ILLEGAL TOTALISATOR

Taranaki Daily News, 1 February 1933, Page 4

ILLEGAL TOTALISATOR

machines on dog tracks APPEAL COURT’S DECISION. EFFECT OF ENGLISH JUDGMENT. A considered judgment with regard to the legality of totalisators on greyhound racing courses was given in the King’s Bench Divisional Court composed of the Lord Chief Justice (Lord Hewart) and Justices Avory and Branson, says the Evening Post’s London correspondent. ■ • , Mr. Irwin Shuttleworth, secretary oi the Northern Bookmakers’ and Backers’ Protection Association, Limited, appealed against a decision of Mr. Horace Marshall, the Leeds stipendiary magistrate, who had dismissed summonses under the Betting Act, 1853, against the Leeds Greyhound Association, Limited, for being the occupiers of a totalisator on their racing track and permitting it to be used for betting. The respondents, the Leeds Greyhound Association, Limited, were charged before the Leeds , stipendiary magis-: trate on tw6 summonses alleging that,: being the occupiers’ of a totalisator at the ’Leeds greyhound racecourse, in March last they -Unlawfully permitted it to be used by other persons for the purpose of. money being .received on be-, half of' such other persons as. the con-: sideration : for ah undertaking to pay thereafter money on a contingency re-j lating to a greyhound race, or for. securing the payment by other persons of money on such a' contingency, con-; trary to the Betting Act, 1853, section; 1. ' The respondents, Mr; C. Ridley Sut-> cliff* and Mr. Mark Barker, employees; of the company, wsre charged with aid-; ing' and abetting. - I It was admitted that the respondent association were occupiers of the- fotal-> isator, and. the magistrate found that they had permitted the keeping of a “place.” The magistrate, however, found' that it was not a “place” within themeaning of section 1 of the Betting Act, 1’853, although the association had permitted the use of a place for distributing bets by the betting public, and had taken percentages therefor/and he dis-, missed the summonses. Mr. Cornyns Carr, K.C., and Mr. Gil-; bert’ Beyfus appeared for the appcl-. larit; Sir William Jowitt, K.C., and Mr.; Dingle Foot for the respondents. JULIUS TOTALISATOR. The totalisator in operation was a “Julius All-electric Totalisator,” the; property of Totalisators, Ltd. It was worked by that,, company through a; company called the Tote Operators Ltd.,; under license of the respondent associa- j tion, by virtue ,of an agreement en-, tered into’ between the association and: Totalisators Ltd. The licensee coven-' anted to' pay the * assbdiatiori. . It was; provided that the ■’licensees, should, be! entitled to retain out' of the turnover, moneys passing through the totalisator; not less than 10 pet cent, of the turn-' over. - . .... , ... . . i “The language of ’section 1 of the; Betting Act, 1853,” said Lord Hewart, in, the course, of his judgment, .“is some-; what involved by reason of thfe anxiety of the draughtsmen to guard against; evasions of it. It will tend to clearness if it is dissected ’ and words not; applicable .to. the - present case are omitted. ' So treated', the section reads as .follows:— ■■ ‘ !. ,5-. . “ ’No place shall be kept. “ ‘(1) For the purpose of the occupier, thereof betting with persons resorting thereto, or ■ ■'• • “ ‘(2) For the purpose of' any money or valuable thing being received by or on behalf of such occupier as aforesaid. ■. . “ ‘(a) As for the consideration for any assurance, undertaking, promise, or agreement, express or implied, to pay or give thereafter any money or valuable thing on any event or contingency of or relating to any race; or “‘(b) As for the consideration for securing the paying or giving by some other person of any money or valuable thing on. any .such.. event or. contingency as aforesaid. . . .’ PAYMENT OF A PERCENTAGE. .“It. is not, .and could .not .be, contended that the respondents had ■ committed any offence against . that part ,of the section which .is. marked ‘l’ in our dissection of it.’ This result follows from the decision of the House of Lords in Attorney-General v.~ Luncheon and Sports Club,' Limited, 1929/ where it was held! that.’the operators .of a totalisator do not make bets or. wagers with, the persons who stake their money through the totalisator. “The operators of a- totalisator, however, do receive money, arid if they receive it as- the consideration for any promise, thereafter or .implied,. to pay any money thereafter to anyone on any event or contingency-of, or relating to, a race, the place which, they keep for the purpose of so. receiving tbh money is;’ in -onr opinion, - within the ordinary meaning of the language used in that part of the -section -which Is distinguished above' as ‘2 (a).’ ’ “The money paid to the operators of a totalisator is not a., gift. They are entitled, in the ordinary course of the events, contemplated, alike by themselves and by those who pay their moriey to them, to put .into their own. pocket a percentage of each payment’ they receive.” A BETTING ESTABLISHMENT. After 'dealing k with the crises' Powell v. Kempton Park Racecourse Company, apd .Hawke, y. Dunn, 1897, rind Lord Halsbury’s decision, the Lord Chief Justice went on to say:— “It seems to me clear that the tning against which the enactment is levelled is any place used in the sense I have explained. There must be a business conducted,, and there must be an owner, occupier, manager, keeper, or some person who, if these designations do not apply, must nevertheless be some other person who is analogous to and is of the same genus as' the owner, keeper, or occupier, who bets or is willing to bet with the persons who resort to his house, room or other place.

“In this view it is not an offence under this Act of .Parliament to allow persons to . assemble for the; purpose - of betting with -each other; there is, upon this hypothesis, no' business being-con-ducted at all. The different betting people, or each individual bettor, is conducting his'dSvn bu'sifiess, and doing it in a house, used, indeed, but only ’used, just as he might do it on the racecourse or on the high road. There is no betting establishment at all;., and there is po keeper of one.” RESPONDENTS RECEIVED MONEY. His Lordship next referred to the case of Reg. -v. Hobbs. “In pur view,” he said,, “Reg. v. Hobbs wag decided upon the. particular facts of the case, which differ,, from those of the present case in two most material re-, spects.” In the present case the respondents did receive money as or for the consideration of a promise to pay, and to pay upon the event of a race. Sir William Jowitt, for the respondents, argued that the decision in the Hobbs case could be explained only on the assumption

that , the Court had placed on the words, in section 1 the limitation, that the per-; son receiving the money must have re-> coived it in pursuance of a bet mado ■ with himself. ■ ; “If this view were correct, said his Lordship, “as .in bur'.opinion it is not, then HObbs’ case would be in conflict with the later decision’ iii the case of Reg. V. Stoddart. ! In that case there was, it is titue, the " fact that Stoddart had made a contract, which: some members of the. Court thought was indistinguishable from a bet, but the distinction .drawn' by all the Judges" was- not that Stoddart- had made .a. bet .wherbas Hobbs had not',.but; that’ Stoddart had made a coptract, and Hobbs -had not. “The judgment .of .Mr. Justice Wills is a clear authority . that the words of the section are to be construed in their natural and ordifiaiy sense," and'are not to be.limited in the way suggested. • ’SCOTTISH CASE. “The last case relied upon by....thie respondents is!,Strathbrn: v, ths\ Scottish Greyhoppd Racing. .Company, Ltd. It is nbt a Which; is this Court, but.it. is needless to. say that we Should riot differ from if without the most anxious consideration. Having given it that consideration we._ observe two) things: First, that twb .members of the Court arrived at the deefsion; given with obvious' reluctance, in feeling that tliey were bound by authority; and, secondly, that that . authority was the opinion of Lord Halsbury in .Powell v. Kempton Park Racecourse Co., which, for reasons already given, we think was not dealing with the part of section 1 of the Act of 1853 material to the, case before us. <.. \ “For these reasons. w6 are of opinion that the respondents. committed the offence with which they, are charged, under the first of the two summonses. We are confirmed in this opinion .by the argument of Mr. Comyna Garr for the appellants. . ': ■ c “On the construction which we have adopted, section 6 of the Act is necessary to prevent a mere stakeholder, from coming within the. Act. . If the other construction were the .correct one, section 6 would be quite uniietessary. “Having come- to this decision - upon the first summons, ■we .do not consider it necessary to express any opinion aS to the.second. . ~ • “The case'must go back -ta the learned magistrate, with the. direction that the respondents were guilty of the charge made against them in the first summons.” '... •'