WAR NOTES.

Star (Christchurch), Issue 11948, 6 March 1917, Page 7

WAR NOTES.

GERMAN DIPLOMACY

THE PEACE OVERTURES

[From Ora Correspondent.] LONDON, December 2S,

Matters arising out of the German, peace overtures are so inextricably mixed up with questions affecting the future prosecution of the war that it is quito impossible to keep them separate. Gor many has simply called in her diplomacy to tho assistance of her big guns, her submarines, and all the other paraphernalia of tho war. For that reason we have'to regard tho German pcaco overtures, aud the neutral intervention which these peace overtures have brought in their train, from tho point of view of their probable effect on future military operations. From tho enemy's standpoint the flying of this peaco kite was as much part and parcel of a settled campaign as was von Hindenburgs spectacular invasion of Rumania. That Germany ardently desires peace no one doubts for a single moment. And, German psychology being what it is, your modern German, with his hands dyed red with the blood of hundreds of thousands of men who have fallen victim to his lust of world dominion, is still able- to pcrs'aade himself, after trampling under foot every law* of Heaven and earth, that in offering peace now he is really acting our. of motives of humanity. People who are not cursed with the Teutonic psychology recognise, on the other hand, that these peaco overtures havo their promptings not in the call of humanity but in dictates of prudence suggested by a careful study of Germany's existing military and economic position in the Avar. This is not to say that the position is positively desperate. It can only bo desperate if Austria has told, her Ally that sho intends to conclude a separate peace, and as to this wo necessarily do not possess the necessary information to enable us to express an opinion. Alike on military and economic grounds Austria's position is infinitely worso than that of Germany. The possibility, therefore, that Austria, with a new Emperor at the head of affairs, will refuse any longer to be dragged along at the chariot wheel of Germany is not one which ought to bo entirely dismissed. But until we havo clearer proof than is available at present that this is tho actual position it would not be wise to pin our faith to any such development. THE FOOD SHORTAGE. If Austria were to conclude a separate peace with the Entento Powers the whole military and -economic position of Germany would, of course, be tandamentally altered, and if we did not find her suing lor peace immediately a military decision in favour of 'the. Allies might in any caso be looked for in a, very few months. But providing always that she can hold Austria to tier allegiance Germany's resources should still suffice to hold her enemies at bay for some timo longer. That sho is feelmg the effect of our naval blockade with ever increasing severity is patent to everyone. But the best military minds in Europe have always taken the view that the economic factor alone would never suffice to bring Germany to her knees and force her to an unconditional surrender. People in Germany who are not directly or indirectly engaged 011 war work are probably living at this moment under conditions of semi-starvation. But the German army itself is well fed. Tho evidence derived from prisoners affords evidence of this. Soldiers who arc actually in tho fighting line not only obtain nil 'they require but are in tho enjoyment of what, in any other campaign but this, would have been regarded ns positive luxuries. Tho German armies which are held in reserve are less well fed. They get as much plain food as they need, but they get no luxuries. It is only when you ges lower down the military scale that yen begin to discover the real effects of our naval blockade. Soldiers who are on garrison duty and who are on tho lines of communication are on reduced rations and the same remarks seems to apply to irany engaged on munition work. All this, of course, is a tribute to German organisation. Germany cannot disguise the economic pressure from which she i.-; suffering, ! but she has so ordered her household as to ensure that this economic pressure shall not assist the Entente Powers to obtain a military decision. GERMANY'S ASSETS.

Thero is another consideration which has doubtlessly played its part, in inducing Germany to seek peace at the present moment. She probably recognises that from this time onward her decline must he rapid, and patent, to the whole world. She has reached the summit of her military successes in the war and that being so she doubtlessly feels that she has more to barter with now than she can hope to possess six or even three months hence. She retains in her hands practically the whole; of Belgium, her line through northern France has not been fundamentally altered since the battle of the Marne, Serbia and Rumania have hjecn overrun, and a big strip of Russian territory continues to bo held by her armies. With all this to bai'ter with she conceives that the present is a favourable moment for offering to smoke the pipe of peace. And even if this offer is not entertained Germany clearly hopes to derive certain incidental advantages from its rejection. Some of these advantages she realised when President Wilson made his ill-timed intervention, and. Germany still hopes to entangle the Entente Powers into an acceptance at least of a conference at which terms of peace might be discussed at a round table. But the object of this cunning suggestion of a conference are so obvious that the proposal assuredly will not be accepted. Mere common sense suggests that whilst the Allies nre in general agreement as to tho terms on. which they wo'uld entertain peace and as to the re-shaping of the map of Europe which must follow after the war, there must be many points of detail which still await settlement and even consideration. If a peace conference took place the representatives of the Entente Powers would be forced to discuss these details in the presence of the enemy, and we may be quite sure that Germany would use her best

endeavours to aggravate and accentuate any differences of view which she might detect. THE HEEL OF ACHILLES, The German peace overtures appear to be having a certain subtler influence, on the military counsels of the Allies which even Berlin may not' quite have foreseen. Rightly or wrongly, as has already been indicated, Germany's tendor of peace given rise to an impression that Austria at least is in a parlous state and may at any time seek to conclude a separate peace. This impression has tended to bring into prominence once more the views of the Eastern school of military strategist*. These experts have always maintained that the quickest way to end the war is to administer a knock-out blow to Austria rather than to continue beating our heads against the iron wall of the Western front. They arguo that such a plan of campaign affords opportunity of closer co-ordination with Russia, and they remind us that tho south-eastern theatre of the war has always been regarded as constituting for the Central Power s the vulnerable heel of Achilles. The- suggestion that a little more pressure is all that is necessary to bring Austria to her knees constitutes unquestionably tho strongest argument that can bo deduced on behalf of the Eastern school. But tin* disadvantages of such a policy are held! by most to outweigh its advantages, and not the least of the disadvantages is the strain which would bo imposed on our shipping in conveying the necessary troops and supplies to Salonika and such other ports and bases as might be secured. This strain is severe already and no one can say to what extent 'it will be further aggravated as German submarine activity develops. And if at the end of it ail Austria were found to be less vulnerable than wo fondly believe those responsible for the strategy of the Allies would have good reason to reproach themselves for their departure from the accepted axiom that a military decision is to be sought at the point where tho enemy is to be found, not at his weakest, "hut at his strongest. And this axiom applies with especial force where one of the two belligerents is fighting, as Germany is fighting, on interior lines. Because it must he obvious to anyone that Germany can transport her armies from one theatre of tho war to anqther with much greater celerity than the Allies could hopoto do if they listened to the syren voice of the strategists of tho Eastern school. WEST VERSUS EAST. Happily there is not much fear that this mistake, as tho present writer humbly regards it, is likely to be committed. The advantages of our continuing to concentrate our main energies on the Western front- are somanij test that they hardly need to be pointed out. First and foremost it is the front that stands nearest to our own doors. The difficulties of transport, though not inconsiderable, are not by any means insurmountable. The sea passage involved is a very short one, affording a minimum of opportunities to German submarines. On French soil we are operating in friendly territory with no lines of communication behind us which may be menaced, and with excellent roads and railways at our disposal. In the unlikely event of a German invasion of our shores the 'Western front is the theatre whence we could most readily recall troops. Tho fact that we have just taken over yet a further slice of the French line suggests that these considerations are fully appreciated by those who have the final voice in deciding the Allied strategy in the war. That we should take over a portion of the French front at the first convenient opportunity that presented itself was foreshadowed in this column .some time ago, when the writer ventured to point out that those who were urging this course on Sir William Robertson and Sir Douglas Plaig were really engaged in the unprofitable pastime of forcing an open door. A proof of the correctness of this view comes at a very timely moment if it gives pause to those who showed a disposition to give a hesitating endorsement to the Eastern school of strategists. It is in the Western theatre, as may be made manifest sooner than some people oxneer. that a military decision in the wur is to bo looked for.