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THE SINN FEIN REBELLION.

COMMISSION OF INQUIRY. LORD MIDDLETON’S EVIDENCE. United Press Association—By Electric Telegraph—Copyright Received May 33, 10.50 a rn. London, May 33, The Commission resumed its inquiries into the Sinn Fein rebellion. Lord Hardingo read a letter frora General Macready, stating "that Mr Birrell, Lord Wimborne and others bad a conference at the War Office on the 20th March, purely with regard to recruiting in Ireland. A proposal was made to send troop? to be quartered outside Dublin for the purpose of stimulating recruiting. Mr Birrell afterwards saw General French. As far as the War Office was aware the question of sending troops to overawe the Sina Foiners never arose. Some time previously General Friend wrote intimating the possibility of trouble in the South of Ireland and that he unght require extra troops and the War Office arranged to have u Reserve Brigade ready to send over if -cabled for.

Replying to Lord Hardingo Mr Birrell said his recollection was that at all the interviews lie pointed out it was most desirable to let the people of Dublin see the troops in the streets.

Lord Middleton gave evidence that; he interviewed Mr Birrell ,'aari strongly urged the disarmament of the National Volunteers, Mr Birrell replied: “I laugh at the wnoie thing.” Messrs Redmond and Dillon were against taking any notice of seditious utterances. Lord Middleton said he remonstrated with Mr Birrell as to his dangerous course and in January interviewed Mr Asquith, who asked him to submit a memorandum. Lord Middleton banded this to the Committee and Mr Birrell, at the end of February., sent Lord Middleton a confidential letter, which be was now permitted to read. Mr Birrell wrote thas loyalty in Ireland was a plant of slow growth and he was not,surprised at signs of disloyalty. Whereat Lord Middleton was annoyed and demanded strong measures when headstrong priests and crackg brained people make speeches which, if made in England, would not bring the speakers within the terror of the law, but within range or the mob. Mr Birrell added, ‘‘We cannot rely on Irish juries. A proclamation of the irregularity of the Irish Volunteers would be reckless and foolish. I am more alarmed at the possibility of bombs ” Lord Middleton later interviewed Sir Matthew 7 Nathan, who said the Executive was largely guided by Messrs Dillon and Redmond’s advice. Witness protested • against the responsibility being placed on those gentlemen, and said Mr Redmond could hardly carry a single seat in Munster, and also that his life was endangered. Eir M. Nathan replied that the Government had difficulties in taking prominent steps and had to deal with dangerous men. Six days before the outbreak Lord Middleton gave Lord Wimborne the gravest warning. Justice Shearmau; It must have occurred to you that it you carried out the disarmament of the Volunteers it would suggest the retort that you should also disarm the Ulstermen.

Lord Middleton: That might have been said in the case of Mr Redmoud’s Volunteers, but hardly la the case ot the Sinn Feiners. X should have been much surprised if the Ulster Volunteers and Mr Redmond’s had net been willing to pile arms under efficient jurisdiction daring the war.

Lord Wimborne tesitlied that his position and powers were entirely usurped by the Chief Secretary and Under Secretary. He had no Executive machinery with which to take action independently’ of his colleagues, nor any means of asserting his views when they conflicted with those of his nominal subordinates. After repeated representations ir> obtained partial insight into the administration and received daily reports for his information, but not with a view to inviting his opinion.

CAUSES OF IRISH RISING. MR MASSINGHAM’S FIVE REASONS, London, May 33. Mr Massingham, writing to the Nation, says that the Dublin rising was due in my opinion firstly'to tho formation of the Government coalition and the - latter's resort to conscription ; secondly to the pinprick policy’ of compromise, twist and in the disarming of volunteers; thirdly English administration by absentees and Mr Redmond s absorption in the English side of the Nationalist movement: fourthly the gradual loss ot the liner idealism of the Sinn Fain and absorption of the Fenian spirit; fifthly the temptation the war offered to the old revolutionaries; sixthly, the resentment at (ho severity of the suppression of Dublin strikes; s venthly, Ulster's resort to force when Ireland was settling down to its abandonment.— Sydney Sun cable.

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Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/RAMA19160523.2.18

Bibliographic details

Rangitikei Advocate and Manawatu Argus, Volume XLI, Issue 11581, 23 May 1916, Page 5

Word Count
737

THE SINN FEIN REBELLION. Rangitikei Advocate and Manawatu Argus, Volume XLI, Issue 11581, 23 May 1916, Page 5

THE SINN FEIN REBELLION. Rangitikei Advocate and Manawatu Argus, Volume XLI, Issue 11581, 23 May 1916, Page 5