THE NAVY.

Timaru Herald, Volume XCVIII, Issue 170576, 5 August 1921, Page 7

THE NAVY.

BRITAIN’S POLICY. HOUSE OF COMMON'S DILEMMA, j By Electric Telegraph —Copyright. j| Australian mid N.Z. Cable Association, s LONDON, August 3. J

Colonel Aniery, in the House of Commons, in .submitting tho naval Estimates, including’ provision for four capital ships, said the Jailer was not a policy of competition or challenge, but simply the replacement of obsolete ships. A few hours’ actual lighting in the late war sufficed to revolutionise ideas as to tho necessary type of battleship. Other Powers were to make use of that experience. There were at present under construction whole ba. tie fleets of a typo incomparably Ha ro powerful than any afloat at the baiile of Jutland. Japan would have eight comploted by 1925, and eight more completed by 1928, while the United States have twelve of these supreme engines of war, each of over 43,000 tons, completed by 1925. The construction of lour ships could' not under the circumstances be regarded as provocative. Contrawise the Admiralty might be open to a charge of allowing the navy to fall below tlie standard of other Powers. This was a risk only justified by tho general financial situation and the desirability ol avoiding any step inviting competition in armaments on the eve of the Conference, whose object was to avoid competition. (Cheers.) In the matter of design we were not trying to steal a march on other Powers, but only bringing ourselves up-to-date, with modern developments. The new ships would be battle cruisers of the Hood type, but improved iu regard to armaments and protection in the light of war experience. They would be equipped with sixteen inchers. The day of tho capital submarine or aeroplane had not yet arrived, and therefore the capital ship remains tho pivot of naval warfare. The ships would be constructed in private yards, as the Government dockyards were not , large enough for tho Hood size. It was intended as soon as the finances would permit that the Government dockyards should be brought up to date. Mr Asquith referred to the resolution by the Imperial Conference deferring tlie commitment of naval policy until after the result of the Washington Conference. He gravely doubted if it was necessary or wise to commit ourselves to these new ships. He put their cost at £30,000,000, which was a serious commitment at the moment.

Mr Asquith said that it would be tlie worst possible policy to appear to regulate our construction by tho United States. “I hope the House would not bo induced to enter into wasteful and criminal competition with those with whom we hoped to become permanent allies. We ought only to build tlie ships necessary to provide against tlie risks of interruption to international communications.” The Rt. Hon. G. Lambert contended that new ships were_ unnecessary. Mr Lloyd George was going to Washington as a dove of peace, hut was still building after-war dreadnoughts. Sir Donald McLean, moved to reduce the vote by £IOOO. Received 8.30 p.m., August 4. LONDON, August 4.

Mr Churchill deprecated the aggravation of the situation by extreme language. It was an astonishing fact, he said, that, excepting the Hood, the leading capital units had not been, reinforced for more than seven yeais. Meantime two other navies had revolutionised construction according to the lessons learned in the late war. ‘lf wo delay another year we shall sink to tho level of a third rate naval Power, and may never recover. We would exist then as a great Power only on sufferance. Our power to guide the! events for good would cease, and wo could not extend to the Dominions that protection winch iwe have always been proud to extend. Our hopes for the success of the Washington Conference are the sincerest, hut unless we could assume that tlie ships now building in Japan and America would be scrapped, any disarmament decision a‘t Washington would he irrelevant to the decision reached to-niglit.” Received 5.5 p.m., August 4. LONDON, August 4. Colonel Aniery, continuing, said: “If we fail to construct now we stereotype the present position of inferiority. Britain must declare that she will not accept the position of definito naval inferiority. Let us be sure that ,we ban rely oh our own strength, and never allow our sea power to fall to a point when wo are forced to make entangling agreements to avoid a path which wiil lead to the greatest disaster, not only to ourselves, hut to tlie whole world. The v6te was carried.