The Southland Times. WEDNESDAY, MAY 21, 1941. Hunger Shapes the Policy of Spain

Southland Times, Issue 24440, 21 May 1941, Page 4

The Southland Times. WEDNESDAY, MAY 21, 1941. Hunger Shapes the Policy of Spain

PEW details have been cabled of the recent Cabinet changes made by General Franco. Some weeks ago it was reported in 8.8. C. broadcasts that there had been a reshuffle of portfolios, and some interesting names were mentioned. It has now been announced that further changes are being made, including the dismissal of the heads of the Press and Propaganda Departments. According to a report which came through Portugal, the Foreign Minister, Senor Ramon Suner, placed his resignation in the hands of General Franco, who refused to accept it. This may have been a mere rumour, made feasible by the fact that Senor Suner is a leader of the National Council of the Falange, of which the dismissed Ministers were also members. If it is true, however, it will strengthen the impression that General Franco s policy, if not actually pro-British, is at least moving away from a close co-operation with the Axis. Senor Suner is openly pro-German, and is strongly backed by the Falangists, who represent the political power behind the present regime. It has been made apparent on several occasions that General Franco is not ready to go all the way with the Suner group in its helpful attitude towards Germany. Admittedly, there have been numerous reports, not always reliable, of German activity in Spain. One example of such reports comes today with a message from the Tangier correspondent of The Daily Express, who claims that German troops, “disguised in Spanish uniforms,” are being massed in Spanish Morocco. It is possible that General Franco is willing to give a limited aid to Hitler, and that he is trying to reach some kind of compromise between neutrality and nonbelligerency. This policy is dangerous, and may have disastrous consequences; but it represents fairly accurately the position of the Spanish Government.

Today there is only one reality behind the politics of Spain—the hunger of the people. It is not generally realized how desperate the food situation has become after years of civil war, bad harvests and administrative bungling. Foreign correspondents who have been in the country recently do not speak of a food shortage: they speak bluntly of famine. One of them even went so far as to declare that conditions are worse than in Poland. The difficulties have been eased a little by the arrival of grain ships which Britain allowed to pass through the blockade, and navicerts will be given to Spain while she remains neutral. Unfortunately the basic problem is not transport: it is simply Spain’s inability to pay for sufficient cargoes of wheat. British loans have been on a generous scale; but the money does not go fai' enough. The Spaniards are proud. .They will not allow the Red Cross or the Society of Friends to undertake mass distribution of food to the starving people, although it must be admitted that those who place pride above hunger are not themselves in danger of starvation. Meanwhile, with at least 800,000 tons of wheat needed to tide the country over until the next harvest, and with barely 10 per cent, of that quantity available, the outlook is increasingly grim. General Franco must base his policy on questions of food supply. If Germany could convince him that Hitler’s New Order gives the best promise of early and substantial relief he would probably enter into an alliance with the Axis. But so far the New Order has meant little more than a system of supply for Germany herself: the Spaniards cannot have failed to hear of the train loads of grain that leave the occupied countries for a single destination. The Nazis may try to convince General Franco that the quickest way to satisfy the national hunger is to seize somebody else’s granaries—Portugal’s, for instance. Recent political changes encourage the belief that the Spanish leader is adopting a wiser policy, possibly because he knows that his armed forces and his economic resources could not survive the strain of even a short campaign. And the alternative method—the acceptance of German aid —means the ultimate loss of Spanish sovereignty. But in this war it is foolish to trust to fixed positions, in politics as well as on the battlefield. Spain’s neutrality might become suddenly fragile if Britain suffered misfortunes in the Mediterranean.