British High Command.

Taihape Daily Times, 21 February 1918, Page 5

British High Command.

WHATIS THE TRUTH ABOUT | ROBERTSON? j DEBATE IN THE HOUSE OF | COMMONS. LONDON, February 19 In the House of Commons, Mr. Asquith paid a tribute to Sir Win. Robertson as a great example. He could not help wishing that Mr Lloyd George's speech had been made a week ago when the Premier refused to define the functions of the Versailles Council. "For asking this information," said Mr, Asquith, "I was assailed as a pacifist, even as a 8010 in disguise. Such was the fashion of some important and. widely-circulated newspapers now conducted under the auspices of those who have since last week become custodians of propaganda I understood last week that the changes at Versailles had the full assent and approval of all the Government's military advisers. Now I know this to be untrue as regards Sir Wm. Eobcrtson.

Mr. Lloyd George interposed: I thought the Government had then met all purely constitutional difficulties and there was nothing else left. Only afterwards I found that Sir Win. Robertson regarded the matter differently Mr Asquith.—ls not it a fact that Sir Wm. Robertson intimated on Monday, the 11th, that he could not,possibly assent to the proposal? Mr. Lloyd George.—No. Mr. Asquith.—And is it not a fact that General Wilson had been already sent for to succeed him?

Mr. Lloyd George.—The proposal was made only on Saturday, when Sir Douglas Haig came over. It surprised me when resistance developed on the ground of policy. Mr. Asquith pointed out that the United States was refraining from political participation though military representatives were taking part in the Council.

With scheTues aimed at securing unity of control among the Allies, were near sacrificing unity of control in the British army. These w r ere questions of military efficiency wliereon soldiers were better judges than politicians. The Government had now taken the responsibility of disregarding' the greatest strategic and technical authorities! There was some disquiet in the public mind owing to the forced retirement of Lord Jellicoe and Sir William Robertson, preceded by a virulent and unscrupulous Press campaign. It was scarcely adequate compensation that Lord Derby remained at Whitehall, and Lord Beaverbrook entrusted with propaganda.

THE HIGH COMMAND CHANGES STATEMENT BY LLOYD GEORGE. Received 8.45. • • LONDON, February 20. Mr. Lloyd George, speaking in the House of Commons on the recent army changes, said the retention of Sir William Robertson as Chief of the GeiP eral Staff was latterly incompatible with the Allies' common policy, which was based on the assumption that the Allies had suffered in the past through lack of concerted, co-ordinated efforts. Mr. Lloyd George said the supreme council unanimously rejected this proposal, and the delegations then separated and considered the matter independently, with the remarkable result that next morning each delegation submitted exactly the .'same proposal, namely, the proposal which now held the field. Lloyd George said he would have liked to have read to the House the document Avherein the Amencan delegation cogently put the case for the proposal which was finally carried, but he could not, because it was mixed up with the plan of operations. The Americans presented their case with irresistible power and logic. The proposal was altered here and there during several hours' discussion, wherein there was not a single dissentient so far as the plan was concerned. Sir D. Haig called attention to a weak point or two, and we undertook to remedy them, but these were not joints affecting the root proposal. (Section of speech missing here-. The Premier emphasised his anxiety that these arrangements should work wholeheartedly by all the AngloFrench military authorities, and especially that Sir Douglas Haig should be satisfied therefore before the agreements were made. He talked tne matter over with Sir D. Haig, who said he would work under the new arrangement, which was that the British permanent military adviser on the council at Versailles should become a member of the Army Council, and should be constantly' in communication with the Chief of Staff and shoule be absolutely free in the advice he gave. The Chief of Staff would have the same powers as his predecessors and Sir Win Robertson, and should remain the supreme military adviser to the British Government. He would

accompany Ministers to meetings or

the supreme war council as adviser, | and have the right to visit France and I consult military representatives. Our representative at Versailles must j have the most perfect freedom to discuss and recommend the plans, and if the Commander-in-Chief did not approve or if there was a difference or opinion among the various representatives then the Government would decide. There was n derogation of authority by the Government. The Chief of- Staff would be the chief acviser to the Government in tEe event of any such difference of opinion. It was only after the Government decided to offer Sir W. Robertson the position of representative at Versailles that the Premier realised that General Robertson objected on military grounds to the system which the Versailles conference decided unanimously to adopt. Robertson suggested the representatives at Versailles should be made the deputy of the Chief of Staff, but the Government rejected the suggestion, because the suggested position would be impossible for any man, and would make British representatives inferior to other members of the council. i

A voice: 'What about Foch?"

The Premier pointed out Foch was within twenty-five minutes v of Versailles, and could be consulted in the event of an emergency. The Premier reiterated that the Government deeply regretted it was obliged to proceed without General Robertson. It was choice between carrying out unanimously the policy formulates by the military advisers of the Allies 4 ' and retaining the services q| a most distinguished and very valued public servant. He was paid the fullest consideration, but in view of the magnitude of its policy, the Government was bound to stand by the arrangement with its allies.

Following is the' missing section of Lloyd George's speech:—Upon returning here he reported to the Cabinet that he thought the plan unworkable and dangerous. Subsequently, the Army Council made certain criticisms from a constitutional viewpoint The Premier said he considered these carefully with Lord Derby, " who, throughout,, had put Robertson's case before Cabinet. r M ALLIED CO-ORDINATION ' IMPERATIVE. NO ONE ALLOWED TO STAND IN THE WAY. COUNCIL AT VERSAILLES UNANIMOUS. Received 9.20. LONDONN, February 20.' The Premier said: Government's reply regretted General Kobertson's position was no longer compatible with the policy decided upon at Versailles, but if that policy was right no personalities, however valuable, important or distinguished, should stand in the way of its execution. (Cheers.) If the policy was wrong no personalties no governments ought to stand in the way of its beig instantly defeated. The Premier emphasised there was absolutely no difference between our policy and the policy of France, Italy, and the United States in this respect. The policy was based on the assumption that the Allies had hitherto suffered through lack of co-ordinated effort, and our purpose and policy has been to get concentration/ and unity of effort. It was only necessary to look at 1917 to find exactly the samet.sdt of circumstances inevitably diminishing the power and concentration which would otherwise have been possible in order to counteract the efforts of the Germans and their Russian colleagues. It was agreed at Versailles that there must be a central authority to exercise direction over the war policy that that authority must be inter-allied, and must have executive power. The only difference of opinion was over, how that authority should be constituted, but agreement on this point was also reached.

The Premier proceeded to mention that several proposals k were considered and rejected. One was that the Central Authority should be composed of Chiefs of Staff, but this idea was found to be unworkable. The Premier said it was left that the new body must ot only know the conditions of their own armies on our fronts, but all the conditions on all fronts and of all armies. Versailles was now the reposi tory of such information, which was co-ordinated by very able staffs. No single War Office possessed such information. |

The Premier proceeding said, there were cogent reasons why Chiefs of Staffs ih various capitals could not properly exercise the functions aimed at

The Premier dwelt on the natural difficulties of securing military unity of the Allies. Some thought the new arrangement would secure not only political unity, but Imperial unity of the armies_ The Government propos-

'ed to invite suggestions from the

highest military authorities in regard to the best means of removing the anxiety that the new scheme might impair the efficiency of our army. The Government would adopt any such suggestion to improve the new scheme. The national feeling of the historical tradition of suspicion militated against every alliance, while there were also dfficulties due to professional conservatism. \He pleaded for mutual trust and confidence which were the very soul of victory. . t George said: "We discussed and re< discussed this plan in order that our whole concentrated strength should be mobilised to resist and break the most terrible foe civilisation was ever confronted with. We faced the terrible realities. The enemy rejected the most moderate terms which the whole of civilisation accepted as reasonable. Why had the enemy rejected them? Because lie was clearly convinced the Russian collapse would give him the victory and impose Prussianism forcibly on Europe. The Premier beggeel the House to turn down all controversy, and close the ranks. (Loud cheers. ) t If the House disapproved of the Versailles policy, let it put in a Government who would refuse to accept that policy, but it must be another Government. (Cheers|) The Government, was entitled to know, and know to-night whether Jthe House and the nation wish them to proceed with the policy deliberately settled with a view * of organising our forces. He said: "We must advance on the foe .1 have endeavoured to discharge the terrible functions of my position to my utmost capacity and strength. (Cheers.) 7

If the House to-night repudiate that policy for which I am responsible and which I believe the safety of the country depends, I shall quit office with but one regret that I have not had greater strength and greater ability to place at the disposal of my native land in the gravest, hour of her history." (Loud and prolonged cheers.) ] LORD DERBY'S EXPLANATION. Received 8.10. LONDON, February 20. < In the House of Lords, Lord Derby strongly supported the Versailles Conn dPererice, which had already achieved •important "results: He had done hii ut« -most • to induce Sir "William Robertson to accept the Versailles scheme* Lord Derby added that he had tendered his own resignation, but Lloyd George asked him to remain. PRESS OPINIONS. THE CRISIS PASSED. Received 9.5. ; LONDON, Feb 20. The "Morning Post" states it does not believe the public yet realise the army position. This is not surprising, because any newspaper attempting to explain it wpuld be treated as Ahab) treated the Micians, but may not thQ public-look to the House of Commons for the truth. They had ""swapped horses" in the biggest crisis of the war, when the stream was deepest and the night darkest. The "Daily Telegraph's" Parliament tary correspondent says the symp* toms of the crisis have vanished. The Unionist War Committee met /rivately and endorsed the Govern* inent's policy, and heartily concurred with Mr. Chamberlain's declaration that the Government must sever it| connection with press influence an<J themselves govern. Strong represent tations to this effect were made to Lloyd George privately, by his most ardent Unionist supporters. Mr. Chamberlain said half of Lloyd George's troubles arose from the fact; that the Government was associated with certain newspaper thereby surrounding themselves witH suspicion and distrust ',