The Taranaki Herald. NEW PLYMOUTH, APRIL 18, 1868.

Taranaki Herald, Volume XVI, Issue 821, 18 April 1868, Page 2

The Taranaki Herald. NEW PLYMOUTH, APRIL 18, 1868.

Eowever much we may dissent from the opinions expressed by Mr. Brown in the Provincial Council Chamber on Tnosdiy last, with regard to the manner in which the office of Superintendent should be filled, yet we freely admit that he is entitled to a certain amount of credit for so candidly placing them before the public. Of course in his character of representative of the Omata District in the House of Representatives, it is his duty to be explicit to his constituents respecting his political opinions, but it is a course which all our members have not yet thought proper to pursue. Although tho resolution which obtained the sanction of the Council was one which simply asked the Superintendent to call a public meeting, in order to discuss the propriety of altering the form of government in this Province, yet in speaking to that question Mr. Brown went straight to the mark at which he aimed, that is — the proposal to substitute an officer nominated by the General Government for a Superintendent elected by the people. The reason which he advanced to show that such a radical change in the appointment of our Chief Magistrate is desirable, may be reduced to the following propositions :—: — First, That an elected Superintendent being in an independent position, was apt on slight provocation to fight the Central Government to the detriment of the public service. Second, That when elected jhjf^vas absolutely beyond the control of 'the Provincial Council or the people. Third, That he could of his own will expend the public revenue without appropriation by the Provincial Council. His arguments in favour of a nominated Superintendent may be stated as follows : — First, That having the confidence of the Colonial Government, he would be able to amalgamate the two services and thus reduce the expenditure. Second, That greater discretionary powers would bo given to hinv on all matters affecting the interests of the Colony. Third, That in all questions which were purely local he would be controlled by an Executive, having the confidence of the Provincial Council. Before we enter into tho discussion of such an important question, it is desirable that we should first state the principles involved in our system of government, in order to form some conclusion as to which is the best course to pursue at such a juncture. When a constitution was first proposed to be granted to New Zealand, its physical configuration was no doubt taken into consideration, and suggestod i that distinctive character which Provincial institutions possess, and which has so I singnlarly and successfully contributed to the colonisation and progress of the Colony. That it is of a most liberal character, and calculated in a high degree to promote the happiness and prosperity of any community which would interest itself in its working, and possessed intelligence enough, to carry out its principles to their legitimate conclusions, no unprejudiced person will

dispute; and if Provincial institutions in their practical working", havo in some measure fallen short of the height to which their great capability might have carried them, we will endeavour to show that it is not the result of any inherent defect of principle, but from causes which with any other form of government would have resulted in evils of far greater ' magnitude than those which now afflict the Colony. According- to John Stuart Mill, there are three conditions which must bo fairly fulfilled in order to produce the good working of any system of government. First, That the people will accept it. Second, That they bo willing and able to sustain it. Third, That they are willing and able to do what it requires of them to fulfil its purposes. These conditions have been fulfilled by the people of New Zealand, as far as tho first and second is coucei-ned, but as regards the third that has not been the case, aud it is to the sad neglect of their political duties that all tho evils under which we now labour can bo surely traced. The remedy is not to be found in deprivingtho people of a chance of adequately performing their political duties, but by endeavouring to teaoh them their full extent, and create a desire to ' perform them. There is no doubt that a democratic form of government such as ours, requires for its successful development, not only an intelligent people, but one who value the privilege they possess, and will zealously exercise it. Has this been the case in this Province ? how often have we seen members returued for the House of Representatives, and the Pi'ovincial Council, who in returning thanks for the great honor done them, have been obliged to air their eloquence for the sole benefit of their proposer and seconder, and a solitary individual or two the only representatives of the free and independent electors. In fact the only election in which the public generally take an interest, and will trouble themselves to record their vote is | in the election of the Superintendent, and if the people are deprived of this privilege, it will ultimately have the effect of deadening that healthy feeling of the possession of power, responsibility, and public obligation which at certain intervals pervades every section and class of society, and keeps alive that feeling of patriotism which we would not willingly see die. We have stated that the evils under which the Colony now labours being falsely alleged as due to provincial institutions, are rather the consequonce of apathy on the part of the electors with regard to the free exercise of their political rights ; and we now further state that from its earliest infancy until now the Colony has been governed by a minority, who are directly interested in a large Government expenditure, the means for which are unfairly j wrested from the people b}- the agency of a Customs duty which exacts its black mail not according to an individual's wealth and stake in the country, not from those colonial sybarites who drain the country of its wealth to luxuriate iv European cities, but from the striving settler, according to the number of mouths which he has to feed and bodies to clothe. A more monstrous and dishonest system of laying the State burdens, andonesouttei*ly subversive of all good government, it is scarcely possible to conceive, and so demoralising in its effects that it appears to the amazed student of our political institutions not as the result of representative Government, but rather as the scheme of a self elect oligarchy, whose chief aim seems to be to relieve themselves from any contribution whatever towards the support of the State, at the expense of their poorer fellow settlers. Having briefly reviewed our system of government, its capabilities of success, and its cause of failure, we will now investigate the soundness of Mr. Brown's deductions as regards the necessity for altering the mode of selecting tho Chief Magistrate of the Province. First, That an elected Superintendent is apt to fight the General Government. That is a sound reason why we should retain the system — local interests frequently require a champion to fight its battles — not as Mr. Brown used to be when Superintendent in a condition of normal antagonism to the General Government — not to insist on a pitched battle on every trivial question of abstract right where a difference might occur, but on all questions of local importance, it is highly necessary that there should be some officer independent of the General Government, whose duty would be to maintain the rights of the Province Mr. Brown stated that a nominated Superintendent would in that position act as a buffer. We accept the term — he would be a buffer to all intents and purposes, but we submit that he would be only a [single action one, | to absorb all the blows aimed at the j Central Government, but would afford no protection to us against those given in return. From the second proposition we entirely differ ; no Superintendent can now successfully resist the united voice of ; the Council, if they choose to exercise their | power, especially if the people support the j Council. With regard to the third, in which he states that the Superintendent" can expend money without its being appropriated by the Council, this is entirely incorrect ; and we would refer him to the "Provincial Audit Act, I860," for a confirmation of our assertion ; and with respect to the position in which a nominated Superintendent would stand to the Provincial Council, it would be a most anomalous one, for according to Mr. Brown, he would have no veto on any acts of the Council as regards provincial matters, but would be entirely controlled by an Executive which the Council would appoint. And as to the power which ho would derive from the Colonial Government, we are aware how very limited thoso powers would be "and how circumscribed in all directions by inflexible k rules, which

would have to be religiously observed. Tii such a position there would be no room for a man of ability — the greatest administrative genius would bo smothered in a month IjFhe could not reconcile himself to travel in the narrow official grove laid down to confine his progressive steps ; none but the true official mind could possibly exist in such an utter abnegation of all the higher functions for a chiei executive officer. Then when we consider that an officer appointed to that position by the General Government would be paid at least £500 por annum, we cannot see where any saving could bo effected ; on the contrary, it would tend to tho increase of expend'ture in all departments. The office of Superintendent of a Province is one of such high distinction that it would be sought for, oven if there were little or no emolument attached to it, provided that tho attendance at office was confined say one day per week, and the practical duties of the department supervised by a permanent secretary. We do not fear for the result of this proposal, either at a public meeting or at the Provincial Council . Thte people of this Province will not willingly relinquish their power — they are not so utterly fascinated with the charm 8 of centralism that they are willing to place their political rights at tiie disposal of the Central Government for experimental purposes ; and if such a result should be achieved through the instrumentality of tho General Assembly, it will be an act ol political garrotting, which is now becoming a common occurrence. Session after session wo see -Acts passed on the principle of which the country has no possible means ofexpressing its opinion until they are law, as witness the Local Government Bill of last session, an Act of 400 clauses, which was to take the place of the comparatively simple enactments of the Provinces. In short, centralism tends to huge unwieldy enactments and rigid circumscribed rules for the conduct ot public business, provincialism to simplicity and elasticity in its ordinances to suit the ever-changing conditions of a progressive community in their struggle for victory with nature over the material world.