How Goes the Fight?

Star (Christchurch), Issue 12084, 13 August 1917, Page 2

How Goes the Fight?

HOTES m IE WAR, THE POS!TiI .ANALYSED, CHRISTCHTTRCH. August 13. In continuation of the earlier offensive, the British on Friday attacked on a two-mile front east of Ypres, completing the occupation of We-sthoek village and ridge. The advance involved a good deal of heavy fighting, even though the objectives were near at hand, and on the righ'i the attack appears to have jncountered particularly pevere opposition. The purpose of these local operations is to gain possession of the main ridge running north-east from Hollebsks and ihe once-famous Hill 60 to the neighbourhood of Zonnebeke. This piece of rising ground, which at its highest, point reaches no more than 200 feet, is the northern continuation of the Wytschaste ridge. In length the portion now under attack is about six miles, from the gap through which runs •the Ypres-Gomines railway to tha saddle crossed by the Ypres-Roulers railway, and there is another extension northwards for a. couple of miles past Pass-' chendaele. The southern part -of tha main ridge east of Ypres is held by the British, but they will have to push eastto Gheluvelt and north-east past Zonnebeke before they have the whole of it. Then, no doubt, measures will be taken to clear the Pfissehondaele and Moorsled a hills, drpriving it he enemy of all th e higher ground in this region.

The raid carried out east of Monchy must have been organised on quite an 'elaborate scale. The invention of the trench raid is said to have been due to a Canadian ofucer. The old practice in making a reconnaissance was to attack the enemy's front trenches, by surprise if possible, kill or capture the occupants and then sit. down and wait for the inevitable counter-attack. It was a costly business, because the casualties in occupation were always much heavier than those suffered in the actual attack. The enemy had the range of his own trendies and bombarded energetically, and as often as not the counterattack ejected the reconnoitring force. The trench raid bar, manifest advantages. It may be undertaken as a surprise attack, or, more often, it is preceded by a, heavy bombardment, lasting half an hour or more, which drives the enemy underground and incidentally plays havoc with his entanglements. At the- appointed moment the shellfira lengthens, a, barrage is created, and the raiders—now always specially trained for the work—make their dash. They kill the Germans who resist, bomb and destroy dug-outs and machine-gun posts, collect maps and documents and prisoners, and return to their own trenches. The reconnaissance is quite as complete as it used to be, and the raiders' casualties are comparatively very light.

The Germans, of course, always refer to raids as "attacks" In one sense they are attacks, but there is no intention of pressing them home, and the attackers do not plan to remain in possession of the enemy's trench. A definite time is generally allotted for the operations. Sometimes the enemy is alert and stops "the raid at the outset, and sometimes he comes out from underground or from shelter trenches in force, and a hand-to-hand fight occurs. But the primary purposes are the infliction of casualties and the gathering of information, and the intention is the same whether the raid is carried out on a front of half a mile or of three miles. The Monchy raid was a, big affair, and probably it had tho special purpose jf destroying the strong posts and trench fortifications built up by the enemy during the period of comparative quiet. Sooner or later Sir Douglas Haig is bound to return to the attack on this sec-tor, and when the time comes it is probable that the offensive will have as a prelude a series of local attacks on the flanks of the salient which the enemy still holds between Bullecourt and Monchy.

There has been a revival of fighting immediately north of St Quentin, where the Germans attacked on a narrow front on Friday and obtained a footing in the front Allied trench. A French counter-attack virtually restored the line. Fayet must be near the junction of British and French lines. In the advance earlier in the year British and French were both taking part, in the operations around St Quentin, the 'French attacking from the south and south-west, while the British attacked from the west and north-west. A subRpr.iTn*-. r.'-nnr/r»;npnt transferred the wbole St Quentin sector to the French, a wis6 change which obviated the possibility oi any weakening of attack or defence through misunderstandings. IC may bo recalled that during the Sonrme battle similar changes were occasionally made to facilitate the combined | operations, as when the British, who had occupied Los Bceufs and Morval, transferred, the latter village to the French, in vipw of the launching of an attack ou Sailly-Saillisel.

Broadly speaking, the news concerning the Prussian froiu, as far south as the Sucz-wa valley is fairly satisfactory this morning, i.i that enemy attacks havo boon beate.'i off, and the Russians have even been counter-at-tacking with effect immediately south of. the Pruth. But while one cannot say that tho position in the Bukovina and northwards does not give cause for anxiety, it is obvious that the Rumanian front demands more urgent, attention. Von Mackensen is pressing a strong offensive on the Focsani sector, with tho Archduke co-operating in tho Oasin, Oitoz, Usu and Trotus valleys. •Tho effect of the drive-will apparently be to compel the Russians and Rumanians to fa.ll back to the line of the Sereth | as far north as %3 confluence of the I Trotus. They will presumably our to defend the Trotus line, especially if tho enemy's advance in the Bukovina and Northern Moldavia can be checked, but thA outcome may be. and, indeed, ia likely to be, that the advanced positions will be abandoned, and the Sereth line defended. If von Mackensen ca.n force the crossing of the Lower Sereth it may be necessary for the Allies to retreat to the Pruth, but in the meantime it appears that a general withdrawal to the Sereth is the most probable development.

The local Italian operations on the CarsOj rectifying tha irregular front ba-

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fcween Boscomalo and Gastagnavizza, call for no special comment, beyond the observation that the "doline" included within the Italian lines are small vallejß and depressions. ''The numerous small, hidden valleys, which open out suddenly and unexpectedly,*' says a semi-official account, written last year, " seem like small craters, each of which hides deep grottoes and mysterious holes. Behind the high clumps of stones which accumulate in them the Austrians have placed quick-firing guns and entrenched themselves so strongly that the conque'st of each one means a hard-fought battle. In the grottoes big guns have been placed, and the entrance closed with armour-plate, which hides the cannon as soon as it has been fired. The character of the ground makes it impossible to locate these masked batteries, even by aviators." The account, while it refers generally to the "doline" of the Carso, will sufficiently indicate the sort of fighting that • may be involved in the inclusion of a few "doline" within the Italian linea.