ECONOMY IN MEN.

Sun (Christchurch), Volume III, Issue 871, 24 November 1916, Page 6

ECONOMY IN MEN.

FRENCH ARMY'S NEW METHODS. TACTICS OF THE SOMME DRIVE. CASUALTIES REDUCED BY HALF. [By Captain Phillipe Millet in the " Observer."] Much has been written already about the new methods of the French army. Ido not think, however, that the most remarkable feature of the present advance has been sufficiently noticed. 1 refer to the economy in men. There is no mystery about it, as the figures are now more or less official. Since July 1 the French have not only been pushing on both banks of the Somme, on a front extending from the right of the British Army to the south of Chilly, but they have had to fight around Verdun in order to repulse the last German attacks and to regain some ground. Their military effort has therefore never been greater since the days of the Marne. In spite of that, the monthly losses are now considerably less than during the early months of the battle of Verdun. Moreover, the average casualties of the French Army are at present less than half what they were last year. Such an encouraging result is not due to the mere fact that the output in heavy guns and in ammunition has steadily increased. It is equally due to a quite recent improvement in the way of preparing and leading an attack. As the Germans have been taught by bitter experience all the details of the new French tactics, there is no harm in explaining the essential principles of these tactics to the public. Roughly speaking, the whole secret consists in establishing a narrow and almost mathematical connection between the work done by the artillery and the movements of the attacking troops. Such a difficult problem as this was not easy to solve. The French command make no difficulty about confessing that it look them a long time to find out exactly how to proceed. It was not only in the early days of the war that they had more or less to rely in the end on the dash of the infantry and wage war with men's breasts. All of us who spent the first 20 months at the front know that, even as late as in September, 191;"), although we had many more heavy guns and shells, the connection between infantry and artillery proved very imperfect and was responsible for many losses. Indeed, it may be said that it is only since July last that, owing lo lessons drawn from Verdun, the problem at lasl found a solution. Events have clearly shown that this solution was the right one. Preparation and Attack. Two filings must be considered separately. First of all, the preparation; secondly, the attack itself. The object of the preparation is to get rid of all the different obstacles which may delay the advance of the infantry. Now, these obstacles fall under three headings: There is first the barbed wire, then, the defensive works (trenches and strongholds), finally the curtain fire (tir de barrage) of the enemy's artillery. Experience and minute calculations have shown how to deal with every one of these points. The destruction of barbed wire is almost exclusively the task of the 75's; our gunners know exactly how many shells are required per yard of wire entanglement—a fact which allows us lo determine with accuracy what extension, given the number of 75's available, may be given lo the front of attack.

The task is somewhat more complicated as regards the destruction ofj the defensive works. Experience has proved that the best way to deal j with the front-line trenches, especi-i ally when they are not easy to ob-l serve, is to use exclusively against i them an enormous number of trench i mortars of all sizes. II is quite pleasing to hear that these prehistoric instruments, ;it which we all used to; laugh at first, are now tiring with wonderful accuracy and make the Huns uncomfortable even when they hide in their underground caves. Howitzers are only used at present against the second and third lines! and all the works behind the firstline trenches. As it is, their task is; already a sufficiently heavy one, as it is assumed that every inch ofj ground must be plastered with shells, i As for the curtain lire, i' can only be dealt with by tiring on ihe enemy) batteries themselves: aerial observation is required and also long-range j guns. Aeroplane Photography. The minuteness of the preparation] is surely one of the most comforting! features of the new war. It is generally known that, in order to make! sure that all the enemy works have] been properly destroyed, photo-! graphs are repeatedly taken by aeroplanes. But this is not considered enough. All these photographs are submitted not only to the divisional staff concerned, but to all the company commanders who are to lead the attack; they are required to slate! whether they think that the destruction is complete, and, whenever there' appears lo be a doubtful point, toj send out a patrol to confirm by direct! inspection of the ground the results j shown by the photograph. Then, and not before, the infantry attack is launched. Here begins Ihe second' stage. Everyone acquainted with trench warfare knows what the root difficulty was up to the present advance. It had been quite rigidly assumed! that the attacking troops must only! advance under a protective curtain of shells. On the other hand, as all the wires are cut as soon as a bailie begins, one did not see how to make

I sure that the moving curtain of shells would precede the attacking infantry I without going too fast or—which J was a more ominous danger—too I slow. The difficulty seemed so ini superahle that some of the best artillery officers suggested that the | only way out was to time exactly beforehand the movements of the | attacking troops with the lengthening of the range. Any advance ! under such a system would have had to proceed according to a sort of rail- ; way time-table. I The Work of Co-ordination. ' Fortunately, another solution was ; found since the Allies have achieved the mastery of the air. The connection between the advancing infantry and the artillery is now ensured by the so-called infantry aeroplanes. Each French division is provided with a number of these. Their task is to follow closely the advancing | line, not in order to lire on the enemy, but simply to report to the gunners and let them know exactly what is going .on. As soon as the infantry j has reached a given point, the 75*s are informed that they must lengthen their range beyond it so as not to hit our own men. Information is similarly given if the infantry happens, to be held up by an unsuspected obstacle, or if a German counter-attack is seen coming up from the rear. The way in which this new device has worked on the Somme is simply j marvellous. It is mainly to this scientific system that the troops owe the fact that they have been able to under a curtain of shells which moved continuously ahead of them at a distance of 201) or 300 yards. These lew technical points explain why the French losses have been reduced by such a margin in spite of an almost continuous offensive. Of course, things might and will be still more satisfactory. The main handicap the French are still contending with arises from the fact that they have not a sufficient supply of long-range guns to completely smash the most deadly German gun, the long-range 210. The Germans are therefore still able to delay in j some way our advance by their curtain fire, and some time will elapse before this last difficulty will be met as successfully as the other ones. Hut the only conclusion which ought to be drawn from this fact is| that the efficiency of the French j Army has not yet reached its climax. The co-operation between the workshops, which are daily increasing their output, and the high command, who devise the best way of using the new weapons placed al their disposal, has still to yield its best fruits. It! is, however, very gratifying to see that the results attained have already 1 allowed the nation to spare her own. blood while increasing her offensive power.