THE MILITARY POSITION.

Timaru Herald, Volume XLI, Issue 3288, 11 April 1885, Page 3

THE MILITARY POSITION.

Having thus described the points m dispute between the two Powers, it may be as ■well to give some particulars regarding the military position of each. First and foremost there is no doubt England has an enormous advantage m having the co-operation of the Afghans. With Sir Peter Lumsden and his little army to direct operations it is evident that with our Afghan allies the Russians might be kept m check for a considerable ■ time iintil the main body of tho English troops could arrive on the scene. We know, that General Stewart has been ordered to.- take the field with 50,^00 troops, and that on the other hand, the Russians are said to be massing 60,000 troops at Baku. Thence they would be shipped across the Caspian Sea to Aekhabad, which is about 350- miles from Herat and 270 miles from Penjdeh. Quetta, whence our troops wo being concentrated, i< about 140 miles from Candahar, and 490 from Herat. Tho Russians thua have the advantage of greater proximity to the scene of action, but not so much, as to make it appear doubtful that Afghan opposition to Russia would effectually counterbalance it. On the 23rd February last, The '2V/»esgave an interesting statement as to the AngloIndian forces immediately available at fcnat time m the Quetta district arid m Scinde which conclusively showed the strength of our position. In fact, m those two districts alone we had an army equal to that of which General Komarofl! has the' command. We extract the following details and comments from the article of our contemporary. Although eight years have elapsed since Quetta was first occupied under the terms of the Treaty of 1854 with the Khan of Khelat, it is within a comparatively short period that it has acquired the great; military importance it possesses to-day. As a military station it now ranks with Peshawur, and its position amongst our Indian cantonments is unique from the fact that.it has no large city or turbulent population, to overawe. ■ The execution of General John Jacob's policy beyond the, Scinde frontier has been attended with the happiest results. ' Our presence has pacified Beloochistan and we hav.e acquired a military .position of great strategical value well m advance of the Indus. 1 Five years ago it -was feared that the new Government would relinquish the advantages acquired by their predecessors m this quarter, but fortunately Quetta and the Piflhin Valley have been retained, and after four years' neglect their full value is now appreciated, and during the lost twelve months moasures have been 'adopted to make the most of our position beyond the Bplan Fats'. The troops garrisoning the : Quetta district, •which inoludffß tho Bblnn : Pa»B and •oin»

places oast of it, as well as the Pishin Valley, are composed of regiments from the armies of the three Presidencies, although Madras is only represented by a single battalion. ' According to the latest returns of the distribution of the Anglo-Indian army, which has to be supplemented by the force at that time employed on the Zhob Valley Expedition, the Bengal troops serving m the Quetta district were 906 British infantry, 5974 native infantry, and one battery of fioyal Artillery ■with 109 men. The Bombay troops were more numerous, consisting of 2133 British infantry and two batteries of Koyal Artillery with 219 men. Tho Bombay native troops numbered 4222 infantry, 624 cavalry; and : one mountain battery with 168 men, Ihe Madras native regiment mustered 820 men. The Quetta division had, therefore, a total of 3039 British infantry j three batteries of Royal Artillery with 328 men, 11 016 native infantry, 624 native cavalry, and one battery, of native artillery with 168 men. This gives a nominal grand total of 15,175 men and 22 guns (there being only four guns to the native battery), which may bo taken as representing an efficient force of 14,500 men. But this is not all.' At the period to which these returns, relate "we-had a considerable force, actually m the field carrying on operations of war m the Zhob Valley t and m addition to the' 15,000 m.en nlreatly specified., That expedition consisted ■„■ of 1259 British infantry, one \ English battery- with 110 men, 3973 . natives, and one native mountain battery with 167 men. The Madras army was : represented by a contingent of 164 sappors. There were consequently m the Zhob Valley 1369 English and 4HOI native troops, including cavalry with 10 guns, besides the large number already mentioned as stationed m the Quetta district. When the expedition returned these 5673 men were, with the exception of some Bengal cavalry, distributed within the limits of the Quetta command and m Scinde. All the artillery was also retained, bo that we have within, the region, between the plain "of Kachhi and the Khojah Araran range an army of more than 20,000 men witli 32 guns. A very considerable part of this corps is stationed at different places m the i Pishin Valley, which is 30 miles nearer Candahar than Quetta, but according to a quite recent statement there were at Quetta alone 800 British infantry, 5000 native infantry and 1200 native cavalry. ' To the Quetta division has also to be added the garrison of Seinde. : This force distributed between Kufracheo and Jacobabad numbered, at the same time as the figures previously given relate to, 1428 British infantry, 3397 native infantry, 1015 native cavalry, and two batteries of Royal Artillory with 298 men. This gives an additional total of 6138 men and 12 guns. The Indian Government can ..therefore dispose at this moment of a force between the lower portion of the Indus and tho Pishiri Valley of more than 26,000 men and 44 guns. Of that army 6462 are Englishmen. It must also be borne m mind that this force might easily be incroasod by troops landed at Kurrachee from Bombay or elsewhere The Punjab garrison, could also spnre from five to ten thousand men for the purposes of an expedition b«yond Qnttta, so that there would be no difficulty .m despatching an army of 16,000 men into Afghanistan without any extraneous aid. It could be raised to 25,000 men by a reinforcement of 5000 troops from Bombay and the same number from the Punjab. There would . still be 11.000 men left as a garrison m Scinde, considerably more than there have been on equally critical occasions. The weak point of tho force forming the Quetta .division .is cavalry, precisely tho one m which it should be most strong. Four regiments of. horse for the whole of the region from the Indus to the Afghan frontier are too few. They ought to be doubled, Another improvement would be ito place two Horse Artillery batteries m the Pishin Valley. With. 4000 cavalry (eight regiments) and 12 guns of flying artillery, wo should have a movable force on our extreme western frontier to which Russia has not and probably- never can have m Central Asia anything to be compared. We have mentioned the resemblance between Quetta and Askhabad, and the comparison applies even as to their opmttiunications'. Askhabad is > not yet conneoted by railway with the Caspian, although tlie latest . accounts represent' the Russian authorities as pushing on the line' energetically ; neither is Quetta with the' lndus. The English Government do not Bhroud their operations m the same air of mystery as Russia is m the habit of doing ; but there are conflicting reports as to the exact point which the railway to Quetta has reached. One account has stated that it will not be concluded for ah indefinite period of three yea»-s, r but wo believe the more hopeful statement that 100 miles remain to be accomplished, and that 'this can bo done by the end of this year, represent^ the truth. ,