The Southland Times. SATURDAY, APRIL 7, 1945. Uneasy Prelude to World Security

Southland Times, Issue 25641, 7 April 1945, Page 4

The Southland Times. SATURDAY, APRIL 7, 1945. Uneasy Prelude to World Security

THE discussions in London, attended by British and Dominion statesmen, are proceeding on the assumption that the San Francisco conference will not be postponed. It cannot be said, however, that the political atmosphere is in the settled condition which alone could favour the right approach to collective security. London newspapers, including The Times, have suggested that the changing military situation in Europe would justify a decision to hold the conference at a later date. The French Foreign Minister, disdaining the politer explanations put forward in London, told his Cabinet that he did not favour an immediate convening of the conference “because important questions were not settled.” It is possible that the French attitude has been influenced by sensitive reactions to the Yalta agreement. A substantial delay would make it easier for France to obtain an equality of status with the inviting Powers, unblemished by any sense of grievance or injured pride. But everybody knows that the real difficulties have been caused by Russia’s last-minute support for Lublin’s claims to representation at San Francisco. Beyond that, too, is the revelation that the Ukraine and White Russia would be regarded as separate members, and would vote as such in the security organization. It was reported yesterday that, according to an article in a Soviet publication, the big four “have virtually agreed to refrain from amending the Dumbarton Oaks plan, and to protect it from any attempt at San Francisco to weaken it.” No statement, made at the present time, could have been more provocative. It was placed on record at Dumbarton Oaks that the proposals were both tentative and incomplete. They were in no way binding on the Governments represented at the talks, and they included no final definition of the organization’s powers. The delegates who may shortly gather in San Francisco have assumed that the scheme can be amended and improved, and that it is their own function to assist in the search for a satisfactory arrangement. Without that function, their presence at the conference would be a mere formality; the dominance of power politics would be left without the thinnest of facades. It will be a good thing, perhaps, if illusions are not permitted to take root in a collective body divorced from authority. But there was always the hope that international discussion and collaboration would create an instrument of world opinion which could exercise a growing and constructive influence on the policies of the major Powers. That hope has lately become tenuous. Prevention of War

It was proposed at Dumbarton Oaks that there should be a general assembly, a security council, an international court of justice, and a secretariat. The assembly will be, in effect, little more than a debating society. It is the security council, composed of several permanent members (Britain, the United States, Russia, China and probably France), and six members elected periodically by the assembly, which will have the controlling powers. There was a general acceptance of the dominant role of the victorious nations; but the success of the council depended obviously on the procedure for dealing with major disputes—that is, with situations which could lead to war. The danger of war, for many years to come, will be confined almost exclusively to the relations which exist between the permanent members of the council. It had to be decided, therefore, what could be done to place the Great Powers under a collective discipline. Britain and the United States held the view that in any dispute affecting one of the permanent members the decision should be reached through a unanimous vote of. the Great Powers, with the exception of the Power that was a party to the dispute. Russia disagreed; the question was left unsettled; and it was announced some time after the Yalta conference that a decision must be made by a majority of seven, which must include the five permanent members. The acceptance of Russia’s proposal makes the whole system a solemn farce. It means that the five Great Powers, all armed with the right to veto any action against themselves, are outside the security system. Disputes in which the smaller nations are involved can be settled without difficulty. But world peace is not likely to be threatened by countries like New Zealand or Belgium. It is the need to place an international curb on the powerful nations which gives purpose and meaning to collective security. The methods proposed by Russia could be acceptable only if the allied nations showed a complete union of aim and policy—or at least the will to work stead- | fastly in that direction. Russia’s I tactics on the diplomatic front make it difficult to believe that such a union can be attained. The support of Lublin’s claims was an affront to Britain and America, who have already swallowed too many principles in the attempt to reach a compromise over Poland. Further, if the Ukraine and White Russia are to have separate votes, the declaration that the organization “is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states” at once becomes meaningless. The Soviet republics are not autonomous in the sense that the British Dominions have complete self-government. It is true that they have their own parliaments; but these parliaments send their delegates to the central body in Moscow; and it is there that national policy is shaped. The San Francisco conference cannot be valuable unless it is allowed to question the membership of dependent States, among other things, and to hammer out a genuine framework for collective security. If the present signs of pressure in the background mean that the old game of power politics is already being played before the conference meets, it would be far wiser to wait until wartime tensions have been removed. The failure to establish an organization which could be worthy of universal confidence would be an event with .tragic implications. I