstraction depended upon language, the whole question became resolved into this—Why had man alone of animals been gifted with the Logos Now, in its essence the Logs* consisted in the power ef predication, or of expressing a judgmant/ “ ,I the bruts could think ‘is,’ and bn P would be brothers.” Was c <”- able that the power o! predication cou been developed by way of a natural genesis? To answer this question in the affirmative, Mr. Romanes argued that animate undoubtedly possessed germ the faculty of makina aien purpose of intentionally commm*(*r feelings and ideas. The gijjnß whjln they made were necessarily reI E r r if«d to those of tone and gesture, except case of the talking birds, where alone IjJKnatomioal conditions required for the .‘•uttering of articulate sounds were present. j Evidence was then given to show that talking i birds and children when first beginning to I speak learned by special association correctly to name objects, qualities, actions, and desires. This first stage of spoken language Mr. Romanes distinguished as the denominative stage, and observed that it would certainly be exhibited by domesticated monkeys, seeing that they were both more intelligent and more imitative than birds, if any of them had j happened to have been able to articulate. 1 ,>ow, if once the name of an object and the lame of a conspicuous quality belonging to the object were used in apposition, the copula vas latent in thought, and only required a j farther advance of abstraction itself to become I w object of thought. The only requisite to j this further advance was the growth of selfj consciousness (which was shown to arise in | children from the naming of self as an object), and thus the denominative ' tage of | language passed into the predicative stage. Mr.° Romanes concluded by arguing that, given a species of anthropoid apa v> ith tha power of uttering articulate sounds, and there would hs no more reason for wondering that this passage from the denominative to \ the predicative stags of language should have i taken place in the brute, than there was for 1 wondering that it took place in the child.