THE MOTOR-CAR CASE.

Star (Christchurch), Issue 8054, 5 July 1904, Page 3

THE MOTOR-CAR CASE.

INFORMATIONS DISMISSED

At the Rangiora Magistrate's Court this morning Mr H. \V. Bisliop, S.M., delivered judgment on the charge of alleged cruelty to a horse, heard at the previous sitting of the Court, against W. J. Cresswell, M. Davis, P. Cannon, X". Neeley and S. Luttrell.

His Worship said thai_the defendants in this case are jointly charged, under section 7, sub-section 1, of the Police Offences Act, 1884, "That they did cruelly ill-treat a horse by causing it to be oven-galloped." The offence is alleged to have been committed on March, 14 last, and) the facts of the case have been so extensively circulated and have excited, apparently, such "widespread interest that it is not necessary for me to refer to them in detail. The evidence of the witnesses for the prosecution would appear generally to go to show that the horse was deliberately driyen in front of the defendants' motor-car it so gieat a rate of speed for some eight miles as to reduce the animal to such a state of distress and exhaustion as to constitute cruelty. For [ the defence a very great deal of evidence | has been given, and to my mind most of . that evidence was entirely unnecessary and uncalled for. A number of witnesses were examined who I suppose would be classed as "experts." We had experts as to horses and even as to their brains, as to motorcars, and even as to the rules of the road viewed from the standpoint of the owners of motor-cars. I may say at once that not a scrap of this evidence has had the smallest effect on my judgment. A great deal of it was, in my opinion, quite worthless and unreliable. * No better proof of this could be given than the dogmatically expressed views of the horse expetts on the effect of stringhalt in horses. So far tvs the legal aspect of this defect is concerned,' it has been authoritatively held to be unseundness, an<l its effect is elaborately dealt with in Thompson v. Patterson, and this case is referred to at somo length in OHphant's law on horses. But this is only by the way, and I merely now -refer to it as affording a further instance of the uselessness of relying upon expert evidence. It is over three months since the occurrence, and the present condition of the horse is somewhat beside the mark,, although, undoubtedly, it would be very material and important evidence to a civil claim for damages. So far as the present case is concerned there is not a tittle of evidence that the stringhalt is the result of the act of the defendants. Reference was made by defendants' counsel to what I .might term the public notoriety of this case and to the opinions that would appear to have been freely expressed as to the conduct of the defendants. In my opinion those persons only have themselves to thank for the position in which they 'have been placed by this prosecution. The owner of the horse brought an action to recover a large sum of money by way of damages for the injury ■ done "to " the animal. Very strong prima facie evidence was given in. support of his claim. At least four of the present defendants Avere in Court and heard that-' evidence. Without offering a word of explanation or excuse they deliberately paid a considerable amount of money to settle the matter, and the case was withdrawn. What other conclusion could then be drawn, but that they admitted the cor- ! rectness of the evidence given? They were bound to be prosecuted, and the police would have been wanting in their duty if they had not taken the matter up. Even now I am quite unable to reconcile their conduct that day with what they have since stated on oath. From what has transpired since, they would appear to have been even content, without due inquiry, to pay an amount- largely in excess of the true damages. Hearing the evidence as I did that day I scarcely doubted that the defendants had been guilty of an atrocious act, for which they deserved to be severely punished. Having aE the evidence extensively before me in the present charge I am called upon to decide-, whether there is no reasonable doubt that the defendants are guilty r of ■ that charge. The issues arc very simple. They are : (1) Did the defendants deliberately keep the horse in front of their motor-car, and (2) if so, did they drive at such a rate and for such a distance as to cause suffering? To my mind the material portion of the evidence for the defence, taken as a whole, 'has established a reasonable doubt on both these points. As regards the first point, in addition to the evidence of several disinterested witnesses, I have the explicit unequivocal denial upon oath of five of the defendants. They swore they had no idea of keeping the horse in front of the car ; that for the greater portion of t-he eight miles the horse was not' even within view ; that they only used the horn when necessary to secure the safety of the road; that they never travelled at an excessive pace ; and that the only occasion on which they got near the frightened horse and appeared to put on pace, they were trying to pass it, so as to have a clear run. On this point I do not profess to be perfectly satisfied as to the true facts. There are contradictions and inconsistencies that I am quite unable to reconcile. It i?, however, unnecessary for me to definitely decide as to which side of the evidence 1 would attach the greatest credence, for I am of opinion that a more reasonable doubt has been raised in regard to the sscond point, as to the effect upon tne horse of the eightmile run, and as to whether, even assuming the worst against the defendants, its oondition was such as to constitute cruelty as the result of their action. The evidence as to this is extremely contradictory, and in addition to the. evidence for the^defence of those who saw the horse on the main road in front of the car, there are the two witnesses who have sworn that they saw the animal upwards of two miles from the point where it left the main road, cantering along with no sign of distress. This is a highly penal section, and I cannot convict unless I am reasonably 'satisfied of the guilt of the defendants. According to all rule they are entitled to the benefit of any doubt, and as such doubt exists in my mind, the informations must be dismissed.