“NO THREAT TO PEACE IN EUROPE”

Timaru Herald, Volume CXLV, Issue 21185, 4 November 1938, Page 9

“NO THREAT TO PEACE IN EUROPE”

VIEW OF WAR IN SPAIN Mr CHAMBERLAIN AND TREATY WITH ITALY British Official Wireless RUGBY, November 2. In the House of Commons to-day, the Prime Minister Mr Neville Chamberlain), in moving the motion, “That this House welcomes Britain’s intention to bring the Anglo-Italian agreement into force,” recalled his observation yesterday on his joint declaration with Herr Hitler, at Munich, that if it were suitably followed up, it might well be found to contain the seed of a new era of confidence and peace in Europe. Since the date of the Anglo-Italian agreement, Mr Chamberlain added, there had been no differences between Italy and Britain, but it was clear if the improvement in the relations which followed the conclusion of the agreement were to be maintained, the delay in putting it into force, already over six months, could not be indefinitely prolonged. The issue before the House, the Prime Minister explained, was not the agreement itself, which already had been approved by a large majority, but whether the preliminary conditions which he had laid down as essential before it could come into force, had now been fulfilled.

OFFICIAL STATEMENT DEFENCE OF BRITAIN’S POLICY CONFIDENCE IN OTHER LEADERS In the course of his speech Mr Chamberlain said that in making the condition he had stated Britain’s recognition of Italian sovereignty of Ethiopia would morally be justified if Britain could feel that it would constitute an important step towards a general appeasement in Europe, but the Government must be able to consider that the Spanish question had been settled, and on July 26, in reply to an interjection by the Leader of the Opposition (Mr C. R. Attlee) he had said: “If Britain thinks that Spain has ceased to be a menace to the peace of Europe, I think we shall regard that as a settlement of the Spanish question.” Since then the British plan for the withdrawal of volunteers had been accepted by the Powers on the Nonintervention Committee, and the Spanish Government had announced at Geneva its intention to withdraw the International Brigade. Moreover, at Munich, Signor Mussolini had volunteered the information that he intended to withdraw ten thousand men from Spain. These had now been withdrawn. Signor Mussolini’s Assurances It was true that Italian pilots, aircraft and other material remained in Spain, but Britain had received from Signor Mussolini the following assurances:— (1) That the remaining Italian forces in all categories would be withdrawn under the Non-intervention Committee’s plan when it came into operation. (2) No further Italian troops would be sent to Spain. (3) Italy had never for a moment entertained the idea of sending a compensatory air force to Spain in place of the infantry forces withdrawn. “These three assurances, in conjunction with the actual withdrawal of this large body of men, in my judgment constitute a substantial indication of the earnest and good intentions of Italy, and form a considerable contribution to the elimination of the Spanish question as a menace to peace, but they are not the only considerations weighing with Britain. “When I was at Munich, I spoke on the future of Spain with both Herr Hitler and Signor Mussolini, and both of them assured me most definitely that they had no territorial ambitions whatever in Spain. In my mind, it is perfectly clear that the Spanish question is no longer a menace to the peace of Europe, and consequently there is no valid reason why we should not now take the step which obviously would contribute to a general appeasement.” The Prime Minister then made the point that if any justification was required for the policy of agreement with Italy, it could be found in the action of Signor Mussolini, when at Mr Chamberlain’s request he used his influence with Herr Hitler before the Munich meeting. By that act of Signor Mussolini, the peace of Europe was saved, and it could not be supposed that he would have responded to Mr Chamberlain’s request if British relations with Italy had remained what they were eighteen months ago. Recognition of Sovereignty Regarding recognition of Italian sovereignty over Ethiopia, the Prime Minister said that new credentials would be issued to Lord Perth on similar lines to those which the French Government intended to give its new Ambassador to Rome. The French Government had stated that it welcomed the British Government’s intention, as it welcomed, generally, anything which could contribute to an improvement in Anglo-Italian relations. In conclusion, Mr Chamberlain read two messages received from the heads of the Australian and South African Governments. Mr Lyons stated that the Australian Government was convinced that the Anglo-Italian agreement should be brought into operation forthwith as a contribution to peace, and de jure recognition accorded the Italian conquest of Abyssinia.

The withdrawal of ten thousand Italian troops from Spain seemed to it a real contribution, and In its opinion a peaceful and friendly Mediterranean was essential in the present condition of the world. To refuse de jure recognition would seem to ignore the facts and to risk danger over a matter which was now immaterial. General Hertzog’s message said that he felt that the step was wise and necessary, and would materially contribute to the appeasement of Europe. “It will be observed,” said Mr Chamberlain, “how both Mr Lyons and General Hertzog have gone to what I think is the root of the matter, and recognised that in the action which Britain is proposing to take, it is not concerned solely with the relations between Britain and Italy, The step we are taking must be regarded as a step in the policy of appeasement which I have described on so many occasions.” "Spain Will Pay Price" Mr Arthur Greenwood (Labour) said that what mattered was the price to be paid for the Rome agreement, and that price was going to be paid by the people of Spain. Mr Greenwood said he thought that the withdrawal of ten thousand Italians, whom he described as war weary or convalescent from wounds, was inadequate, even as a token withdrawal of the Italian forces in Spain, which he put at ninety thousand. It was farcical to describe that as “a settlement of the Spanish question.” While the civil war continued through the intervention of dictators, countless thousands of women and children would continue to be bombed and slaughtered, vital British communications would continue to be threatened, and British shipping continue to be attacked. Mr Greenwood said he saw the Italian withdrawal as a trick designed to secure more delays favouring the rebel forces. To bring the Rome agreement into force now was to make a concession without an adequate return, and it would not bring peace one day earlier. For the Liberals, Mr Wilfred Roberts contended that Signor Mussolini had not met the conditions laid down by the Prime Minister. One of these had been that Italy should do nothing to alter the balance of the forces in Spain in favour of General Franco. He asked .whether any assurance had been obtained regarding the bombing of British ships. Apprehensions Justified Mr R. A. Eden claimed that the apprehensions which have caused his resignation had been justified by events. The main fact in the present situation was that when the Government put its name to the Rome Agreement it made an essential condition, and Mr Eden went on to argue that it had not been satisfied. A settlement in Spain most members understood to be either the ending of the civil war or at least the end of foreign intervention, so long as Italy had air legions in Spain it could not be said that there had been any effective limitation of foreign intervention, and the honest truth was that the essential condition which the British Government had laid down had net been satisfied. The British Government had been ready to make, and had made, very farreaching concessions in its sincere desire to improve the general atmosphere, but up to now, Mr Eden said, he could discern few signs in curtain other States of a similar spirit. He could not believe that the bringing of the Rome Agreement into force in the present circumstances was in the interests of Britain, and he could not vote for the motion. The Government's motion was carried by 345 votes to 138. About 12 Government members abstained from voting on Mr Chamberlain’s motion in the House of Commons. REACTION IN ITALY MR CHAMBERLAIN’S ANNOUNCEMENT WELCOMED United Press Association—By Electric Tel ear a ph —Copyright (Received November 3, 6.30 p.m.) ROME, November 2. Mr Chamberlain’s announcement of his desire for the early implementation

of the Anglo-Italian agreement has given the greatest satisfaction in Italy. “WIPING THE SLATE CLEAN” GENERAL PRAISE FOR MR CHAMBERLAIN United Piess Association—By Electric Telegraph—Copyright (Received November 4, 1.5 a.m.) LONDON, November 3. Reuter’s Rome correspondent says: “General praise of Mr Chamberlain in tackling world problems is felt. An era of friendship is possible, wiping the slate clean of old scores, though Italy, while she has no territorial ambitions in Spain, is not prepared to weaken the desire for Franco’s victory nor impair the Rome-Berlin axis.” First Slip in Agreement The initial step in the Anglo-Italian agreement will be Lord Perth's presentation of fresh credentials accrediting him to the King of Italy, as Emperor of Abyssinia, after which he and Count Ciano will exchange notes on November 15, declaring that the agreement has become effective. The Associated Press understands that Lord Perth is now over the age limit. His retirement from the Diplomatic Service is expected by January. Britain and Italy will begin an exchange of military information. Both will undertake to respect the independence of Saudia Arabia and Yemen. Italy undertaking not to seek political Influence in Arabia south of those territories. Britain and Italy will agree not to fortify the islands of the Red Sea. Italy will undertake not to use the East African Nationals extra territorial for military service. Italy will immediately subscribe to the 1930 naval treaty, after which Japan will be the only abstaining great power.