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THE CRISIS IN THE FAR EAST

MALAY PENINSULA IS ARMY FORTRESS.

DEFENCE PROBLEMS AND NEW CONCEPTIONS OF MILITARY STRATEGY.

(From the Singapore Correspondent of “ The Times.”)

LONDON, 11th June.

Singapore is best known to the world as a naval base, but increasing ly the role of the Army in the defence of the fortress-island and the Kfe,terland of the Malay Peninsula is attention. This is partly because the growth of the Empire war effort has made it possible to send large army reinforcements to the Malaya Command, partly because of the changed nature of the defence problems, and also to sane extent because of new ideas of military strategy. There aye probably mors trained troops to the square mile in Malaya than in any neighbouring country. Australia, three days away from Singapore by air and a fortnight by sea, can send troops and munitions almost as easily as India on the other side of the Bay of Bengal, but only with the arrival of the first Australian Imperial Forces did the full significance of these facts dawn upon the public. Now that the Australian Imperial Force is in Malaya, however, together with British and Indian reinforcements, and the Royal Australian Air Force is ready for a big share in the Malayan work of the Royal Air Force, Australia is regarded as a main source of the strength of Singapore. From the Commonwealth can come, if necessary, a constant stream of trained men and modern equipment. To-day Australian troops may be seen almost everywhere. They have taken the country by stormAmong Malays, Chinese, and Indians the name “ Aussie ” is synonymous with a valiant, courageous, determined and unconventional soldier. A PEOPLE’S ARMY. When the General Officer Commanding Australian Forces, MajorGeneral H. Gordon Bennett, spoke on the wireless the day after his troops arrival, his informal manner introduced his listeners to the conception of a people’s army that many had only half understood. Afterwards he told how many of his officers and men under his command were in responsible and highly-paid appointments in civil life and had left their jobs to volunteer for service with the Australian Imperial Force. Men earning £lO a week were now privates at 6s a day, and men who were potential officers had joined the ranks rather than wait until there were openings for commissions. A company commander was a broadcasting official earning between £lOOO and £2OOO a year before the war, and several noncommissioned officers and men belonged to the same clubs in Australia as their officers. Though this may seam normal in Great Britain, to Malaya it came as a surprise. The camps in which the Australians are accommodated have all been built within a few months. They are usually wooden huts with palm-tree thatch roofs, and afford the maximum protection from rain and sunshino. and are exceptionally cool. The welcome accorded the men was tremendous. When one unit was moving from one part of Malaya to another an Australian planter entertained 500 at a point half way on their journey. They have quickly’ made friends with British, Indian, and Malay troops, and with civilians of all communities. As they* brought with them hundreds of trucks and lorries, stores of all kinds, and complete equipment, no additional strain has been placed on the administrative services of the Malaya Command. In Singapore itself the task of the Army is threefold. First there is the defence of the fortress by means of coastal batteries, both long-range guns and artillery of smaller calibre. Then there is the "anti-aircraft defence of the town areas, docks, and such military* objectives as naval and air bases and army cantonments. Third comes the defence of the beaches from machine-gun posts against any enemy r who may’ attempt to make a landing on the coast. The maintenance of internal security’ is also shared by' the Army: and, in the event of an invasion, the enemy’ must be attacked wherever he may gain a foothold, a most unlikely event unless all the first-line defences were overcome. The coastal artillery of Singapore has long been famous. No one harbours any doubt of its ability’ to keep

off sisa-borne attack. Similarly, the anti-aircraft batteries, manned by both British -and Indian troops, are being constantly strengthened, and could deal with the most formidable air attack. Mobile anti-aircraft batteiies and Searchlight units would in an emergency provide protection for all parts of the island. Beach defence is a specialised duty, the role of highly, trained troops. Barbed wire entanglements almost all round the inland, with concrete “ pill-boxes ” at intervals, are evidence that this form of protection has not been neglected. Peace-time exercises, when troops attempted to land from shallow-bot-tomed vessels, proved the efficacy of the measures taken in the last 18 months. Many of the troops are not stationed in Singapore, but in the Malay Penin sula, which, in accordance with the official announc<#nent at the end bi last year, has now been put in a “ state of defence.” As a result one meets troops in all parts of the country’, often in the most unexpected places. There are troops on the east coast, with its wide, sandy beaches racing the China Sea; troops on the west coast facing the narrow Straits of Malacca, opposite Sumatra; troops in Penang and other parts of North Malaya; troops in the southern Malay States, British, Indian, and Malay troops, reinforced by the Volunteers of the Straits Settlements and Malay States, and the Johore Military Forces, have as their task the production of the peninsula, the “back door” approaches to the Singapore base. To understand their task one must appreciate the nature of the country in which they train and in which they would operate in the event of war Only’ the western side of the peninsula is at all developed. Most of the towns, the main railway lines, and roads are concentrated there, the trunk roads running north and south from Kedah and Province Wellesley (with the island of Penang linked with the mainland by' a ferry) to Johore Bahru, which is linked with Singapore by a causeway. In the west coast area as far inland in some districts as 100 miles, are situated most of the rubber and coconut plantations, most of the rice fields and other forms of cultivation. The tin mines also are on the west, chiefly in the Federated Malay States of Perak and Selangor. A mountain range runs down the peninsula like a backbone. It is for the most part covered with jungle which stretches for miles over high hills towards the east coast. The east coast jegion, comprising the unfederated Malay States of Trengganu and Kelantan, and parts of Pahang and Johore,. is least developed. Jungle still covers most of Malaya, and vast areas are almost unknown lexcept to foresttry workers and surveyors. FOREST TRAINING. During the last few years the science of jungle warfare has been closely studied. All troops in Malaya today are highly trained in this form of fighting. In an exercise recently carried out in jungle country, Indian troops participated with troops of a famous Highland regiment. An enemy was supposed to have landed at a certain point on the coast and to have pushed his advanced elements, with armoured vehicles, along a main road. The Indian troops established a front controlling this road, and the battalion commander ordered one of his platoons on a long-distance patrol through the adjacent jungle with the object of outflanking the enemy. Carrying everything they needed on theii backs guns, ammunition, food, water, spare clothing even mosquito nets—they were to harry the arm-, ouiird cars. As the platoon continued its patrol one realised how the men and their officer must have an almost unlimited capacity for endurance and must be able to employ field-craft of a high order; realised, too, that Malaya is a country where the highest standard of leadership is demanded of a patrol leader, and where the eyes and ears, and even the “ sixth sense ” of the soldier must be constantly on the alert for an ambush. After several hours’ hard going the platoon approached the main road from a direction where the enemy was not expecting attack. .Then it went into action—with much success.

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Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/TAWC19410813.2.29

Bibliographic details

Te Awamutu Courier, Volume 63, Issue 4463, 13 August 1941, Page 5

Word Count
1,372

THE CRISIS IN THE FAR EAST Te Awamutu Courier, Volume 63, Issue 4463, 13 August 1941, Page 5

THE CRISIS IN THE FAR EAST Te Awamutu Courier, Volume 63, Issue 4463, 13 August 1941, Page 5