DEFINITE ADVANCE

Poverty Bay Herald, Volume LV, Issue 17233, 12 April 1930, Page 8

DEFINITE ADVANCE

NAVAL DISARMAMENT THREE-POWER AGREEMENT TONN.UiF. RF.DITKD (British OJliciiU Wireless.) Ree. 2 p.lli. 11l Dill, April 11. Air. -\. V. Alexander, First i.ord ol the Admirallv, reviewed in a speech at iStmllield tlm‘results ot the Naval Uonference. While regretting that a complete live-power agreement had not been achieved, he said a gratifying detinue advance had been made. tic recalled that in 1927 it- was desired that the Naval Disarmament Uonlereiice at Geneva should comprise all the live powers gathered at the present conference. Trance and Italy, however, felt unable actually to participate in the conference. Moreover, after many weeks of earnest- negotiations, three powers, United States, .Japan, and Great Britain, failed to arrive at an agreement. It was useless to disguise the lad that for a time feeling between the l nited Stales and ourselves was not as happy as we desired. We had now arrived at a complete agreement; with Japan and the United States on all classes of ships, and, what was most important to remember, upon very much lower figures, than the last proposals made at the- Geneva Conference in 1927. Taking cruisers, destroyers, and submarines together, the total figure for the British Umpire and the United States proposed in 1927 was 590,000 tons cadi plus a- 25 per cent., average, which gave a total of 737,1)00 tons. This total was to remain in force until 1936. The agreement now reached with the United states for these cutecrories of auxiliary ships was to be a total of 541,700 tons by 1936, showing a reduction on the Geneva proposals ol 195),800 tons. The United States’ figure now was 526,200 tons, as compared with 737,500 tons proposed at Geneva, showing a reduction of 211,300 tons, the small extra reduction in the total tonnage in the ease of the United States being in recognition of larger numbers of heavy Bin. cruisers which the United States mav build.

The .Japanese figures proposed at Geneva were 401,250 tons and four auxiliary ships, while the provisional figure agreed at: this conference was 367,050 tons, showing a saving of 114,200 tons in auxiliary tonnage. Therefore, the reductions of tho three powers combined compared with the proposals whereon tho cftuicrencc broke down in 1927 was rio less than 521,300 tons, which constituted a very significant indication of the progress of public opinion in the direction of disarmament. Moreover, the powers had mutually agreed to waive, pending a further conference in 1935, their rights under the Washington Treaty to build any <>f the capital ships provided in that treaty to be laid down from 1931 onwards. SCRAPPING OF BATTLESHIPS.

It had also been agreed by the three pdwers to reduce the numbers of their capital ships to the minimum figures provided for in the Washington Treaty with the least possible delay, instead of waiting until 1936. This means the early scrapping of live British battleships, tlnoß American, and one Japanese.

Another great achievement, continued Mr. Alexander, had been the rectification in the agreement of the world tendency to build the largest, size cruiser permitted under the Washington Treaty. When the Government entered office lust year the American authorised programme in Bin. 10,000-ton ships was not less than 23. "In the case of the British there were 17 Bin. ships built and building, and one farther ship authorised in the total programme, which, if carried to its completion, would have been not less than 20. and as Japan might quite milti rally have been expected to build pro rata, oven these figures might not have been the maximum. To-day it had been definitely agreed amongst the three powers that the maximum number ol ships of this class should he 18, 15, and 12 respectively.

Mr. Alexander thought tlie greatest value of the measure of agreement, already secured was l<> he found in t lie helpful moral effect/ created in support of a general move to disarmament and peace. 'There were also valuable econo, rnie advantages for the period of the agreement. The most, important thing for this country was the avoidance ol expenditure, which would have hail to bo incurred in laying down new' replace meat, battleships. Under the Washington Treaty this would have involved an expenditure of at least t 150.000.000 up to 1936. In addition, we should make a saving of £4,C00,000 in maintenance charges in respect of the five battleships which aro to bo prematurely scrapped. In the case of cruisers, it was not possible to give the figure, hut he might indicate the general position by saying that when the Government- came, into office last year ii found 63 cruisers built, building, and authorised. GREAT SAVINGS. In connection with the programme, which aimed at a general goal of 60 under-age cruisers and 10 over-age, 70 in all, under the present agreement the maximum number of cruisers would he 50 during tho whole of l-ho period of the agreement up io 1936. Jhe savings would certainly be many millions. In the ease of destroyers, we bad tit tho present moment- 190.000 tons built, building, and authorised, whilst the agreement, stipulated for 150.000 tons. In the ease of submarines, the fixing of maximum tonnage in the agreement with the United -States at, 62,700 tons Would mean that, compared with the programme which would otherwise have had to be- followed, we should stive in construction up to 1936 about. £3.400,000 and in maintenance about C4SO.CC/). or a total saving in this eategorv of 113,850, OCO. Tt. was sale to estimate that up to 1936 the saving involved by Llie three power treaty would he at- least between £60,000.000 and £7O,CCO,COO. Mr. Alexander thought that in such circumstances the conference must he described as a tremendous advance on the road to disarmament. EUROPEAN NAVA I, POWERS Mr. Alexander said lie hoped the continuance of the conversations between France, Italy, and Great Britain would result in a happy agreement between the European naval powers, as iiad beet; consummated between the oceanic naval powers, which might, lie titled in to the general scheme, of the treaty’. It should of course, he recognised that each of the parlies to the three pßvver. agreement would have to he coveted by the terms of the treaty in such a way that they might adjust- their position if the con struct ion programmes of other powers outside the agreement should make that necessary. For example, Britain's de strover lour,age would be materially al footed hy an increase of submarine tonnage. it, must also not he forgotten that the conference had achieved much in Ollier directions. \\'e had moved in the plenary session on behalf oil the British Government, and with the support ol file United Stales, for the uhnlilinu ol submarines, and he eon tossed disappointmen I fit not having secured this. Nevertheless. complete agreemenl would he reached on the regulation of the use of submarines and that ayi cement, while not going so far as sonic people desired, was a very distinct advantage, hearing in mind the Isn't that the treaty which Britain signed on this matter at Wash-

ingtdn never came into operation he cause of the failure to secure all iouml ratilieation. Another important point had been an extension of the recognised life of (lilleienf classes o 7 ships, which would secure economy in replacement. fit conclusion. Mr Alexander expressed gratification at the unanimous re.-ogui tion accorded bv the delegations to the ability, patience, and goodwill of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald which had enabled much io he achieved.