GERMANY’S GREATEST GHOUL.

Waipawa Mail, Volume XXXVII, Issue 7914, 4 August 1917, Page 3 (Supplement)

GERMANY’S GREATEST GHOUL.

WHY HINDENBURG WOULD NEVER, TAKE PRISONERS, AND HOW HE FORCED THE RUTHLESS U-BOAT CAMPAIGN. Hindenburg has been the chief and most constant advocate of Germany’s policy of terrorism and 1 frightfulnesb since the outbreak of war. Terrible as have been Germany’s atrocities hi Belgium, they probably would have been worse had Hindenburg been in command on the Western Front at the outbrerJk of war. Hindenburg has boasted that what the German troops did in Belgium was child’s play to what h ; s troops did in Russia —a grim boast, ana the full and fearful meaning of which we shall probably never learn. The Prussian policy of frightfulness and terrorism in war has been advocated by its supporters on the grounds that such a policy is calculated to slu'bdue and conquer an enemy in the shortest possible time. But Hindenburg, I verily believe, is an advocate of frightfulness for its own sake. The manner in which Hindenburg dleveistated the country on the line of his retrea.tym Franco is evidence of this. There was no object o,f the s/ightest military Va'luo to be gained in the way he burnt and destrqved towns and villages. It was simply wanton destruction. KILL ALL PRISONERS. There have been differences of opinion among miltarists as to the utility of different forms of frightfulness. For example, Ludendorf and 1 von Falkenbayn were, at least, not among the warmest advocates of Zeppelins being used to bomb open and undefended’ towns. But Hindemburg is the open, avowed, determined! advocate />f all forms of i rig'htfiulness, and the more terrible they are the more enthusiastically does he support their use. A doctor who knew Hindenburg well, not in a professional capacity, for the General never needed the services' of a physician, told me that Hindenburg, when once talking of the rule? of civilised warfare, said that if he had his own wav lie would never take any prisoners of war. “They are a needless encumbrance,” ho said. “You have to feed and look after them; except in the case of the total surrender of an anripr I would never take prisoners'.” When the doctor suggested’ that two could play ati that game Hindenburg* replied: “ Yes, of course, hut that would not matter; if I lose a thousand men t docs not matter to me a .jot whether they are killed or taken prisoners. They are of no further use to me.” Hindenburg’s absolute disregard l for the lives of his own soldiers is, however, not shared in general by the German people or even by other militarists. The sort of frightfulness that appeals to the Germans is the kind that they can practise without fear of reprisals. SUBMARINE WARFARE. To do Hindenburg justice, the fear of reprisals) is not one that troubles him. From the start of the submarine campaign. Hinidenburg advocated! tiho unrestricted use of the U-iboats. This brought him into conflict with Beth-mann-Hollweg and the Kaiser, and even some of the Kaiser’s generals. Hindenburg’s opponents were, no doubt, actuated by political rather than by humane consideiNations, for they daw that the absolutely unrestricted u<se of the U-boat? wouidil, if it did not bring them into conflict with the whole of the neutral world, alienate the sympathy of every neutral fiom Germany. H’ndenburg was summoned to see the Kaiser on the subject. He saw the Emperor alone. What took place between them 1 don’t know, but I was informed on reliable authority that Hindenburg put his views on the matter bluntly before the Emperor. “If we win the Avar,” he said, “it will not matter a jot to us' how ive Avin it. If we lose it, the reckoning avc shall have to pay will not be appreciably lessened by our refraining now from making full use of all the weapons- at our disposal.” Hinde'nburg’s advice, hqr.vever, for the moment Avas overruled. It Avas not until twelve months later that the Kaiser and Bethmann-Hol'lweg AA’ere compelled by the popular outcry in favour of the unrestricted use of the U-boats, ail outcry encouraged and fostered as far as possible by Hindenburg, to adopt the General’s policy. IN SUPREME CONTROL. T may mention that this particular form of frightfulness, ever since the sinking of the Lusitania, is one that specially appeals to the German people, for they cannot very well entail on them any form of reprisals. It is' not like ill-treating prisoners of war or putting them to death. Hindenburg is now in a position that he probably never in his Avildest dreams thought he would occupy. He is practically in supreme control of the direction of the German army and navy. Probably he knows that the Central Empires can never win the war. But I fancy that is not a consideration that troublas him much. His whole thought and energies will be directed to maintaining the German resistance us long as possible. He has publicly stated that Germany could maintain her resistance for another thirty years; whether it would be possible for Germany to do that or not need not be discussed. It .seem? on the face of it extremely improbable that she could. But one thing is practicably certain that ere another thirty years have passed Hindenburg will have passed out of the land of the living, and Avhat may happen then does not trouble him. All that Hindenburg cares about is that he may hold the position he hoav occupies as long as possible, and l so long as be can avoid an actual defeat on sea. or land he will probably continue to hold it, unless and until the internal situation in Germany makes it impossible for the Germans' to continue the struggle. AFRAID TO FIGHT. For how long Hindenburg may be able to avoid a battle Avit.li the forces that are gradually pushing him back on the Western Front I don’t pretend to say. That is a question that only a military expert in possession of all the facts governing the military situation could express an opinion on of any value. But there is, 1 think, no doubt that Hindenburg will not allow the suffeiings of the civil population in Germany to interfere Avith his plans in the field! He will not .hesitate to suppress internal disorder in Germany toy the most ruthless methods, and in dloing this) lie will certainly have at liis back the support of the Kaiser and all sections of the militarist party. Hindenburg is in the position of a man Avith a pack of starving Avolves behind him and a foe better armed and! equipped than lie in front. He can keep the Avolves at bay Avibhout much trouble toy shooting them, but lie will not risk a fight with his foe in front as' long as he can avoid it. When ultimatelv compelled to fight, it Avould not surprise mo if Hindenburg ended his career on the battlefield.