The Southland Times TUESDAY, APRIL 30, 1940. Italy Moves Nearer to Germany

Southland Times, Issue 24113, 30 April 1940, Page 4

The Southland Times TUESDAY, APRIL 30, 1940. Italy Moves Nearer to Germany

PROVOCATIVE speeches have become so much a part of Italian policy that it is not easy to decide when to take them seriously. If the Fascist Government had acted every time the students of Rome were encouraged to fill the streets with shouts of Tunis! it would have long since been engaged in a major struggle. But agitations that cause only mild political reactions in normal times are potentially dangerous when they are allowed to occur while Britain and France are at war with Germany. Signor Mussolini showed that he recognized this fact by remaining unusually quiet and passive during the early months of the struggle. Lately, however, he appears to have given instructions for the semi-official expression of anti-British opinion; and in two speeches quoted yesterday and this morning in cable messages from Rome the process has been allowed to reach a delicate stage. Count Grandi said nothing new when he informed the Chamber of Fascists that “Italy cannot stand outside this conflict.” But Signor Ansaldo, who is sufficiently important to be allowed to broadcast to the Italian troops, became more specific when he coupled the, same statement with the hope, plainly expressed, that Germany will defeat the Allies. The inference to be taken from such comments is that if Italy enters the struggle it will be on the side of the Nazis. It is also patent that, if the Duce makes this fateful decision, it will be because he believes that Germany can win the war. A Stronger Axis?

Comment on the situation can only be speculative. There are certain possibilities, however, for which some support can be taken from recent cable messages. In the past few weeks a number of trade agreements has been arranged between Russia and some of the Balkan countries. Admittedly, too much importance should not be attached to trade moves. It may be remembered, for instance, that although Italy and Russia are ideological enemies they lose no opportunity for extending their trade relations. But trade and politics are almost inseparable in the Balkans. Germany has become so dependent on imports from Yugoslavia, Hungary and Rumania that any serious curtailment would be a threat to her war economy. If the Balkan States are turning towards Russia, it will mean that their Governments, which are remarkably sensitive to political symptoms, have sensed a returning warmth in the Rome-Berlin Axis. This could mean that there has been an extension to Rome of the new Berlin-Moscow Axis, and that Herr von Ribbentrop has succeeded at last in building a union of the totalitarian States. Against any such arrangement, however, there is a single major objection: the intense hatred of communism in the Italian people. Many Italians detest Nazism with an equal fervour, and as time goes on the nation may generally realize that there is no fundamental difference between the dictatorship of the proletariat and the dictatorship of the Party. In the meantime, however, Signor Mussolini has been able to stimulate a preference for Germany, a task which may have been made easier by the strong tone of anti-British feeling. If the Duce has revived his end of the Axis, it may be because the Nazis have decided to liquidate the Soviet alliance and strengthen the old ties with Italy. Soviet Policy

Two interesting messages could be taken to imply some such development. German shipping has been warned that the Gulf of Finland is a “danger zone,” which means obviously that mines have been laid—presumably by the Soviet. And it has been reported in the Baltic countries that “the Soviet has made a demarche to Berlin concerning Sweden’s neutrality.” Until there are definite signs of coolness between Germany and Russia, it would be foolish to emphasize these symptoms. But it can at least be suggested that a combined GermanItalian move in the Balkans would be in line with Axis policy. Italy would not act alone, for at her first move in the Eastern Mediterranean she will be opposed by Turkey. A Nazi-Fas-cist advance in the Balkans would be hard to check, and it is doubtful if the Germans are afraid of Soviet intervention. The Red Army’s showing in Finland was poor enough to encourage a belief in Nazi circles that Russia will not be anxious to undertake further adventures. Speculation need not be carried further. But while Italy continues to draw nearer to Germany it is impossible to ignore the implications of a new rapprochement. And at the moment the above explanation is the only one that seems to fit the known facts.