GENERAL BULLER'S WISE CHOICE.

Star (Christchurch), Issue 7293, 4 January 1902, Page 4

GENERAL BULLER'S WISE CHOICE.

Nor is sufficient justice done to General Butter's determination in November, 1899, to go to Natal with, the bulk of (has forces. With, our recent experience of Boer warfare, it is not in the least likely that a march. upon Bloemfontein would ihave relieved LadysmAth automatically, as was assumed by so many dn England at the time. Whsere General Buller went astray~*vas in attempting 'to aKlvance upon two ■different fronts at tine same time — in Cope Colony to relieve Kimberley, and in^ Natal to relieve Ladysmstb. There is no longer, debate in military circles as to whether lie waß right in going to-Natal ; events have settled that dispute for ever. The account of the Lindley affaiir, in which, the 13th Yeomanry were compelled to surrender, has been revised, and the word " convoy," which; made it appear that the battalion had 1 supplies of food 1 with it, deleted, tho.ugh the startling story told by Mr M. Fitzgibbon, . who served! as a trooper with this ill-fated force, to the -effect that the man who first raised the white flag was shot by two of his comrades, is not noticed. / * The later period of the war is dealt with in seven chapters, which brings this edition thoroughly up-to-date. A spirited account is given of the affair at Frederikstad, to which sufficient justice has hardly been done in England, though there a severe lesson was read to De Wet, while the conduct of the British infantry was superb. " There have been few finer infantry advances during the- war," writes the author, "for the veldt was perfectly flat, and tike fire terrific. A anile ,of ground was crossed by the fusiliers. Three gallant officers — Dick, Elliott, and Best — went down; but the rush of the m#n was irresistible. At the edge of the ditches the supports overtook the firing line, and they all surged into the trench together. . . The scene which, followed has not often been paralleled. About a hundred and fifty burghers rushed but of the ditches, streaming across the veldt upon foot to the place where their horses had been secret cd. Rifles, pom-poms, and shrapnel played upon them during this terrible race." It is in such, passages of vivid and flowing narration that the author's peculiar success lies. UNINTELLIGIBLE LENIENCY. Dr Conan Doyle comments sharply upon British ieniency to the train-wreckers. "Considering that these (Boer) tactics were continued for over a year, and that ■they resulted in the death or mutilation of many hundreds of British officers and men, 'it- is really inexplicable," he says — and the public will in -this agree with him — " that the British authorities did not employ the means used by all armies under such circumstances — which is to place hostages upon the trains. A truck-load of Boers behind every engine would /have stopped the practice for ever. Again and again in this war the British have fought with the gloves when their opponents used their knuckles. But the explanation is, we balieve, that the Home authorities for a time forbade hostages. Certainly the practice of placing hostages on the trains has now at last been resumed, with results which seem to be satisfactory, as derailments of :a'te have markedly decreased, till last month there were none." Another mistaken act of clemency which is severely criticised was the decision,, when first the British Army entered the Free State, to permit the Boers who outwardly accepted the new conditions to retain their hoTses. "The prolongation of the war is largely due to this act of clemency. At the same time political and military considerations were opposed to each other upon this point." But where political and military considerations are in conflict in time of actual war, it is never Avise to allow the political the upper hand. Our failure to secure a pacification must be attributed mainly to attempting at one and the same time to conciliate and to crush an enemy— two aims which are diametrically opposed. THE HORSE QUESTION. But if. political interference with generals had much to answer for it was not, in the author's judgment, the sole cause of the present impasse. " Every train of thought brings the critic back always to the great horse question and encourages the conclusion that there, at all seasons of the war and in all scenes of it, is to be found the most damning indictment against British foresight, common-sense, and power of organisation. That the third year of the war should dawn without the British forces having yet got the- legs of the Boers, after having the horses of the world upon which to draw, is the most amazingly inexplicable point in the whole of this strange campaign. From the telegram "Infantry preferred," addressed to a nation of roughriders, down to the failure to secure the excellent horses on the spot while importing them unfit from the ends of the earth, there has been nothing but one long string of blunders in this,- the most vital question ol all- " Even up to the end in the Colony the obvious lesson has not yet been learnt that

it is better to give 1000 men two horses each and so let them, reach the enemy than give 2000 men one horse each, with, which they can never attain their object. The chase during two years of the man with two horses by the man with one horse has been a sight painful to ourselves and ludicrous to others." CAUSES OF UNSUOCESS. Perhaps, too, thofagh the author does not notice it, the spirit of routine which marks a peace-trained army has proved one of the gravest obstacles to success. The Boers are, for the most part led by young men, some might say boys. The British are directed mainly by middle-aged or elderly men, and difficulties as to seniority prevent the rapid promotion of those who have showi most ability. There is, too, the question of centralised command, which is not touched, though the failure of the attempt) to capuu c De Wet in February of this year w as mamly due to that cause. But this is a matter which makes little show in telegrams or correspondents' letters, a nd the immense importance of it is therefore in some clanger of being overlooked. The final conclusion of the authoi is that "a very few months ,must see the end of this long drama." But he argues from the dubious premise that in October there were only 8000 to 9000 burghers in the field, a calculation which is quite at variance xr'Ah the evidence afforded by the extreme activity of the commandoes of late. It is not likely that so small a force would have been able within the space of a fey daj s to attack in "overwhelming" force, if telegrams can be believed, at points so far apart as Scheeper's Nek, Vlakfonte-in, Moedwill, and the neighbourhood of the Orange River. In the " National Review," Sir C. Warren some weeks ago estimated the original Boer strength at 81,000, and if this estimate be correct, there may yet be 12,000 or 15.000 men in the field. The volume is supplied with excellent maps, printed in colours, arid has a goo I index. It need scarcely be- said that it is marked throughout 'by a tone of judicious impartiality and generous recognition of the enemy's good qualities.