FRENCH ANXIETY OVER ROUTES

Southland Times, Issue 23306, 16 September 1937, Page 5

FRENCH ANXIETY OVER ROUTES

VITAL LINKS WITH NORTH AFRICA MEDITERRANEAN LIFELINE OF EMPIRE In these days of uncertainty along the shores of the Mediterranean France is looking with increasing concern toward her “lifeliness” of _ empire, which join North Africa with her southern coast, said a recent French writer. Halfway along these “lifelines” are the Balearic Islands, where the Italians landed soon after the Spanish civil war started. An ideal base for air and sea attack against the Algiers-Marseilles line could easily be created there. For that reason France feels her safety threatened. Anything that affects North Africa is as vital to France as . anything that affects the way to India is to Great Britain. From North Africa France thrusts the spearhead of her penetration towards the Niger and Congo. French Morocco is today a great grain reservoir, a source of raw materials, an immense recruiting station. Deprived of French Africa, France would cease to be a first-class Power.

' Economically the French possessions on the African shores of the Mediterranean are almost beyond appraisal. They send the mother country cereals, wines, oils, cattle, phosphates, iron, zinc, lead—as precious in wartime as in peace. Militarily the French African lands play a foremost role. North African regiments have always stood, in the opinion of the French General Staff, among the best According to estimates given by a former Minister of War, France, in the event of a new conflict, could count on 1,500,000 coloured soldiers, 600,000 to 700,000 of whom would be drawn from North Africa and the Senegal. 140,000 TROOPS French colonial troops at present stationed in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunis number some 140,000 men. These men are charged with the preservation of order and peace in those three territories, but in case of war they would be immediately recalled to France. Upon the speed of their transportation and their entry upon the field would depend, to a large degree, the fortunes of the Republic. Hence the double problem confronting French defence—how to speed the Mediterranean crossing for African troops and how to protect their convoys.

The simplest route is through the Western Mediterranean. Marseilles and Port Vendre, on the Continent, are linked with the African ports of Algiers, Oran, Bona, Philippeville, Bizerta and Tunis. The shortest crossing requires about 20 hours. A fleet of some 30 ships, belonging to three navigation companies, is at present plying between the terminals and efforts are being made to modernize it.

For the French Navy the protection of these vessels is a heavy task, complicated by the necessity in wartime of chasing off raiding enemy cruisers, and it calls for the assignment of a good number of units. What makes this task still more difficult is the fact that the African coast lacks good natural harbours. Its rocky bays offer shelter only to small vessels. The cost of building artificial harbours with long piers stretching well into the sea has demanded an enormous outlay of money. The loading and unloading

of ships and the embarkation and landing of troops are exposed to air raids and attack from the sea. So far, only the harbour of Bizerta has adequately protected facilities. NEW NAVAL BASES With these considerations in mind, the French Navy has begun to construct a series of military bases equal to the need. Toulon, Ajaccio in Corsica and Bizerta in Africa are three points of a strategical square that will shortly be completed at Mers-El-Kebir. This port is west of Oran and soon will have a first-class arsenal. Mers-El-Kebir will have important aero-naval facilities, backed by all the resources of its neighbour, Oran. Once solidly established on the Berber coast, France would be in a position to answer any attacks from either west or east. To the east, Bizerta is capable of neutralizing thrusts from that sector of the Mediterranean. To the west, Mers-El-Kebir will be a stronghold against any aggression coming from the Balearics or from the southern zone of Spanish Morocco. The great handicap that weighs so heavily upon France is the need of maintaining two fleets—one in the Atlantic, the other in the Mediterranean. The dispersion of the two units, too far from each other to unite quickly in case of danger, is in itself a cause of weakness. In the vain attempts to join them lies the explanation of France’s past maritime reverses.