NAVAL DEFENCE.

Southland Times, Issue 17231, 30 December 1912, Page 4

NAVAL DEFENCE.

It would not be easy to explain just why it is apprehended in some quarters that co-operation between Australia and New Zealand for the purpose of naval defence cannot be arranged on any other basis than that of complete Australian control. We are told that New Zealanders will not agree to any proposal which might abridge their independence —as it that made a naval agreement between New Zealand and Australia impossible. The complete independence of New Zealand and co-operation with. Australia for naval/ defence are not incompatible. Bui in any case what does our Independence in regard to naval defence amount to? At present we can boast none. We gave a Dreadnought to the Imperial Navy and we pay a contribution towards the cost of the present Australasian squadron of £IOO,OOO a year. In return we accept a proposal from the Admiralty to station part of what is called the China squadron in onr waters. The New Zealand unit will consist of a number of cruisers of the Bristol class, some destroyers and some submarines. In other words New Zealand will have just the sort of fleet that she requires, but instead of paying for it she will allow the British taxpayer to enjoy that privilege,. At present, therefore, our Independence consists in this, that we get what we need at somebody else’s expense. Australia has decided to carry the whole cost of the Australian fleet, and as the Australian Prime Minister is quite familiar with New Zealand’s position too much boasting about our independence may give Mr Fisher an opportunity of making comparisons which would not be in our favour. The question is, of course, one of New Zealand’s position in the event of war, and this was indirectly referred to in the Admiralty Memorandum prepared at the request of the Canadian Government and tabled by Mr Borden a few weeks ago. The Admiralty authorities distinguished between general and local naval supremacy. The British Government’s business is to maintain the general supremacy of the Navy; that is to maintain the Navy at such a standard that it could bring the enemy’s main fleet to battle with a certainty of success. For this reason the naval strength of Britain has been concentrated in the North Sea and the number of ships on oversea stations has been reduced from nearly 170 to less than 80. The maintenance of local supremacy is rapidly becoming the duty of the oversea dominions themselves. If Canada, Australia, and New Zealand expect to be free from molestation in time of war they must be prepared to defend themselves. Britain has called half of her ships Home to maintain the general supremacy of the Navy; she would call them all: Home if necessity arose, and if the European Powers continue to build rapidly the necessity will arise. Obviously the most valuable assistance the oversea dominions can give the British Government is to relieve It from the burden of local supremacy. That is what Canada has done to some extent in stipulating that the squadron to be paid for fcy Canada is to be a Pacific squadron. It is what Australia has done by building, manning and maintaining an Australian Navy. And Australia’s danger is New Zealand’s danger. Any cruiser squadron that came into the South Pacific to despoil Australia while the British fleets were engaged with the main strength of the enemy somewhere else would threaten New Zealand and it would be to New Zealand’s interest to combine with Australia to destroy the invaders. New Zealand, like Australia, lies in the shadow of the Asiatic menace. For all these reasons New Zealand’s natural policy is one of cooperation with Australia, and such cooperation is surely possible without any restriction of our independence or any hurt to our amour propre. At all events the question is so big and so important that it ought to be discussed impartially, and the last thing that we should do is to encourage prejudice or to make up our minds prematurely that the scheme is unworkable. Admittedly there are great difficulties in the way, just as there are difficulties in the way of obtaining unity without mitigating independence as regards Imperial Naval defence, but to overcome difficulties is the task of statesmen.