NAVAL ESTIMATES

Southland Times, Issue 19295, 5 August 1921, Page 5

NAVAL ESTIMATES

FOUR CAPITAL SHIPS A NON-PROVOCATIVE PROGRAMME THE VOTE PASSED. (By Telegraph—Press Assn.—Copyright.) (Australian and N.Z. Cable Association.) LONDON, August 3. Colonel Amery, in the House of Commons, in submitting the Naval Estimates, including provision for four capital ships, said the latter did not constitute a policy of competition, or a challenge, but simply meant the replacement of obsolete ships. A few hours’ actual fighting in the late war sufficed to revolutionise ideas as to the necessary type of battleship. Other Powers were not slow to make use of that experience. There were at present under construction whole battle fleets of a type incomparably more powerful than any afloat at the battle of Jutland. Japan would have eight more completed by 1925, and eight more completed by 1928, while the United States would have twelve of these supreme engines of war, each over 43,000 tons, completed by 1925. The construction of four ships could not, under the circumstances, be regarded as provocative. Contrariwise, the Admiralty might be open to a charge of allowing the Navy to fall below the standard of other Powers. This was a risk only justified by the general financial situation and the desirability of avoiding any step inviting competition in armaments on the eve of a conference whose objective was to avoid competition. (Cheers). In the matter of design they were not trying to steal a march on the other Powers, but only bringing themselves up-to-date with modern developments. The new ships would be battle-cruisers of the Hood type, but improved in regard to armaments and protection in the light of war experience. They would be equipped with 16-inch guns. The day of the capital submarine or aeroplane had not yet arrived, therefore the capital ship remained the pivot of naval warfare. The ships would be constructed in private yards, as the Government dockyards were not large enough for the Hood size. It was intended as soon as finances permitted, that the Government dockyards should be brought up-to-date. Mr Asquith referred to the resolution by the Imperial Conference deferring c.mmitment to naval policy until after the result of the Washington Conference. He gravely doubted if it was necessary or wise to commit themselves to these new ships. He put their cost at £30,000,000, which was a serious commitment at the moment. (Received August 4, 5.5 p.m.) Mr Churchill deprecated aggravation of the situation by extreme language. It was an astonishing fact that excepting the Hood, the leading capital units had not been reinforced for more than seven years. In the meantime other nations had revolutionised construction according to lessons learned in the war. Colonel Amery, continuing, said: “If we fail to construct now we will stereotype the present position of inferiority. Britain must declare that she will not accept a position of definite naval inferiority. Let us be sure that we can rely on our own strength. We must never allow our seapower to fall to a point when we will be forced to make entangling agreements to avoid a path which would lead to the greatest disaster, not only to ourselves but to the whole world.” Mr Asquith said it would be the worst possible policy to appear to regulate our construction by the United States. He hoped the House would not be induced to enter into wasteful and criminal competition with those with whom we hoped to become permanent allies. We ought only to build ships necessary to provide against risks of interruption of international communications. Mr Lambert contended that new ships were unnecessary. Mr Lloyd George was going to Washington as the dove of peace, but was building after the war, dreadnoughts. Sir Donald McLean moved to reduce the vote by £lOOO. The vote was carried.