PROSPECTS OF THE WAR.

Star (Christchurch), Issue 721, 14 September 1870, Page 3

PROSPECTS OF THE WAR.

The following articles on the prospects of the war are from the Madras Mail, an able and well-informed journal. From the fact of being in close telegraphic communication with Europe, and so being enabled to follow the progress of events from day to day, and from having the assistance of professional information from the military authorities, the Indian leading papers are usually in a good position as regards war intelligence, which, in a military empire like India, is viewed with the utmost attention ; and the following extracts will no doubt be read with interest. THE NAVAL FORCES OF THE CHIEF EUROPEAN POWERS. The announcement tbat some Prussian men-of-war had left Plymouth, followed by a French despatch boat, reminds us that there may be some fighting at sea as well as on land. The Prussian ships have doubtless made for their own coast, and will be fortunate if they get into a secure harbour before they meet with a French squadron. We have taken the trouble to collect a few statistics regarding the navies of the chief European powers, from which it will be seen that Prussia has no chanca whatever of competing with France upon the sea. Indeed, even supposing the Russians should join the Prussians, the French Navy will be quite prepared to meet them both, and is probably quite strong enough to blockade all the principal Russian and Prussian ports. Great Britain. —On the Ist February, 1869, the fleet of Great Britain comprised 367 steam ships of different sorts. Twentythree of these were armour-plated, and 15 more armour-plated ships were under construction. Only 19 sailing vessels were to be found in the whole fleet. The main strength of the fleet consisted in 44 line-of-battle ships, 32 frigates, 21 corvettes, 36 sloops, and upwards cf 100 gun-boats. The personnel ot the Navy, according to the Navy Estimates for 1869-70, was about 4200 officers, 30,000 men, 7000 boys, 7250 coastguards, and 14,000 marines. Prussia. — The entire navy of the North German Confederation does not exceed 89 ships, carrying 563 guns. Forty-four of the ships are propelled by steam, eight are sailing vessels, and the remainder seem to be merely armed boats for coast-guard service. Three frigates, one corvette, and two ships of the line are armour plated. Kussia. — At the beginning of 1868 the Russian navy comprised 267 ships. The armour-plated force consisted of 13 monitors, four frigates, and three floating batteries, six ships of the line, eight frigates, 18 corvettes, seven clippers, about 100 gUn -boats, 22 transports, and 13 schooners, come under the class of noncuirasses. Several armour-plated frigates were also under construction. • France. — The following was the strength of the French Navy on the Ist January, 1869:—

In addition to the above must be added 7 paddle-wheel corvettes, 34 despatch-boats, and 10 transports, aggregating 116 guns and 1 0,225-horse power. The sailing vessels comprised 2 line-of-battle ships, 10 frigates, 6 corvettes, 25 transports and other armed craft of smaller proportions ; the sailing fleet amounting altogether to about 100 ships and , 900 guns. At the beginning of 1869, 8 armour-clads and 23 non armour-clads were under construction, and doubtless some of these ships have been set afloat before now. The personnel of the navy was as follows : — Admirals, 2 ; vice-admirals, 16 active, 10 reserve ; rear-admirals, 30 active, 19 reserve; captains of ships, 130 ; captains of frigates, 286 ; lieutenants, 825 ; ensigns, 600 ; other officers, 323 ; total, 2241. The number of sailors was about 40,000, a number that can be increased in time of war by naval conscription. The marines number about 30,000, officers and men. STRATEGICAL SPECULATIONS. Little is to be gathered from the telegrams, whfch assign Metz as the point of concentration of the French armies. Tbat fortress is, in the first place, their proper point to assemble, whether their ulterior " objective " is the Upper or Lower Rhine. In the next place, an army of great magnitude placed between two first-class fortresses, such as Metz and Thionville, with admirable ground for defence behind the Moselle, could not be better posted. The lines of rail connect

Metz with the Rhine at several points ; and, so long as those lines are maintained intact, the French Emperor may throw the weight of his force on any one of several points. Now, all history proves that the French, in obedience to a national characteristic, are prone to adopt an offensive attitude in war. It eminently suits the genius of the French soldier; and the Emperor knows, better than any man perhaps, how far the impulse, the springing valour, and active intelligence of his men will carry him. But, looking at matters in a strategic point of view, the aspect of things may make the bravest of French soldiers anxious. Putting Russia aside (for in the case of her intervention it is difficult to imagine how the French could take and preserve the offensive), there is amply sufficient to make the boldest leader pause ere he commits an army to the invasion of Germany in the face of Prussia of to-day. The Rhine line is altogether in the hands of the enemy. The fortresses of Cologne, Coblentz, and Mayence preclude the possibility of an advance and after-passage of the river in their vicinity, or between them. Imagine a French army crossing between Colngnj and Coblentz, or between the latter fortress and May ence ! Coblentz alone can hold a hundred thousand men ; and how could any army afford to leave so vast an entrenched camp in its rear? And yet a deliberate siege would occupy too many men and too much time. Therefore, an advance on the hhine in that direction, and its passage near that point, is not to be entertained for a moment. It seems improbable, then, tbat the French would move towards the Rhine on any point between Cologne and Mayence. If, then, tu<y do not preserve the defensive, it follows that in crossing the Rhine they must pass between Mayence and Strasburg. It is possible that, with a view to the prestige of the thing, the French might clear all the Rhine provinces, and then dare Prussia to eject them-, but afterwards what could they do ? The acquisition of the Rhine provinces is nearly valueless unless it brings with them one or more of the great Rhine fortresses, an end that would be much more easily achieved through negotiations following on signal success obtained by the French elsewhere. It is likely then that the French (in the absence of Russian intervention) meditate an irruption in imposing force into Germany on some point south of the Maine. The French for • tresses of Metz and Thionville, and the country connecting and in rear of them, may be safely trusted to a part of the great force; and the bulk of the army, with the Emperor in command, will probably cross the Uhine somewhere between Mayence and Mannheim. To pass the river at this point would more effectually separate the Prussians from the South German States, than to pass between Mannheim and Strasburg. From a military point of view the Prussian alliance with these states is, in spite of the accession of resources, a drawback ; for the weight of a French advance between Mayence and Mannheim would necessitate the march of a strong Prussian army south of the Maine, and the strength of the Prussian position lies in the defiles opening on the valley of the Saal, viz., Baireutti-Hof, Kronach-Schleitz, Coburg-Saalfield, with the line of the Thuringian forest. Of course the real strength of Prussia against an attack from France lies finally in the line of the Elbe ; but that is beyoud our present purpose. Looking at affairs from a Prussian stand-point it may be urged that the Prussians, knowing the safety of the Lower Rhine to be well assured by the possession of great fortresses, will mass the bulk of their forces near Wurtzburg, the centre of many great roads of communication, where they are sufficiently near to hold out a hand to the Bavarians, and where they cover their own frontier ; for the French, having no base on the Rhine nearer than Strasburg, would inevitably compromise their communications by an advance across the Maine. Under these circumstances, what advantage would the French gain by passing the Rhine between Mayence and Mannheim ? This difficult question, we doubt not the French Emperor and his councillors, appreciating to a nicety the strategic disadvantages under which they must labour in invading Germany by any route, have it in their mind to trust to the issue of great battles, in which the certainly superior equipment of their men, and their probably superior discipline, will offer better chances of success than the pursuance of a war of mancauvres. MAYENCE. The Prussians, it is now stated, are falling back upon Coblentz and Mayence. Both these fortresses are on the left or French side of the Rhine, the former, as we have already bad occasion to state, being situated at the confluence of the Moselle and that river, and the latter at the junction of the Maine and the Rhine. The towns are 56 miles distant. Mayence, or Mainz, has been a frontier stronghold from the earliest times. Druses, Bon-in-law of Augustus, encamped here, and built the fortress. After his death the body was brought here by the Roman army, B.C. 9. The town since then has been the scene of numerous sieges, and all the miseries incidental to medissval war. It gave birth to Gutemberg, the inventor of moveable types, and now boasts of a statue by Thorwaldsen of that father of the Printing press to which the world is so vastly indebted. The town belongs to tbe Grand Duke of Hesse Darmstadt, and has, by virtue of the treaty of 1866, been garrisoned since that year by Prussian troops . Its population, including its normal garrison, numbers 42,000 inhabitants. The ancient palace of the Electors of Mainz was occupied by Napoleon Bonaparte on, we believe, several occasions, and is now the residence of the governor of the fortress. A bridge of boats 1666 ft. long, over the Rhine, unites Mayence ta Castel in Nassau, on tbe opposite bank, a suburb also strongly fortified. There is also a railway bridge, 1212 ft. long connecting Mayence witb the line to the town of Darmstadt. Mayence is close to the Hockheim, Rudesheim, and

other notableTßhenisF- vineyards,- and is "life usual terminus' of excursions up the Rhine. 'X FRANCO-PRUSSIAN BATTLES. In 1806, at Jena, Napoleon defeated the Prussians under Prince- Hohenlohe. The French numbered 90,000, the Prussians 60,000. On the same day, at a short distance from Jena, Marshal Davoust totally defeated the Duke of* Brunswick at Awerstadt. r The French numbered 27,000, the Prussians 66,000. In 1813 Napoleon defeated the Prussians and Russians at Lutzen. It is not easy to ascertain the exact numbers on either side. The French had a considerable superiority on the whole, but were almost destitute of cavalry. In 1813, the French; under Napoleon, defeated the allied Russians and Prussians at Bautzen. The French numbered 138,000, the allies 96,000. At Dresden, in 1813, Napoleon defeatei the allied Austro-Russo-Prussian army. The French numbered 125,000, the allies 155,000. At the Katzbach,in 1813, Blucher totally defeated the French Marshal Macdonald. The numbers were nearly 80,000 on either side. At GrossBeeren, in 1813, the allies under Bernadotte totally defeated the French Marshal Oudinot. Theallies numbered 90,000, the Frenchßo,ooo. At Dennewitz, in 1813, the allies defeated Marshal Ney ; the French had 70,000, the allies were slightly superior in number. At Leipsic, in 1813, the allies totally defeated Napoleon. The French numbered 166,000, the allies . 290,000. At La Bothier, in 1814, the allies defeated Napoleon. The allies numbered above 100,000, the French 50,000. In 1814, at the successive battles of Montmirail, Cuampaubert, and Vauchamps, Napoleon defeated the superior forces of Blucher. At Laon, in 1814, Blucher defeated Napolon. The allies numbered 104,000, the French 52,000. At Ligny, in 1815, Napoleon defeated the Prussians under Blucher. The French numbered 73,000, the Prussians 84,000. These redoubtable antagonists have not met since the final fall of Napoleon.

Nos. Guns, Power. Armour plated Screw Steamers Steam rams ... ... ... 2 104 18,000 Do. 1 12 950 Frigates '.. ... 14 524 12,600 Corvettes 8 112 3,600 Coast guard ships 4 28 1,885 Floating batteries 15 230 2,625 Small floating batteries ... 11 22 460 55 1,032 23,920 Sorew Steamers not Armourplated. Lino-of-battle-ships 15 1,350 11,000 Frigates 17 614 B,<HO Corvettes 14 140 6,570 Despatch boats 49 196 6,630 Gunboats 23 92 1,430 Do. 47 94 886 Transports 66 132 16,780 231 2,618 60,636