A VOICE FROM THE EMPIRE CITY.

Wairarapa Standard, Volume 11, Issue 1302, 30 April 1881, Page 2

A VOICE FROM THE EMPIRE CITY.

I wdl not waste your space m giving nly reasons for addressing you oil a which would be better .sifted ( iii the Coaij d paratively populous ” Empire Citj-:" It is to be hoped that we may not be long witlri y out a paper through which truth may be spread, In the issue of the Post 23rd April, one signing himself “ Democrat,*j in a very well meant letter on the subject of “ the late Lord Beaconsfield,’’ entertained a very grave error with regard the Suez canal trick. He says ■■ it is a fact generally admitted that the securing of the great interest in the Suez Canal from the Khedive of Egypt was the most brilliant stroke of policy 11 in the whole of the late Earl’s extraordinary career." I write this reply to prove not that it was not as good a trick as any of his other dodges, but that it had and has a suicidal tendency, that in point of fact Disraeli has endangered the omnipotent influence which the English (as shipowners) possessed, and that if he had started with the intention of doing the English interest the largest amount of damage possible he could not have chosen • a better course than the one he followed for an object totally opposite. Of course such people as your humble servant, who has no time to think them matters out must depend for information on those who have, therefore I may at once say that I have adopted the opinion of Leone Levi, who in a lecture at the King's College on the subject of "the commercial importance and economic value of the Suez Canal” supplies the information alluded to. I do not dispute that many thought the purchase a “ good move” —but Mr L. L. shows that all the English (whose interest was and is tenfold that of any other nation, and nearly three times that of all the nations combined) condemned the enterprise when they might have secured the administration of it. After showing the great interest England has with the concern Mr L. L. says " the first Napoleon predicted that the time would come when the Turkish Government would glory in carrying out such a work and Mr de Lesseps had in our days fulfilled the prediction, spite of all opposition, detraction, and evil prognostication, The Canal, it was said would be a stagnant ditch, filled up with the deposit of the Nile and the sand of the desert. That the lakes through which it was to pass would be filled with salt, the the navigation of the Red Sea was dangerous, that there was a difference of level between that sea and the Mediterranean, that shipping would never be able to approach Port Said; and that in short the whole thing was a foolish proposal. Next political objections were urged especially by Great Britain. The Canal, it was said, was intended especially to transfer the trade of the East from England to France The Pasha of Egypt might sever his connection with Turkey. It was not the interest of England that there should be a water passage between the Mediterranean and ths Sudian Ocean at the command of any other power than England. Lord Palmerston declaimed that the project could never bo carried out except at an enormous loss of money and human life, and that as a commercially remunerative enterprise it was a mere bubble. And then came the engineering difficulties of the late Mr Stephenson, who wondered at the idea of cutting a Canal through a desert 80 miles long, argued that so far as the tranit of passengers and merchandise was concerned the project would lead to no saving of time, and expressed the opinion that if not absurd it was impracticable.

From the above, “ Democrat” will see that much importance cannot be attached to the opinions of people who did all in their power to deprive England of immense benefit and who when it was thrust upon them advised the " grand move' 1 which turns an interest, secured by the interests of all the world, into a private (nationally) affair, likely to be en« dangered by war, However let Mr L. Levi speak with regard to this “grand move.'' He would say nothing about the unbusiness* like manner in which the purchase wa* made or the extravigant commission paid upon it; but he asked was it becoming of the British Government to enter into such a transaction purely from political motives, and whether there was reason to fear that those shares being in the hands of one State might prove inconvenient and dangerous in the future ; and if the British Government swayed the consols of the company it might not give rise to serious dissensions and jealousies ? Then suppose that when Governments were to buy up the remaining shares, would there be security for the main, tenance of the Canal against the dangers of political complications ? Again, could Eng. land alone assume a paramount right ove* the Canal if her co-partners objected ? Nor should it be forgotten that the possession of Khedives shares would not give us an ab« solute majority in the administration of the Canal, whilst the French influence must always exist so long as the principal direc* tion is French and the bulk of the capital was supplied by Frenchmen. At thejsame 1 time as three-fourths of the receipts came from British shipping. No other nation could have so great an interest it the man. agement of the Canal. Now mark Mr Levi's question, “but whose fault was it that England had not acquired a supreme in. fluence in the undertaking ? It was in her power to have acted otherwise, but she would not do so though she had the deepest interest in bringing the East and West together,'* After enumerating many advantages the lecturer adds “ the opening of the Canal had also given an enormous” stimulus to the building of steamships. In 1869 we had 938,000 tons of steam vessels, whilst in 1876 we had 2.005,000 tons, hence the supremacy of England in the Suez Canal. On the other hand France had only 200,000 tons; Germany 180,000, and all the other Eun> pean states together perhaps 400,000. He goes on to show that in 1876 the trade of the United Kingdom with Sudra, the Straits, Ceylon, China. Japan. &c., all of which sooner or later would have to use steamships, amounted in 1876 to or 24 per cent of the entire trade of Great Britain. The future of the Canal was practically iu the hands of its administrators, and if there was war in the East let them be careful not to imperil a commercial undertaking with political movements,

From the above it would appear that eminent thinkers do not look upon the " grand move’’ as all wisdom, but on the contrary that it is the very essence of foolishness, the gigantic British interests in the Suex Canal by rendering its management subject to political dodges. One is afraid to contemplate the damage possible to be done to British commerce in the event of a war in the East, which it is well known Lord Beaconslield was bringing on. I dont know if the subject is worthy of your notice, if it is it will help to fill a column quite as well as any other subject