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THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN DIFFERENCES.

With our present issue we are enabled to i present our rpaders with an authentic map of the seat of the present difficulty m Afghanistan. It enables one not only to fix the locality of the recent encounter, but also to understand more clearly the points m dispute between England and. Russia m reference to the Afghan frontier. These were admirably sketched m a recent number of The Times, and it may be as well, perhaps, to recapitulate i the main facts as oxplained by our eon- , temporary. ■ . I > The first point to be observed is that the ■ old province of Badghees, which' by' a doubt- ' ful philological process is said to derive its 1 name from Bacchus, has at most periods, and i now continuously for a long number of years, ' been dependent on Herat, and paid tribute m i kind or otherwise to the occupiers of that i city. It waß repeatedly mentioned by the • late Ameer Shere Ali during his long official > correspondence with the Indian Government, ■ and one of his chief causes of apprehension at ' Russian expeditions against the Turcomans ■ was lest the latter after defeat should " take ' refuge m his provinco of Badghees." We • have, therefore, the claim of the Ameer to i the country immediately north of the Paro--3 pamisus and theßarkhut spur, through which f is the important Robat Pasa, established on ■ ground that cannot well be disputed. It is i more difficult to say how far north tho limits 1 of Badghees -may be ■ considered -to ex- [ tend. That is one question, but not • all, from either the Afghan point lof view or our own. It .is certain l that Afghan authority must be : established much further down the Murghab ' than it can be on the Heri Kud ; and here 1 we are talking of the direct administration of ■ the Ameer's officials. As a matter of fact, 1 something more than that has always been > deemed necessary. It would be just as un--1 reasonable to burden the Ameer with the 1 government of remote districts as it would be dangerous to make Russian and Afghan officers como into immediate contact at Penjdeh or Pul-i-Ehatum. For that reason there should be an intervening territory held by the local tribes, practically independent, but nominally subject to the Ameer, and this object would have been attained by the laying down of any frontier line from Sarakhs to the Oxus. lhe Russians would have held the Merv oasis m security, and witti it the route from Turkestan to the Caspian. Tho Ameer's officials would have resided at Penjdeh, and m a position to be selected near the Robat Pass, while the Salor and Sarik Turcomans would have retained unmolested possession of their settlements between the Murghab and the Heri Rud. For all practical purposes the delimitation of the Afghan frontier would have' thus been completed. Russia would have furnished some proof of her good intentions, and English opinion would m return have declared itself satisfied with . regard to Russian designs upon the integrity ■■ of the dominions of the Ameer of Afghanistan. Such was the solution which English Ministers contemplated as the result of the labors of the Joint Commission. The proposals brought by M. Lessar to London on behalf of the Russian Government were very different. They showed that Russia either did not believe m, or did not want, that durable arrangement of the relations of the two great Empires m Asia for which England was unaffectedly desirous, and which she believed would be attained by the 1 arrangement just sketched out. > M. Lessar did not come to London to 1 discuss the English propositions, but to carry J- certain points which, once conceded, would render any Commiaaion at all unnecessary, ■ and would place tho Afghan hold upon g Herat at the discretion of tho nearest 0 Russian officials. M. Lcsaar put forward the Q Czar a pretension on ethnological grounds to a exercise authority over all the Turcoman tribes. There is nothing new m this claim - for Genoral Petroosevitch deolared before Geok Tepe was taken that the occupation of Merv would carry .-with it the incorporation - of the whole Turcoman people m the Russian dominions. Merv has been occupied, and some elders of the Salor clan, whose camping places are close to the northern . outlet of the Robat Pass, have given 2 m their adhesion to the Russian i, authorities. By this act, to which the 3 presence, of a Cossack detachment at Ful-i-Khatum gives increased significance, - the Russians maintain that their authority is ■. firmly established on the middle course of the - Heri Rud up to the. western spurs.: of the s Paropamisan range, and that it is impossible - for them to think of withdrawing from posif tions which' they have once occupied. • This i. declaration is of the highest political imports ance, but it must be regarded as still more 5 important m the light of what follows. The t Heri Bud valley being thus' seized by Russia J on the plea of the voluntary acceptance of her c rule by the Solars, it follows that where the » Solars have been m the habit of encamping 1 there the Russians will have a right to go s and certainly to exclude others from ) going. In this manner tho district of J Badghees, which has been unquestionably a dependency of the Ameer is to be quietly b appropriated by Russia. Having once turned i the flank of this province the Russian s authorities declare that there is no practical b frontier for Afghanistan except the Paroo pamiaus, and that Colonel Alikhanoff 'a out- • poßts from Merv are now so far advanced up s the Murghab that even on that river it is f impossible to allow the Ameer's authority to extend below Penjdeh. On the. eastern side of the Badghees district Russia, would suggest ' aa her- boundary the Kushk stream, thus acquiring tb» complete possession of a wedge

thrust m between the two principal rivers of North-west Afghanistan, effectually commanding the road from Herat to Meshed with the Afghan outposts at G-horian and Kushan, and placing the Cossack pickets on the Kushk stream, -within forty miles ef Herat itself. Commenting on these demands, The Times further observed — " The arguments with which those claims are advanced declare with ironical candor that there is no other feasible frontier line, and thulit will be no great loss to the Ameer to surrender his nominal rights m Badghees. It is a sufficient reply to these declarations to point out that Russia, after violating her oft-renewed pledge not to annex Merv, consented to delimit the Afghan frontier from Saraklis to the Oxus. 11. Lessar's mission is a distinct infraction of ~ the diplomatic arrangements come to between the two countries last spring. It has been authorised for the express purpose of making proposals which are .m flagrant contravention of the principles enunciated at the commoncoment of tho negotiations. They would entail a distinct ' violation of the integrity of Afghanistan — one of the cardinal points of English policy— for if Badghees is not Afghan neither is Maimena nor Badakshan. Their after-consequences would be more insidious still. It is not saying too much to declare that the exercise of the Ameer's authority would be impossible m Herat once the Russians were established on'the Kushk river. Either a collision or on alliance would inevitably ensued. The retention of Penjdeh by the Ameer would be rendered unmeaning and valueless when the Russians had outflanked that position by a movement m tho direction "of . Kila-i-Maur. Were M. Lessar to carry his points the Ameer Abdurrahman would be justified m feeling aggrieved, and m considering that we had sacrificed his rights and disregarded his interests. M. Lessar 's arguments are specious and plausible, and if wo were compelled to accept tho onward advance of Russia towards India as inevitable there would be force m Mb representations that frontiers must be marked by either mountains or rivers. But those who put forward this argument overlook; the fact that the English Government is' pledged by its declarations at St. Pebarsburghand by its promises at Cabul to maintain the integrity of Afghanistan. So long as we are true to our engagements, it necessarily follows that Kussia is arrested on the threshold of any great scheme of ambition, and that she can only reach the Indian frontier after having overcome the resistance of the Afghans supported by the men and resources of the ! Indian Empire. M. Lessay's mission has so far failed, because it implied a violation of diplomatic etiquette, and also because it ran directly counter to all the most solemn and binding expressions of English policy m Afghanistan and Central Asia."

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https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/THD18850411.2.21

Bibliographic details

Timaru Herald, Volume XLI, Issue 3288, 11 April 1885, Page 3

Word Count
1,455

THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN DIFFERENCES. Timaru Herald, Volume XLI, Issue 3288, 11 April 1885, Page 3

THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN DIFFERENCES. Timaru Herald, Volume XLI, Issue 3288, 11 April 1885, Page 3