THE FALL OF NAMUR.

Star (Christchurch), Issue 11216, 23 October 1914, Page 8

THE FALL OF NAMUR.

COSTLY INACTION. • BELGIAN LOSSES, 14,01$). "SAUVE QUI PEUT!" [Fbom Our Correspondent.) - ' LONDON, September IS. Ono-of tho bitterest blows to (lie.Allies' hopes and plans in the earlier iiogvs Jt tile campaign in the wo stern <• theatro. was the totally unexpected collapse of the Belgian defence of Namur. What this startling German success cost the Allies in the long run may never he really known, but to tho Kaiser's army operating in Belgium the speedy reduction of this stronghold was indeed "a gift from the Rods," for had Namur emulated Liege, its reduction must have cost the Germans thousands of men, and tho detention in its neighbourhood of a big force of all arms, which its speedy collapse set free for use against tho already hard-pressed Allies elsewhere. Moreover, the capture of Namur gave the German soldiers back the confidence; the gallant defence of Liege • had knocked of them, and what was ■perhaps more valuable still, the huge • 'store of provisions in tho forts—including, it ,t9; understood, not less than three million . daily rations, became available to supplement the Germans' store of- provender, thus relieving to a •very appreciable extent indeed tho strain under which it is now known their commissariat showed unmistakable signs of breaking down. JPhe failure of Namur to offer a- more piotracted resistance was inexplicable at the time of its' fall, and tho accounts " of their experiences given by the kui'vivors of the garrison have,, therefore, considerable intere-st. As is known, Namur was strongly protected by modern : forts, which had, during the three weeks' respite afforded by the heroic defence of Liege, been further strength-ened-in .nil sorts of ways. Largo areas had been mined, the field of live from the forts had been cleared of obstacles, / while liarbed-wire obstructions carrying olectrie currents of 1500 volts covered s|ll the approaches. In Namur itself immense stores of ammunition and provisions had been accumulated, and it ■was confidently . anticipated that its siege , would occupy the Germans j weeks and its capture cost them at least j , 50,000 men. Instead, it fell practicallv j at the first attack, and it is estimated that its'-fall and the retreat of the Bel-gian-troops from it coour gallant allies fully 14,000 in killed, wounded and prisoners. ( SOMEONE HAD BLUNDERED. •It. is not for the British to attempt to /ipportion the blame (if any) for NaHiur's downfall, but Continental critics, who'apparently base their judgment ou , accounts given bj' members of the garrison generally, hold that the Nainur General Staff made two great mistakes: Firstly, they let the enemy close in upon'Namur practically at his leisure instead of - persistently embarrassing his advance by attacks; and, secondly, they waited too long for tho help they ex- ■ pected from the French. For a week, h jseenis, the Belgian forces on the one bank of the Meuse waited, without any movement; for the Germans on the other " bank to deliver their attack, happy in the belief that every day thus passed was a day gained on die, path of victory. As a matter of fact, during this time the Germans wore, bringing up enormously heavy siege artillery, the power and even the existence of which have only been revealed since the outbreak of war. Taught by their losses before Liege, instead of hurling regi- ( ments at the Namur forts, the Germans preferred to await the arrival of these big gnns, the movement of which and of the main German forces was carefully screened by a dense curtain of cavalry which moved about in all directions and apparently threw the Belgians " right off the scent" as regards German operations against Namur. Michel and his staff are inilch criticised for their inaction during this period. Under cover of a fog, the Germans finally got their new siege guns, to tho number of about thirtytwo, into position at two points, from which they could concentrate their fire on practically any part of the_deferic.es of Namur they chose for their objective. They were placed at a minimum distance of three miles from tho Belgian trenches, and consequently out of range of the Belgian guns. ■ As usual, the Germans proved to; be mast acciirately informed, a German officer who was taken prisoner having upon him 'photographs of the new trenches dug up only a few davs before. It was upon these trenches that the Germans concentrated their fire first of all, and what the defenders in them had to undergo from tfhc rain of shot <md snoll is told 1 bv one of the survivors.

, A TEN HOURS' ORDEAL. He says:—"Without troubling about .the forts-, the Germans at first centred 'their' rain of steel upon our entrenchments, where our men were posted awaiting the attack. For ten hours our brave young fellows stood this temole ordeal without being able to fire a shot in return. AnV man who put lus head above tho fire-swept ramparts simply had it mown off. Lying flat on oui stomachs;,-' using whatever vv * °°" ld J;° shield our heads, all we could do was to wait for this rain of iron and tire to end. We were all burning to emulate our valiant brothers who -re.l ab Liege, but what human being would not be disheartened when he could not sven see the enemy attacking him, and could do nothing to protect himself, nothing to avenge the comrades falling around bim? Whole regiments were decimated, and I still shudder at the memory -of these horrors. The losses among the officers were terrible, and gradually the soldiers, deprived of their leaders, became demoralised. With one bound, they suddenly rose and fled—a general sauvo qui pent—and only when the lines were reformed to tho rear was it seen how many were missing." ■ „ Meanwhile many of the German Buns had been turned' on the torts, especially those of Maigeret and Ma-r----obovelette. Armed with guns or much .smaller calibre, they c °"'4 °"® r but a feeble resistance, and Maigeret, in fact, only fired about ten shots before it was reduced to impotence by the German siege guns. At Marchovelette seventy-five men were killed in the batteries, and both forts soon surrendered. The other works, however, were still holding out when the army left the town. Such Was the confidence of General Michel and his staff in the ability of the fortress to hold out that tho eventuality of a retirement had not been in the len-st provided for and great contusion consequently ensued. Many 'soldiers declare that they heard officers say; "Get out as best you can. The thing is to get to Antwerp." No provision had been made for the destruction of the immense stores, and all these, with the fortress artillery and most of the field artillery, the horses of which had been killed, fell into the Germans' hands. Tho ambulance corps was ono of the worst sufferers from this lack of organisation, and lost 150 men out of its 600. As to sick and wounded, many of them were left behind in Namur, but such as could be moved were got through to. the French lines. The narrow road was choked with men, horses and vehicles, a swirl'n£ torrent, n.n4 of the enormous pack of Belgian motors 6nJy a few were saved, for tho Germans entered the town oloso on th" heels of-the retreating and utterly disorganised force. THE RETREAT TO ANTWERP.

Concerning that retreat a survivor gays: "Our line of rotreat was on bt Gerard, jrliere wo hoped to join the French brigade which had been asked for as a reinforcement , from Ihn&ut-. .wo wer©' doomed. to uisflxypoUK* id I , ' 4 *'"» / i J

merii. after disappointment. Tho French, having be©n overwhelmed at Dinaut, had been obliged to iali back by way of Morvillo and could only send us two regiments, bravely fought their way through to us and joined us not far from, Namur, vary reduced in numbers.

" Our generals had also believed that Iho blowing up of tho bridgo at Zambes would be sufficient to oover our retreat but the Germans, moving more rapidly than we, cut our retreat near Bois-les-V'llevs, where their machine guns disabled some of our guns and made a clean .. sweep of .several iuoior-oarr filled with officers. At last we cut our way through, .but; at the price 'of what losses! Tt was here that tho Bth and 13th Re<rn>erits '-f the lino (".'iieeially distinruisVd th n msolvos. Thev lost- nearlv a'! tlvnr officers. Ono of our commissariat trains fell into the hands of the enemy.

" Tramping over tho fields wit 1, ranks b'-nVen, regiments hopeles'dv inWmiugled, our troops continued their retreat, ever pursued. ■ over harassed. Moreover, we tumbled right into the path of the _ French '■etreat from. Charleroi. Tli ; - .further demoralised our men, a"d it was not till we got to T'hilipneville that ■hp troops were pu'led together again nul reformed. And then b"gan a -■even days' march to Antwerp whlc-> was executed in f'M r, lv good order."