THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN

Taranaki Daily News, 15 August 1931, Page 12

THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN

STAMM’S GREAT EXPERIMENT

“STARVING RUSSIA GREAT.”

WHAT WILL HAPPEN IN 1933 T

(By Frank Whitaker in John O’ London’s ’Weekly.)

In 1927 it was touch-and-go with Russia. Lenin had been dead three years, and his mighty drive was losing its momentum. Industry 7 was moribund, and attempts to organise the harvest were in revolt; the cities groaned, under a new tyranny worse than the old. Behind the scenes Moderates and Extremists fought desperately for power. Personal loyalties anil antipathies cut across cherished doctrines. On the one hand stood. Trotsky, creator of the Red Army, the chess-player turned strategist," still the idol of millions. On the other stood Joseph Stalin, the shoemaker's son from Georgia,, who had been intended for the priesthood but became a revolutionary instead. The ono believed in ruthlessness —the peasants must be taught that the State master; their crops must be requisitioned; they- must be taxed to. the last penny. The other urged ■ caution persuasion rather than force. . The public knew little of Stalin, but Lenin had spotted him. It was he, in fact, who gave him his name —the name than means steel, the Man. of Steel. Already Stalin had won an important victory. Trotsky had gone to the 'Caucasus for his health while Lenin lay dying. He returned to find, himself deposed, from command of the army. With a gesture of contempt Stalin ordered him to prepare schemes for electrical development instead. Trotskv submitted, and submitted again. One by one his friends submitted—or disanpeared. Late in. 1927 Stalin played his trump card, and won. Trotsky was expelled from the Communist party for “anti-party activities.” In January, 1928, .he- left Russia for good.. The extremists were now without a leader, but they were still powerful. They threatened to start a revolution within a revolution. Stalin found it imperative to create a diversion which would satisfy them without alienating his own followers. The famous Fiveyear Plan was the result. It would be going too- far to- assert that but ,for Trotsky there would have been no Plan. Russia’s economic straits made the introduction of some such scheme certain, sooner or later. But it was largely due to Trotsky’s disappearance that it came when it did, and took the form it did. How well Stalin’s tactics succeeded may be judged from the fact that of 5000 men who went into exile with Trotsky all but 300 have since returned repentant. The Plan came into force late in ' 1928, and has therefore, run about half its course. Its object, in a sentence, is “to starve Russia great.’’ A hundred and forty million people.are tightening their belts, going without food, fuel and adequate clothing, in. order that Russia may arm herself with maehimw —machines from abroad, machines feverishly put together at home, machines that will enable Communist Russia to challenge- the world. Now and again the people reach desperation point. Then the flow of- exports is temporarily checked until the crisis is over. . It is the biggest industrial experiment, the biggest single attempt to dragoon the human spirit, in history, but most people know very little about it. What they do know is usually a distortion of truth. For that the Russian Government itself is large’y to blame. It does not encourage inquiry, and the moral and political questions involved in the experiment make it difficult to approach it with an open mindBut what the world wants to know are the facts. What is the motive for, the Plan’ Is it succeeding? What effect is it having on world supplies? Will the Russia of 1933 dominate foreign markets? All these questions are answered clearly, and without apparent bias, in “The Soviet Five-Year Plan,” by H. h. Knickerbocker. Mr. Knickerbocker is an American journalist. To get his, material he travelled 10,000 miles in two months. Not long, but long enough for a man who knows exactly where to find Ids information. Although he does no say so, Mr. Knickerbocker was evidently’ given .special facilities, and I, see that’ the Soviet Government thinks enough of his book to put it oil sale .in its bookshop in London. Yet its criticisms of the Soviet regime are ‘■uflicL ently frequent and outspoken to satisfy its bitterest opponents. It is a tribute to Mr. Knickerbocker’s intellectual honesty that he seems to be accepted by both sides. The motive for the Plan can be stated in one word. It is fear. Lenin taught his followers to expect attacks from outside, if not by force of, arms, then by means of the boycott. If Russia recovered slowly capitalistic countries would be warned in time. But a sudden spurt would catch them off their guard, and before they had time to adapt themselves to the new conditions the Soviet Union would be a powerful, self-contained, highly-organised • unit, capable of supplying all its military and. economic needs. And, then, for the world re volution t.

That is the theory. To put it into operation 2069 foreign experts were imported. Half of them are Americans; the .rest Germans, Italians, Szeclio-Slo-vakians, Swedes, Norwegians and. British. They are well paid and, considering everything, well fed. By 1930 they had succeeded in doubling the production of 1913 r arid increasing by 24.2 per cent, the production of 1929. This increase is 2.8 per cent, better’than the figures laid down, in the Plan, but is 7.1 per cent, behind what are known as the ‘‘control figures” —an unsuccessful attempt to squeeze the Plan into four years instead of five. Primary industry, in the same period, increased by 37.7 per cent., but the consumption goods industry increased by only 11.1 ' per cent. The most criticised industry of all—coal—increased its output by 17.6 per cent. But the cost of production fell by only 7.1 per cent, compared with 11.8 per cent, laid down in the Plan. Quality of production, says Mr. Knickerbocker, is very poor, but even so the net result is far in advance of what Russia has produced in the past. Later figures than Mr. Knickerbocker’s are now available. They are, of course, from Moscow itself and allowance must be made for the propagandist impulse. Nevertheless, they are impressive. Compared with 1914, oil production has increased threefold; coal production has increased from 29 million tons to 83 million tons; electric power has more than doubled; steel output has doubled. The figures of grain production are even more instructive. In 1928 the peasants produced 85 per cent., the Kulaks, or well-to-do farmers, 13 per cent., and the State farms, 2 per cent. This year, according to the estimate, the State farms will produce 59.7 per cent., 46.8 per cent, will come from the peasants, and only 2.5 per cent, from the Kulaks, three million of whom have been deprived of thei ■ property. The Plan, as I have said, has only reached the half-way mark, aiid already its effect has been, felt from Tokio to Vancouver. The Governments of France, Roumania, Hungary, Belgium, Canada and Bulgaria have taken protective action, and other Government are being urged to do the same. Let us now try to anticipate the position in 1933,. when the Plan is in full swing. It will be' convenient to do so under the heads of those key commodities, on which Russia is specially concentrating. Asbestos: In 1913 production was 13,762 tons. In 1930 it was 56,900 tons, and in 1933 it is expected to be 250,000 tons, If this estimate is realised it will be worth to Russia nearly twice the entire world production in 1928. Russia possesses a vast store of this indispensable commodity —a single highgrade deposit 36 miles long, estimated to> contain twelve million tons.

Steel: At Magnetogorsk, in the Urals, is the biggest and the most vital undertaking iu the Plan, “Here,” says Mr. Knickerbocker, “is the largest construction camp in the world, at the base of the most highly concentrated deposit of iron ore in the world, which American engineers, operating under the biggest contract ever closed in engineering history, are helping to turn into what is planned to become the greatest steel centre on earth.” The _ deposit is a mountain of almost solid iron, three miles long, two miles broad, and 1090 feet high. Thirty-five thousand people are working on it. Cary, in tho United States, is at present the world’s greatest steel-making centre. It produces 3,400,099 tons a year. Magnetogorsk is planned to produce 4,999,000 tons a year. Its drawback is that it *s a long way from a fuel supply, but the foreign engineers who are supervising its development have complete faith in its future. , .. * Agricultural Machinery: 'At btalin•grad (formerly Tsaritsin) is a huge new factory which in May was expected to produce 10,090 tractors, and from Ju.y onwards 12,500 a month. These figuies are not likely to be realised, owing to delays in obtaining certain machinery. The'factory, which contains an assembly building a quarter of a mile long and 105 yards wide, was built in three months—a world record. Other factories are expected to bring the total pioduction to 150,000 tractors a yea.. Timber: The chief export—quintupled iu the first two years of the Plan. Already Russia exports as much as Finland and’ the United States did together in 1929. By 1933 she is scheduled to export 109 thousand million board feet -—more than six times the present total production of the five chief exporting countries. Yet the Soviet authorities insist that their annual cut- does not equal a quarter of the annual growth. (Mr. Knickerbocker found practically no forced labour employed in ihe districts open to visit, but believes there may be as many as 1,500,900 political exiles in the northern lumber camps. The Soviet authorities say they are paid like ordinary labourers, but forbidden to leave the district to which they are assigned.) Iu 1930 Great Britain imported twice as much Russian timber as in 1925. Wheat: The Soviet Government has to pay no interest on capital investment in the land —it got its land for nothing—and. thua has a big advantage over foreign competitors. It is iinpossibls to give export figures for wheat and rye owing to the Government’s rigid, secrecy, but Mr. Knickerbocker clearly shows . that tho gram is being sold at a loss. The largest wheat farm in the world—looo square tniles—is at, Gigant, in the Caucasus. Between six and° seven, million. • peasant households have-been ‘fgdleefayiaed, 5 ’.-. ■ oi >

Oil: Abricft, the great oil trupt ;cen- : tred on Baku, has accomplished tha task set by the Plan in two and.a Half years. Pre-war Russia produced nearly •63,000,000 barrels a year. Production in 1939 was nearly 120 millionV and 152 million was the figure ’ originally fixed for 1933. This has now been altered, to 289 million barrels —a quarter of th» United States- production and double Venezuela’s. (Venezuela is at present second only to America). Manganese: In two years .Russia has become the world’s biggest producer of this indispensable mineral for strengthening steel and glass-makings Her exports are causing much concern in India, Brazil and the United States, and they "are likely to increase iu the near future.

Electric Power: A new city to house' 509,099 people, and the largest power plant in the world, are being built at Dniepostroy, on the Dnieper. Others are planned on the Volga and Dake Baikal. By 1933 it is estimated that Russia will be third (to the United States and Germany) among the power-, producing nations, instead of tenth, as she was when the plan began..

These are only a few illustrations of the gigantic, audacious task to which Stalin has set his hand. When every allowance has been made for exaggeration, no thinking person can' fail to bp impressed by them. In. two and a half years the Plan has come to touch the life of the nation at every point. Even games are dedicated to the ? common, purpose. There is a Five-Year Plan for chess and draughts! It was announced by no less a person than Krylenko, the Attorney-General, who declared: “Away with chess for chess’ sake. Tournaments, match play and competition of all sorts must aid the creative spirit of the masses and not be ends in themselves. The Plan element must be introduced. Wo’ must organise brigades of shock-troop chess and draught-- players.” It was discovered that there were 380,999 players in 1929. By October, 1933, the order went forth, the number must be increased to 4,009,090 and efficiency must improve. “This is no joke/’ says Mr. Knickerbocker) ‘‘but a deadly serious affair.” One of two questions remain to bd asked. How long will the rank and fit® stand it? Before the war the Russian workman was notoriously lazy and unreliable. Can he have changed hi character in a generation? A nation must live by faith. What hope has the Russian working man of the future? Will the Plan founder on the shortcorninga of the individual? A story is told of two citizens of Moscow who met in the street. “Where are you going in such a hurry?” asked one. “I’m going to jump in the river,” re- - plied the other. “There’s no more bread, no more meat, no more milk, and no more butter. It’s the river for me.” “But wait a bit,” said the first. “Wait till the Plan is over and there’ll be plenty of everything.” ; ‘‘lf I wait there’ll be no more —ater,” said the second citizen, pushing on resolutely towards the river.

It is easy for us, looking on from afar, to shake our heads and say that the jest contains a grim truth. Truth about the Old Russia —perhaps; but not about the New. Youth, in Mr. Knickerbocker’s phrase, is the Government’a biggest asset. There are about l twentyfiive million people in the New Russiabetween the ages of 15 and 25 who have had no contact whatever with the outside world, and none of whom remembers more than dimly the pre-way re-

gime. It w difficult (says Mr. Knickerbocker) for an outsider to realise the power over such a body of isolated youths of a system wherein every publiclj spoken or printed word, every avenue of instruction and information, .every lee' ture platform, book, magazine, and newspaper, every school and club, every radio speech, theatrical performance and moving picture, is the propaganda instrument of an inexorable political machine. The majority of youth is convinced that the Soviet Union, though' obviously not yet quite perfect, will become so with the completion of the Five-Year Plan, and will, at the same time, become the most powerful nation on earth . . . Their general feeling in that all “bourgeoisie” are nearer to the lower beasts, than to mankind. Thes4 are the approaching rulers of the Soviet. Placing themselves at tho ‘isposl* tion of the authorities, they asked to bft’ commandeered to go to any difficult spot on the Five-Year Plan front, where they may be relied upon to work with all the self-sacrifice of a nearly religious fanatacism.

. . . Faith, fanatic Faith, tones wedded fast To some -dear falsehood, hugs it to the last.

What is the world going to do about it? Already Moscow is working on a Fifteen-Year Plan to come into operation when the Five-Year Plan ends. It? object is to subjugate the leading capitalist nations of the world. Will it succeed? That is a question mo?t of us will answer according to our predilections. Personally, I think that by the time the rest of the world has been startled into negotiating with Russia, Russia will be only too ready to compromise with the rest of the world. But there is a long and weary road to travel before we shall arrive. For pointing out its dangers in languago that Sil can understand, Mr. Knickerbocker deserves our gratitude. - I. wish a copy of his .book could be placed in the- hand# of everybody who. has 1 a vote. ■. : vu-h ■