CZECH BETRAYAL DENIED

Southland Times, Issue 23634, 8 October 1938, Page 7

CZECH BETRAYAL DENIED

Mr Chamberlain Has No Regrets IDEA OF ELECTION NOT FAVOURED (British Official Wireless) (Received October 7, 6.30j?.m.) RUGBY, October 6. The House of Commons adjourned until November 1 after rejecting the Labour Party’s amendment and passing a motion approving of the Government’s policy. The last speaker in the debate was the Prime Minister (Mr Neville Chamberlain), who was given another great ovation by his supporters on rising. There was a further demonstration as he left the chamber at the end of the proceedings, members standing on their seats, waving their order papers and shouting good wishes for his holiday. Mr Chamberlain spoke first of personal issues.

“When a man gets to my age and fills my position I think that he tends to feel that criticism and even abuse matter little to him if his own conscience approved of his action,” he said. “Looking back on these events I feel convinced that by my action—-I claim no credit for it and I think it is only what anyone in my position would have felt it his duty to do —I did avert war.”

Emphasizing the horrors of modem warfare and how death and mutilation would strike right at the heart of the civilian population, Mr Chamberlain made it clear that the influence on his mind during the crisis was the thought that one could not ask a people to accept war unless the cause for which they were called to fight was vital, and transcended all ordinary human values and was sacred. Mr Chamberlain discussed the principal arguments which he considered had been directed against the policy the Government had pursued. First there had been the suggestion that although Britain had no treaty obligations she should have declared at an early stage that if Germany had resort to force against Czechoslovakia Britain would fight. For any such action, the Prime Minister maintained, it would have been impossible to secure the support of the electorate. The other suggestion was that if the Government had felt the first course impossible, it should have told Czechoslovakia long ago that in no circumstances would she get any help, so that she could have come to terms herself with Germany. But the problem had not been so simple. France was under treaty obligations to Czechoslovakia and it could not be expected that" she should repudiate these beforehand and, so long as there was the risk of France having to honour her obligations, it was impossible to say that Britain would in no circumstances be involved.

ADVICE TO PRAGUE What the Government had done—and it was the only course open to it—was to advise Czechoslovakia repeatedly to come to terms with the Sudeten Germans and, when Germany mobilized, to utter no threats but to utter warnings again and again that if France became engaged Britain would be bound to support her. Later, when the Government became convinced that nothing could any longer keep Sudetenland within Czechoslovakia, it had urged the Government at Prague to cede the territory. “I pay my tribute to the wisdom and courage of Dr Benes in accepting the advice of France and ourselves,” said Mr Chamberlain. “I know it was a hard decision for anyone who loves his country to take but to accuse us of having by that advice betrayed Czechoslovakia is simply preposterous. What we did was to save her,from annihilation—to give her a chance of a new life in a new State which, even if it involved the loss of territory and fortifications, would perhaps enable her in the future to enjoy and to develop her national existence in neutral security. “Therefore, I claim that the Government deserves the approval of the House for its conduct, which saved Czechoslovakia from destruction and Europe from an Armageddon.” Referring to rumours of an appeal to the coiintry, Mr Chamberlain said that he did not want a general election now because he had no desire to capitalize for party purposes the feeling of relief and thankfulness, which went beyond party limits, and also because at a time when they might have td call upon the country for a great effort in the months to come he did not want to magnify differences. There were only two conditions which might lead him to change his mind—one was if some new problem arose which he felt required a new mandate from the country and the other was if he felt that he had lost the confidence of his supporters. ! TWO VIEWS OF FUTURE There were two views of the future, Mr Chamberlain thought. The first promised the impossibility of friendly or trustful relations with the totalitarian States and was resolved, he contended, in the belief on the inevitability of war. The second was that every effort should be made to avoid war by discussion in' a spirit of collaboration and goodwill by analysing the possible causes of war and trying to remove them. The Prime Minister mentioned incidentally that he had drawn up the declaration signed at Munich on Friday by Herr Hitler and himself. The inevitable war as conceived in the first proposition, he supposed, would be between the democracies and the dictatorships, and it was suggested, that Britain should not only arm herself but should make military alliances with as many other Powers as possible. Such a policy was now described as collective security, and Mr Chamberlain taunted the Labour Opposition with playing with a policy which contained all the things they had formerly denounced, such as alliances and balance of power. He remarked that some of the Opposition members could be made to walk into any trap if only it were baited with a familiar catch-word. Their plan might be a plan for joint security but it was certainly not collective security in the sense of a scheme of defence against aggression in which all the nations were to take their part. To his mind, Mr Chamberlain declared, this policy was one of utter despair and left no hope for the future of civilization or of those things which made life worth living. Referring to the second L.-w—that war might and should be avoided by efforts at co-operation and understanding—Mr Chamberlain replied that he would have expected, in the light of its former professions, support for such an effort among the Opposition, and he referred specifically to the advocacy in the Labour amendment of a world conference. Was not this much the same idea as his own, but put in a different way? His experience showed, however, the unwisdom of calling large conferences with insufficient preparation.

The emergency, he continued,, had thrown a new light on the country’s defence preparations, revealing both its strength and its weakness. He indicated that the Government had begun a prompt and thorough inquiry, cover-

ing all the preparations, military and civil, to see what was necessary to make good the defigiences which had been disclosed in the shortest possible time.

“As for other measures,” said Mr Chamberlain, “I would not like to commit myself now until I have had a little time for reflecion. I think nobody could fail to be impressed by the fact that the emergency brought out the whole people of this country, whatever their occupation, whatever their class or whatever their station, and they were ready to do their duty, however disagreeable, however hard and however dangerous. Everywhere there was a strong desire among the people to show their readiness to serve the country wherever and however their service could be most useful. I would like to take advantage of this strong feeling if it should be possible, and although I must frankly say that at this moment I do not myself clearly see my way to any particular scheme,' I am ready to consider any suggestions that may be made to me in a very sympathetic spirit.”