ROME AND BERLIN

Timaru Herald, Volume CXLIII, Issue 20929, 7 January 1938, Page 9

ROME AND BERLIN

THE AXIS EXPLAINED GUARANTEE OF MUTUAL AID The international situation in Europe cannot be made clear unless ona knows exactly the extent and trend of Italo-German collaboration usually described as the Rome-Berlin fxls (writes "Argus" from London to t.'ie New York Times). For it has come to pass that peace or war on the old Continent depends upon which way this political combination develops. The origin and gradual growth of Lie Rpme-Berlin axis, if closely investigated, form the dargest page in post-war diplomacy. But no useful end would be served by enumerating the series of mistakes committed by Great Britain and France all leading towards the throwing together of Mussolini and Hitler. Later on, the history of this period will be painful to read for politicians in London and Paris. Anyhow, nothing can wipe out this diplomatic miscarriage and now one must consider its results.

The Rome-Berlin axis represents in Europe an active political factor capable of engendering a general conflagration. What is its exact nature?

Let us say straightaway that like the Anglo-French entente, the ItaloGerman co-operation is not expressed in one formal document. No parchment exists embodying the conditions <’ the agreement.. Still in the course of the past year especially Rome and Berlin have discussed certain problems of political action and have laid down lines of agreed procedure in certain eventualities which make it possible to have a perfectly clear idea of the nature of the famous axis.

Phases of Co-operation

Italo-German co-operation falls under two main heads: First, concerted diplomatic action to assist each ot’ji: to attain the aims pursued by the rolicy. of each partner; second, military action in common In case of the necessity of meeting aggression by other Powers against both States or o.ie of them.

Unlike the Anglo-French entente, which is based upon unity of purpose between London and Paris in meeting the menace of militarism In Berlin, i. ussollni and Hitler are confronted with the difficulty that their essential interests are opposed to each other. Italy’s interest centres In the basin of t’..j Mediterranean, while Germany is principally interested in Central and Eastern Europe. Not only that, but Italian and German vital alms clash In the basin of the Danube. Had it not been for the trouble over Ethiopia Italy now would have been firmly attached to a tripartite front with Great Britain and Fr ...:e with the object of resisting the growth of German power In Central Europe. But it is useless to cry over spilt milk, and events, unfortunately, have moved In the wrong direction. Mussolini and Hitler by force of circumstances have overcome their initial mutual dislike, and now have reached i i stage of close diplomatic co-opera-tion

The rules governing the work of Italian and German diplomacies together are the followingßoth Governments consult from case to case on the best way of achieving success by action together in pursuit of a common aim or by one supporting the other’s policy aimed at a particular object. For example, Rome and Berlin act together against the Communist menace tn Europe but German diplomacy plays second fiddle to the Italian partner in th: business of non-intervention In Spain. On the other hand, the Italians back German expansion on the eastward and the German position on the question of colonies. No Treaty Obligation Still no treaty of alliance yet exists irrevocably binding Rome and Berlin to the obligation of common action and mutual support at all times. Attempts to draft such a document have been made on several occasions, but until now have not reached the stage of official ratification. Now we come to the more important military aspect of the Rome-Berlin axis Here again regular treaty obligations do not yet exist. Time after time, especially from Berlin, suggestions have been made for a regular military alliance, but until now have not gone beyond verbal discussions between experts, and the presence of II Duce at the German manoeuvres must not be taken to mean that a military alliance has already been signed, sealed, and ratified. On the other hand, it is absolutely certain that by the arrangement of both Governments their general staffs are in consultation of a permanent character to establish methods of collaboration in certain eventualities of a war in Europe. As in the prewar Anglo-French entente, these staff confabulations are not binding on the two Governments. Yet it would be foolish to underestimate their importance. As things are at present, the Italo-German military co-operation is based on the following formula accepted by both Governments:— "Both parties agree that in case one of them is attacked by more than one Power the other will come to Its assistance.”

These words express the essence of the Rome-Berlin axis as it stands at present. If, for example, Italy becomes Involved in a war with Great Britain alone Germany may stand aside, but if France joins in Germany automatically comes out on the side of Italy, and a general war is unchained in Europe. Equally in a FrancoGerman conflict Italy remains in the role of witness until or unless Great Britain enters the arena, too. No Risk of Being Alone In other words, the above formula the authenticity of which is certain insures a German guarantee to Italy against the risk of being obliged to face alone an Anglo-French combination. The British Government is aware of the existence of this binding obligation and therefore is so reluctant to adopt the point of view of its "dancing Jingoes" who lightly speak about blowing the Italians out of the Mediterranean. In Europe to-day the Anglo-French entente represents a crystallised combination In a form that Is perfectly

clear to observers. But the RomeBerlin axis is still in the stage of formative political development. It is risky to predict if the formula mentioned above will be transformed into an obligation of unconditional military support under all circumstances or if it wili be weakened by the introduction of reservations made possible by an improvement in Anglo-Italian relations.

Now perhaps the object of the persistent efforts of Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain to effect a rapprochment with II Duce becomes clearer. The Rome-Berlin axis must be prevented from developing into a permanent menace to the balance of power in Europe. Mr Chamberlain is convinced that this can be done more easily by way of Rome than by way of Berlin.