NOTES FROM LONDON.

Taranaki Herald, Volume LXVII, Issue 16454, 5 June 1919, Page 3

NOTES FROM LONDON.

THE FRENCH CONTROVERSY

REPLY BY MB. ASQUITH

By Telegraph—Press Assn.—Copyright

LONDON, June 3,

Mr. Asquith, speaking at a complimentary luncheon, replied to the statements in Lord French’s book. Mr. Asquith complained that Lord French had been given access to official and confidential documents to build up a case against men whose lips were closed, some by death, others by official restraint. It was a flagrant breach of tho best traditions of the public service. None knew better than Lord French that his charge against the Liberal Government or callousness in failing to ■supply sufficient guns and shells was without foundation. Documents which iwoiild bo, published shortly would prove that Lord French’s report of Lord Kitchener’s visit to Paris in September, 1914, was a travesty on the real facts. Prior to tho dispatch of Lord Kitchener to Paris, Lord French’s intended movements had filled the Government with consternation, and the Parisian Government feared that the French array was going to be left in the lurch.

Mr. Asquith flatly denied Lord French’s assertion that he advocated high explosives instead of shrapnel before the war. Mr. Asquith quoted a document showing that Headquarters asked the Government in November, 1914, to reduce the percentage of high explosives from 50 to 25 per cent. Mr. Asquith quoted Lord Kitchener’s letter, written on the eve of the famous Newcastle speech, in which ho said Lord French had told him that with tho present supply of ammunition he would have as much as the troops were able to use for the 1 next attack. Mr. Asquith accepted full responsibility for Lord French’s recall, which had no more to do with shells than the eclipse of the moon. THE 1914 CAMPAIGN. LONDON, May 23. Lord French, in a further article in tho Daily Telegraph, states: “In September 1 formed the opinion that it was extremely desirable to push coastwise and northward and drive the Germans from the sea. Mr. Churchill enthusiastically supported tho plan and promised an absolutely devastating naval support.” Lord French anticipated Joffre and tho French Government would oppose the plan. Mr. Churchill, on December 8, wrote stating that Lord Kitchener fully agreed with the plan, promising to send tho 27th Division. Cabinet next day strongly urged the plan upon the French Government, which referred the question to General Joffre. Ho rejected it, as he had another elsewhere, “which,” says Lord French, “was a very feeble substitute.”

Mr. Churchill continued to press the matter, urging Lord French again to put the Admiralty views before General Jolfrc. Lord Kitchener, in a memorandum, of January 0, 1915, showed that the War Council had abandoned the coastwise advance on tho grounds that it would ho too costly and would extend the lino too far. Heavy reinforcements could not be furnished without disorganising the general arrangements, and a sufficient supply of ammunition was not available to ensure carrying the project through to a conclusion, though every effort was being made in all parts of the world in order to obtain an unlimited supply. Tho War Council flt«o anticipated a strong German attack in tho near future, which could better be resisted in tho existing prepared positions. Lord French disagrees with those objections solatium, and mentions that largo train-loads of ammunition traversed Franco for a few months later, bound for tho Dardanelles. He considers those reasons for rejecting the Elan for a coastal attack illogical. Proably tho true explanation was to bo found in tho War Council’s memorandum of January 9, in which tho view was expressed that operations on the west front would probably develop into a stalemate, and that it would bo necessary to find another theatre of war where decisive results were obtainable. Lord French’s opinion was invited on the matter. Lord French replied, discussing all possible theories, including Gallipoli. He said tho attack on Turkey would bo devoid of a decisive result. Tho only decisive theatre was Germany itself. Lord French added; “It is quite feasible to break the Gorman line with a sufficiency of guns and high explosive shells. in any case it would be unsafe to withdraw troops from tho western front, which is vital, and where alone decisive results are obtainable.”

General Joffre expressed a final opinion on May 19, 1916, that if was necessary to bo prepared for a German offensive in'the near future. The front must be made absolutely secure. The Allies must be ready to assume the offensive. Reserves were absolutely necessary, and all secondary operations, including the Flanders coast attack, must give way thereto. , Lord French concludes that he always disagreed with these views, and remains convinced that his plans should have been accepted and tried, whereas those actually employed only resulted in feeble and unsuccessful attempts to break tho German lino, and absolute failure at tho Dardanelles.

SOME .PRESS COMMENTS

LONDON. May 23. The AA’cstminstcr G:\-uotte recalls Lord French’s eulogy of Lord Kitchener in the House of Lords on June 20, 1916, yet persecution has again lifted its ugly head. The Gazette asks whether Lox’d French did not intend to retire on his base and leave the French army in the lurch; whether the French Government did not protest earnestly, and Cabinet thereupon deputed Lord Kitchener personally to convey to Lord French their decision that he should not retire as proposed. Apart from tho anti-Kitchener Northcliffe press, the newspapers generally consider Mr. Asquith has dissipated Lord French’s accusations. They especially draw attention to Lord French’s eulogy of Mr. Asquith three days after the Liberal Government’s fall, whereas Lord French now states be engineered the fall in order to save the country from ruin.— Aus.-N.Z. Cable Assn.