PART PLAYED BY FLEET

Southland Times, Issue 23922, 14 September 1939, Page 6

PART PLAYED BY FLEET

ECONOMIC PRESSURE ON NAZIS VITAL FACTOR OF BRITISH SEA POWER “The German submarine campaign has taught us the futility of relying upon treaty obligations for the protection of our commerce and our food supplies; it has brought home to us in a very practical manner our dependence, as an island kingdom, upon seaborne goods and the necessity for effectively safeguarding them. It has taught us that bread is not always to be obtained by the simple process of sending round to th-' baker s, nor through the sweat of the brow alone. It has to be fought for, and hied for and died for.”—Rear-Admiral M. W. F. Consett in “The Triumph of Unarmed Forces.”

The limitations imposed by international law upon' belligerent rights include the obligation on the part of a belligerent to respect life in all interference with commerce, states an article in The Dominion, Wellington. By treaty, contraband goods only are liable to capture, subject to the antecedent procedure of visit and search being carried out and to subsequent Prize Court proceedings being taken. The German submarine in its attack upon commerce during the Great War threw aside all moral and legal obligations and sank ships at sight and for the most part without warning.

Had Germany bound herself by any code of law, either legal or moral, the submarine weapon would have been almost useless: it is unlikely that she would have succeeded in bringing into her ports a single prize. But she nearly effected her purpose. International law and treaty did not protect us from Germany, but we allowed them to protect Germany from us. full belligerent rights The measures adopted by Great Britain from the very outbreak of the present war indicate that the lesson of 1914-18 has been taken to heart. The .Ministry of Information has announced that Great Britain will use her belligerent rights to the full to prevent war materials reaching Germany. The Ministry of Economic Warfare, now in full operation, has for its aim the disorganization of the economy of the enemy to prevent him from effectively ■ maintaining his War Ministry s activities. It will have the widest scope as a vital offensive arm complementary to the operations of the navy, the air force and the army. Thus, it can be taken for granted that the scandalous and almost incredible position in regard to trade with neutral countries during 1914-17 revealed by Admiral Consett will not obtain in the present war.

“The prestige of this country probably never stood at so high a level, and our naval strength was never greater than in August 1914,” he writes. With the help of our Allies we were in a position of advantage which the most extravagant optimism could never hope again to reach. If the name of England Was not uttered with bated breath, it was mentioned with real respect. But when war broke out the extent of our traffic, which helped to swell the stream that poured into Scandinavia, amazed the Scandinavians. It was equally iniurious as well in its moral as in its material effects, for it gradually stimulated the belief that necessity quite as much as philanthropy lay at its roots. Our prestige waned and the belief was encouraged that it was no longer Eng-

land but Germany that was to be feared.

BLOCKADE POLICY “During the debates that took place in Parliament on our blockade policy, great solicitude was shown by his Majesty’s Government for the Scandinavian neutrals, whose cause was pleaded with considerable eloquence in support of their claim to our good offices in respect of trade. But the sufferings of the Scandinavian communities were not caused by the naval operations of Great Britain, nor by the belligerent operations of any country. They were the direct result of the deliberate actions of their own people who sent their goods to the lucrative markets of Germany . . It can safely be assumed that almost everything the neutrals obtained from the British Empire during the war benefited our enemies either directly or indirectly; in other words, those goods increased the holding-out power of our enemies. . . . The blockade was two years and ahalf late ...”

There is no record ih history in which a fleet has carried out the work of blockade so efficiently as did the British fleet in 1914-18. The number of ships that escaped its unceasing watchfulness was negligible. The effectiveness of the work of the Royal Navy was, unfortunately, seriously impaired by the release of many ships without the authoritative sanction of the Prize Court. The announcements of the Ministry of Economic Warfare and of the Ministry of Information about the control of contraband goods and the examination of ships, together with the energetic measures taken by the Royal Navy against enemy trade and the submarine menace, indicate that the “stable door” is being closed from the very start this time instead of nearly “too late,” as was the case in 1917.