DECLARATION OF LONDON.

Star (Christchurch), Issue 10197, 5 July 1911, Page 1

DECLARATION OF LONDON.

DEBATE IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS. Mr balfourJsTcriticism. REPLY BY SIR_EDWARD GREY, j SECOND READING CARRIED. i United Press Associstion-By Electric Telegraph—Copy right. - LONDON, July L I . Mr Bfcltonr, speaking "" on the Declaration oi London, o- a that Mr M'Kenua's attack on the adI nvfl of the lne intends of neutrals and belligerents were niJoparablo. Ho was unable to understand why so crossly unfair discrmviKm was made between .foodstuffs St to an island like Britain and loodstnffs going to a Continental nation The Declaration precluded the Go-ernment from ' ever protesting agairit the illegal treatment 0 f neutrals, everything being left to the belated decision of an imperfect tribunal Mr Balfour emphasised the value ot diplomatic pressure and all it u'volyed. His great objection to the Declaration was not that a Prize Court was a very inefficient method of compensating a wronged individual, but the Declaration destroyed the existing remedy which was immediate and powerful and often proved effective (Unionist cheers.) All the charges favoured the military against the naval, the Continental'as against the Island Power. He annealed for a closer examination bv experts before tho country was committed to ratification, which would never be revisable. ■,,»■■ Sir Edward Grey, amid loud Ministerial cheers, said that the remarks generallv of the opposition to the declaration embodied a gross amount ot misstatement and misrepresentation He comulained that Mr Balfour s and others' belated views were focussed not on the most important points, hence the wrong perspective and false view of the whole declaration. The most important matter was the effects of the agreement on the right of blockade. He felt that if he could convince Opposition members that Britain s food supplies would be safeguarded when Britain was a belligerent, they would not demand three days' debate. As neutrals', it was clear that Britain was the gainer under the free list. The late Government had protested against ißussia sinking a neutral, but four neutrals were sunk afterwards and no remedy was offered except through a Russian prize court. No compensation was obtained for the sinking, but only because probably there was' an insufficient case against contraband. (Ministerial cheers.) Since then the majority of the great Powers at the Hague had decided against tho prohibition of Binking, therefore it was hopeless to seek acceptance of the principle that no sinking should be allowed. Although an international prizo court would not be perfect, the great Powers having a majority over all the minor neutral Powers, Britain in the last two arbitrations had:constant and willing recourse to representatives of the minor Powers in arranging the Court's decision. Regarding food, he relied on the broad proposition that if they were able to keep the eea free to the British flag in war time they would be able to Keep it free for neutrals. (Cheers.) If they failed to keep the sea starvation would not bo prevented by a neutral flag. An enemy's efforts would be devoted firstly to attacking British not neutral vessels. Members opposite liad tried to prove that without tho Declaration there would bo no fear that food would be declared absolute contraband, and no danger to Britain's food supplies. Lord Charles Beresford had said that if he and other officers saw twenty Vessels with an enemy's food supply they would put them down if they were hanged lor it. (Laughter.) QTius one sentence blew out of the ivater the whole structure which the opponents of the Declaration wore building. He did not pretend that the Declaration was a. substitute for cruisers. He did not suggest any paper instrument for such a purpose. Every Government was aware that the intention of the Declaration was to prevent all food being treated as contraband of •war. Anybody treating it as if all were contraband of war would violate tho fclear intention. Underwriters were aware that under tho Declaration food could not bo legally treated as absolute contraband, and if a cargo wero illegalJy seized compensation would follow. Regarding the treatment of neutrals, the only difference the Declaration made that if a Power against whom Britain was at war sank a neutral coming to Britain, it would be r-ompelled to >rove emergency beforo a Court on which it would have only one representative, instead of a Court of Its own nationality. The only great neutral Power interested in the supply of food to Britain with a fleet strong enough to interfere' effectively was the United States, which was a party to the Declaration. If the United States wished to send Britain food in wartime it could convoy it under Articles 61 and 62 of the Declaration. Sir Edward said that he attached the greatest importance to the concession made in the matter of blockade. " A weapon we particularly retain unimpaired," he continued, "is the blockade, with which it is essential neutrals •should not interfere. This is why the two naval delegates signed the report. i\V« secured the conditions essential, in the - Admiralty's opinion, to the effective use of the right of blockade. Under the Declaration we as belligerents ' avoided the risk of one or more Powers interposing with the doctrine of blockado, making blockade tinder modern conditions useless for our purpose." Sir Edward Grey emphasised the increasing dependence of every belligerent in the future upon the consent of neutrals. Certainly, as with tho growth of shipping peoples were more closely connected, there would be a tendency to restrict belligerent action. Tho Government had dealt with blockade from the standpoint of high policy, and in this matter the Government did not intend to devolve its responsibilities on any commission of experts. (Cheers.) As a belligerent Britain would do its best to destroy converted mer chant ru en. The fact that these would be few, and all known, made the question comparatively unimportant. Moreover, a neujfcral's- obligation to prevent such leaving its ports was positively enjoined in tho . If the Declaration were tot ratified, they would increase the risk of interference from neutrals in •war time, and they would be defeating the keen desire of Continental nations *nd the United States to have some international agreement on the points mentioned. If it could lie shown that there was anything in the Declaration ( vitally endangering Britain, he, even •t the eleventh hour, was prepared to «av that thev ought to draw back. He hoped that lie had proved that where Untain had not gained by the Declaration it was not making things worse than before. Britain., on the other hand, had made some undesirable practices more difficult, and where it wanted to be assured had got assurances it had not had Wore. Refusal to ratify would cau«» fcto other Powers to enter into an

LAST NIGHT'S CABLES.

agreement for arbitration on the basis of the Declaration among themselves. The Government did not wish Britain to Ik; omitted from an agreement into which it was perfectly safe to enter. After Mr Bonar Law had criticised the Declaration as falling far short cl : the Government's aspirations, Mr Asquith summarised the points gained. He admitted regarding tno right to sanction the destruction of neutral fihips that a compromise had been effected, but it was a compromise not injuring Britain. Mr J. C Butcher's amendment to refer the Declaration to a commission of experts was negatived by 301 to 231. There were cheers and some Opposition cries of "Traitors!" The Bid was then read a second time without division.