The Southland Times. PUBLISHED DAILY. Luceo NonUro. THURSDAY,JANUARY 16.

Southland Times, Issue 3299, 16 January 1879, Page 2

The Southland Times. PUBLISHED DAILY. Luceo Non Uro. THURSDAY, JANUARY 16.

♦ A short time back, whilst commenting on the constitutional dispute thenj and still, agitating , Victoria, we .quoted the opinion of the London Times that the best method of settling colonial deadlocks of the kind referred to was by some such scheme as that provided by the Norwegian Constitution. The remedy is well worth examining, not merely on account of the weight always due to the deliberate advice of such a journal as the leading organ of public opinion in- Great Britain, nor only because the difficulty of Victoria during the past few years may be precisely ours in the next few years to come, -but also on account of the value in other vexed questions of the experience of other countries little affected by our interests and prejudices, and sharing but slightly in our modes of thought. To obtain an impartial estimate of - ourselves, and to get the services of a suitable arbitrator in our local difficulties, we very often with advantage go abroad in order to obtain novel and useful information of unlooked-for character. An enquiry, however, into the nature of the Norwegian Constitution will, we think, soon satisfy any one that unless adopted in its entirety it would be worse than useless in the case of a Victorian or New Zealand deadlock, and that, however useful it might be it earned into effect as a whole, such a carrying into effect would not be in the least likely to be approved of by the. very persons who are crying .out most loudly for a remedy and settlement of some kind. In 1814, when the Norwegians were up in arms to resist an attempt on the part of Sweden, backed up by Great Britain, to annex their country, they offered as the price of their allegiance the acceptance of a very liberal constitution, which their powerful neighbor, then at war with Napoleon Bonaparte, was very willing to \ grant. This constitution is one of so .democratic a character that the writer of the article on Norway in the Encyclopedia Britannica erroneously styles the Norwegian Government a pure democracy. Under it, however, the King still rules, but only has the right of veto over the decisions of the National Assembly — the' Storthing — for a limited period, except in constitutional matters, where his veto is final. The Boyal veto may be exercised twice, but if the same Bill passes in three successive sessions, it becomes law without the assent of the King. As regards the suffrage, it is not a mere manhood qualification, but every Norwegian citizen, who is or has been a public functionary, or possesses property inland and has been tenant of such property for five years, at least, or is a burgess of any town, or possesses real property to the value of 600 kroner- — equal to £33 sterling — is entitled to be an elector. The mode of election, however, is indirect, the people first nominating a number of deputies on whom devolves the task of electing the Storthing. Every 50 persons in a town, and every 100 in a rural district, elect one deputy to vote. These deputies then meet in the parish church and elect their member for the Storthing. When the Storthing is assembled for the dispatch of public business, it divides itself into two houses, the Lagthing and the Odelsthing. The former is composed of onefourth of the members, and the latter of three-fourths. All new bills must originate in the more numerous house, the Odelsthing. If a bill passes through the Odelsthing, but is at first rejected by the Lagthing, there is no deadlock, but the two houses meet together and vote as one body, and if the bill receives the votes of two-thirds of the whole number of representatives it becomes law, otherwise it is considered to be rejected. Now, although this is a -very good sample of a liberal constitution — a remarkably sensible one considering that it was drafted in its mature form in four days by the insurgent patriots, and accepted in full by the STredisli Government at onee — it is not at all a constitution which the ultra-democrats of Victoria would approve of, or consent to be guided by. First of all, the indirect mode of election, though recommended by Mills and other able writers and statesmen, and though adopted in the United States in the election of the Senate by the State Legislatures would be an utterly accursed thing to Mr Berry and his democratic supporters. Their doctrine has always been that Parliamentary suffrage must be exercised not merely for the people, but by the people. , But a still more objectionable element to them would be the deprivation of manhood suffrage. That has long been the keystone of the arch under which they enter their political temple. It is doubtful also if the vehement politicians of the Victorian Legislative Assembly would tolerate the right of the Upper House to vote in common with themselves, still less to possess what would virtually be a cumulative vote on the final passing or , ; rejection of a bill. The checks provided under the free constititution of Norway against unbridled democracy, would be useless obstacles to them, obstacles of the very kind which they are now trying to get rid of. It would be idle to .tell them of the need of a' balance of power in the state ; what they avowedly desire is progxess railier -than order ilxe supremacy of the people's will rather than the welfare of every class in the state alike. It is idle to remind them that the best made watches have their cogwheels and compensating balances ; they would prefer that the cogwheels and compensating balances of the state should be removed, and that the watch should go ahead whether it marks the right time of day or not. ~ The Norwegian constitution, therefore, would not help them in the least, notwithstanding the- power given by it under ; some circumstances for the larger popular . assembly of the people's representatives to override both the other House and . the . King. Even were the Norwegian constitution at once theirs, a Berryan embassy to London to pour forth at the foot of the throne the lamentations of 'Victorian patriots over their political grievances would be just as necessary as ever. f Suppose then that the Berry-cwm-Pearsori embassy on arriving" in London only meets with the cold comfort from the powers that be that something like the Norwegian--. constitution may -be adopted, in. Victoria, they umst psvferce

return as dissatisfied as when they went, no nearer the millennium of a pure democracy in their colony " than before. ■Deadlocks will stillremain to them, as to other like-minded politicians, insoluble matters. The real conclusion which wise men would draw from the fruitlessness of their'endeavors would be" one the so-called " liberal"party are little likely to tolerate. It is this : .That deadlocks are always possible with unreasonable and intemperate men, no matter how often and how far their constitutions- are reformed in the- direction of liberalism. * The freest .countries in the world, .Great Britain, the '.United States, Belgium, Switzerland, and Norway, would, in times of difficulty, lean on a vain support if they relied on their constitutions alone for relief, and did not trust much in the equity, moderation, and good 'sense* of their statesmen, and their desire to effect reasonable compromises rather than the state should suffer. The best framed constitution is only a piece of, machinery .depending for its acknowledged excellence mainly on the skill with which it is worked. The much lauded and justly lauded constitution of Great Britain is full, in its most fundamental principles, of theoretical contradictions and absurdities of absolutely irresistible forces applied against absolutely impenetrable objects, but works well because it has been worked, on the whole, by men of sounder wisdom, better information, and more conscientiousness), than ever pervaded any mere" popular; assembly yet. When Mr Berry reforms the personnel of his colleagues and folio wers, and also reforms himself, the reformation of the Victorian constitution will be an easy task— it will, come of itself.