WAR IN THE AIR

Te Awamutu Courier, Volume 62, Issue 4378, 15 January 1941, Page 5

WAR IN THE AIR

A SORT OF DEADLOCK. DEFENCE AND OFFENCE. The air war has reached a curious condition of stability. In the early stages of the war, it seemed that anything might happen in the way of unexpected methods. Some of the things that were expected did not happen: for instance, there has been no use of gas, against which the most elaborate preparations were made. Incidentally, there has been no reported use of gas anywhere in Europe, apart from a German allegation, of dubious verity, that some gas shells were used in Poland. Nor has there been any evidence that gas-filled ammunition has been found anywhere.

Since the end of the struggle in France, aircraft have been used in combined operations in North Africa and Albania, in both cases playing an important part, but with no remarkable change in tactics. THE TWO POLICIES.

It is in the exchange of bombing raids between Britain and Germany that the most impressive changes of method have been seen, especially iti the enemy’s operations, British plans have altered little. There has been a continuous series of British attacks upon military objectives, with a consistent refusal to assail the civilian population as such, in spite of pressure to do so. Dr Hugh Dalton, Minister for Economic Warfare, was reported recently to have said he would rather see the Leuna synthetic oil plant a smoking heap of ruins than destroy every dwelling-house in Berlin. “Nothing indiscriminate is good in this war. Bombs must be planted where they will do the utmost harm to the enemy’s war effort.” And Major-General J. F. C. Fuller, in discussing whether retaliation for setting fire to London is desirable, said that the barbaric principle of an eye for an eye would not help to win the war or the subsequent peace. The Germans, on the other hand, have equally consistently battered non-military objectives. It has repeatedly been said that most of their attacks have been “indiscriminate,” but the heavy toll of churches, hospitals, and other institutions connected with physical and moral welfare of the people suggests that some at least of their bombs have been aimed at or have a natural inclination towards large buildings.

REFUGE IN DARKNESS. In the course of these operations, the Germans have been forced to abandon daylight attacks except for sporadic minor raids. The great air battles in September, when their bombers were “clawed out of the sky” by the R.A.F. fighters, taught them a lesson which they were quick to learn. Night attacks were substituted. Just as the R.A.F. had been able to bomb targets in Germany almost without loss, finding their objectives by navigation, and hidden from attack by the darkness, so that Germans have been able to attack Britain.

The bombing war has now settled down to this position—that each side can attack the other’s territory without fear of great loss of machines and men, and each air force can go on growing as fast as machines can be built and personnel trained. This implies simply a multiplication of attacks of the present form, until possibly something new arises to interfere. Reports that a British answer to the night bomber has been found and is being developed are encouraging, but the problem is obviously one of the greatest difficulty.

THE GUN BARRAGE. Britain’s first reply against the night bomber was the famous artillery barrage; but this is a defensive, not an offensive weapon, and while it had a deterrent effect on the enemy it undoubtedly does more material damage on the ground than to the German aircraft. Tons of shells fired into the air come down again as tons of scrapiron. This tremendous barrage cannot be used everywhere; it can, on the score of cost and effort, only be established where there is an important area to be protected and its reach is limited.

The same problem as Britain has faced is also plaguing the enemy. He also uses artillery, but it does not seem to have been developed on the same scale as that which was set up to guard London and some other large centres. Britain’s principal anti-air-craft gun is one of 3.7 in. calibre, and larger are also used. The chief German gun is 3.4 in, and it is said that this is being replaced, or supplemented by, a new mechanically-loaded gun of 5.2 in calibre, firing a 661 b shell. SOMETHING NEW WANTED.

The orthodox plan of military evolution is the reply in kind. The answer to battleships is battleships; to submarines, submarines; to tanks, tanks—on the principle that if one side has them the other must also. But this, of course, leads to an absurdity. To answer night bombers by night bombers means simply a “war of attrition,” in which each side goes on battering the other in increasing degree. And as the effective answer to the submarine is a host of specialised weapons of an entirely different kind, the night bomber is a challenge to ingenuity in devising active defences. But the scope is limited, and the chief problem seems to be to find a way of seeing in the dark, so that fighters can pick them up. British bombers flying over Germany have met German fighter patrols carrying searchlights, but these were found of little use—as might be expected. A searchlight on a fighter is not likely to be as useful as a battery of searchlights on the ground.

ANOTHER PROBLEM. In the meantime, the air forces continue to grow. With the advent of American assistance on a large scale, the British will grow faster than ever And as these air armadas pile up in numbers one is forced to ask, how will they be used? This is another great air-war problem, and one that has not yet been answered. There is a limit, and not a very high one, to the number of aircraft that can be assembled in a specified space, and a still lower limit to the number that can be controlled as a naval force is ■ controlled, by a commanding officer in the air. If a solution to these difficulI ties can be found, the war in the air I will be changed in a way that will ! make its past seem tame.