LORD LANSDOWNE'S LETTER

Otago Witness, Issue 3331, 16 January 1918, Page 23

LORD LANSDOWNE'S LETTER

THE FULL TEXT. Tho following is the full text of tho famous letter on war aims written by Lord Lansdowno, as cabled to tho New York Times:— "We are now in tho fourth year of the most dreadful war the world has ever known—a war in which, as Sir W. Robertson lately informed us, the number of tho killed, alone can be counted by the million, while the total number of men engaged amounts to nearly 24,000,000. Ministers continue to tell us that they scan the horizon in vain for a prospec£ of a lasting peace, and without a lasting peace we all feel that the task we have set ourselves will remain unaccomplished. "But those who look forward with horror to the' prolongation of the war ( who believe that its wanton prolongation would be a crime differing only in degree from that of the criminals who provoked it, may be excused if they, too, scan the_ horizon anxiously in tho hope of discovering their indications that the outlook may, after not be so hopeless as is supposed. The obstacles are indeed formidable enough. Wear© constantly reminded of one of them "It is pointed out with force that, while we have not hesitated to put forward a general description of our war aims, the enemy have, though repeatedly challenged, refused to formulate theirs, and haye limited, themselves to vague and apparently insincere professions of readiness to negotiate with us. The fore© of the argument cannot be gainsaid, but it is directed mainly to show that we are still far from agreement as to the territorial questions which must come up for settlement in connection with the terms of peace. "Those are, however, by no means the only questions which will arise, and it is worth while *o consider there, arc not others also of first-rate importance, with regard to which the prospects of agreement are less remote. Let mo examine one or two of these. ■ " What are we fighting for? To beat the Germane, certainly ; but that is not an end in itself. We*want -to inflict a signal defeat upon thdj Central Powers, not out of mere vindictiveness, but in the hope of saving tho world from a recurrence of the calamity whioh has befallen this generation. WAR FOR "REPARATION AND SECURITY." " What, then, is it we want when the war is over? I know of no better formula than that more than once made use of with universal approval by Mr Asquith in' the speeohes which he, from time to time, has delivered. He has repeatedly told his hearers that we are waging war in order to obtain reparation and security. Both are -essential, but of the two, security is perhaps more indispensable. "In the way of reparation much can no doubt bo accomplished, but the utmost effort to make good all tho ravages of this war must fall short of completeness and will fail to undo the grievous wrong which has been done to humanity. "It may, however, be possible to make some amends for the inevitable _ incompletenes of reparation if the security afforded is, humanely speaking, complete. "To end the war honourably would be a great achievement. To prevent the same curse falling upon our children would be a greater achievement still. " This is our avowed aim, and the magnitude of the issue cannot be exaggerated; for. just as this war has been more dreadful than any war in history, so, we may be sure, would the next war be even more dreadful than this. The prostitution of science for purposes of pure destruction is not likely to stop short. PROPOSES PLEDGE OF FUTURE ARBITRATION. "Most of us, however, believe that it should be possible to secure posterity against a repetition of such an outrage as that of 1914, if the Powers will, under a solemn pact, bind themselves to submit future disputes to arbitration. " If they will undertake to outlaw politically and economically any one of their number which refuses to enter into euch a pact, or to use their joint military and naval forces for tho purpose of coercing the Power which breaks away from, tho rest, they will indeed have travelled far along the road which leads to security. "Wo are, at any rate, r:'ght to put security in the front line of our peace demands, and it is not unsatisfactory to note that, in principle, there seems to be complete unanimity upon this point." Lord) Lanedowne then cites from President Wilson's speech at the banquet of the League to Enforce Peace, his reference to " a universal association of nations to prevent any war from being begun, either contrary" to treaty covenants or without warning arid full submission of tho cause to the opinion of the world." and quotes from the German Chancellor's speeches to the Main Committee of the Reichstag in the same year in favour of a " peaceful agreement and understanding which will prevent the return of such an immense catastrophe." The Papal suggestion of August last of the establishment of arbitration, and the Austrian welcome of it and readiness to enter into negotiations regarding the Papal proposal, are recorded, and Lord Lansdowne proceeds: "In his despatch covering the Allied Note of January 10, 1917, Mr Balfour mentions as one of the three conditions essential to durable peace the condition that ' behind international law and_ behind all treaty arrangements for preventing or limiting hostilities some form of international sanction might be devised which would give pause to tho Hardest aggressor.' Such sanction would probably take the form of coercion, applied in one of two modes. The aggressor would bo disciplined either by tho pressure of superior naval and military strength, or by the denial of commercial access and facilities.

"The proceedings of the Paris Conference show that wo should not shrink from such denial, if wo were compelled to use the weapon for purposes of self-defence; but. while a commercial boycott woidd be justifiable as a war measure, and while the threat of a boycott in case Germany should show herself utterly' unreasonable would be a legitimate threat, no reasonable man would surely desire to destroy the trade of the Central Powers, if they will, so to speak, enter into recognisances to keep the oeace, and do not force us into conflict by hostile combination. "WAP. AFTER THE WAR" DEPLORED.

" A commercial war j'r less ghastly in its immediate results than a war of, armed

forces, but it would certainly be deplorable if. after three or four years of sanguinary conflict in the field—a conflict which has destroyed a groat part of the Wealth of 'the world and permanently crippled its resources—the Powers were to embark upon commercial hostilities certain to retard the economic recovery of all the nations involved. "That we shall have to secure ourselves against the fiscal hostility of others; that we shall have to prevent the recurrence of conditions under which, when the war broke out, we found ourselves short of essential commodities because we had allowed certain industries and certain sources ■of supply to pass entirely under the control of our enemies, no one will doubt—■ subject, however, to this reservation, that it will surely be for our interest that the -stwjam of trade should, so far an our. own fiscal ""arte rests permit, bo allowed to flow strong and uninterrupted in the natural channels.

" There remains the question ~"Sf rC'vi* torial claims. The most authoritative statement of these is to be found in the Allies' Note, of January 10, 1917. This statement must, obviously be regarded as a broad outline of the desiderata of the Allies; buii is any one prepared to argue that the sketch is complete, or that it may not becomo necessary to re-examine it? Mr Asquith, speaking at Liverpool in October last, used the following language: "' No one pretends that it would bo right or opportune for either side to formulate an ultimatum, detailed, exhaustive, precise, with clauses and subclauses, -which is to be accepted, verbatim et literatim, chapter and verso, as an indispensable prelim* inary and condition of peace. ' There ars; many things,' he added, 'in world-wide eon« flict such as this which must of necessity .be left over for discussion and negotiation, for accommodation and adjustment, at a later stage.' " It" is surely most important that this wise counsel should be kept in mind. Soma of ,our original desiderata have probably beeome unattainable; others would probably now ,be given a less prominent • place than when they were first put forward; others again, notably the reparation due to Belgium, remain and must always remain in the front rank; but when it comes to a wholesale rearrangement' of the map of south-eastern Europe we may well ask for a suspension of judgment and for. the elucidation which a frank exchange of views between the Allied Powers can alone afford | for all these questions concern our Allies as well as ourselves; an-i : f we are to have an Allied Council f- • purp«se of adopting our strategy in "ield to tho ever-shifting developments ..: the war it is fair to assume that in the matter of peace terms also the Allies will make it their business to examine and, if necessary, to revise territorial requirements. PROLONGED WAR . MEANS WORLDRUIN. "Let me end by explaining why I attach so much importance to these considerations. We are not going to lose this war, but ita prolongation will spell ruin for the civilised world and an infinite addition to the load of human suffering which already weighs upon it. Security will be invaluable to a world which has the vitality to profit by it; but what will be the- value, of theblessings of peace to nations so exhausted that they can scarcely stretch out a hand with which to grasp them? "In my belief, if the war is to bo brought to a close in time to avert a world-wide catasthrope, it will be brought to a close because on both sides the peoples of the countries involved realise that it haa already lasted too long. "There can be no question that the feeling prevails extensively in Germany, Austria, and Turkey. We know beyond doubt that the economic pressure in those countries far exceeds any to which we are subject here. Ministers inform us in their speeches of constant efforts on the part of the,'Central Powers to invite peace talk (Sir Eric Geddes, at- the Mansion Hcuso on November 9). "If the peace talk is not more articulate and has not been so precise as to enable his Majesty's Government to treat is seriously, the explanation is probably to b« found in the fact, first: "That German despotism, does not tolerate indepeht expressions of opinion; and, second, that the German Government hag contrived, probably with success, to misrepresent the aims'of the Allies._ which are supposed to include, the destruction of Ger* many, the imposition upon her of a form of government decided by her enemies, hei destruction as a groat" commercial com« munity, and her exclusion from the frea use of the seas. DECLARATIONS WHICH WOULD AID PEACE. "An immeaiso stimulus would probably be given to the peace party in Germany II it were understood — "(1) That we-do not desire the annihilation of Germany as a great Power. "(2) That wo do not seek to impose upon her people any form of government other than that of their own choice- "( 3) That, except as a legitimate war measure, we have no deeiro to deny to Germany her place among the great commercial communities of tho world. " (4) That we are prepared when tho war is over, to examine in consort with other Powers, a group of international problems, soma of them of recen/fc origin, which are connected with the question of the freedom of tho seas. . " (5) That wo are prepared to enter into an international pact, under which ample opportunities would be afforded for the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. " I airj under the impression that authority could be found for most of those propositions in Ministerial speeches. " Since tho above lines were written seotiona 1,2, and 3 have been dealt -with by our cwn Foreign Minister at a publio meeting held in hour of Premier Vehizelos at the Mansion House. The quest-ion of the freedom of the seas was among those raised at the outset by our American allies. The formula is an ambiguous one, ca.pablo of many inconsistent interpretations,' and I doubt whether it will be seriously contended that there is no room for profitable discussion that an attempt should be made to bring about the kind of pact suggested in section .3, and, I believe, common jrrounq to all tho bcligerents and probably to all the neutral Powers.

"If it be once established thaiT there are not insurmountable difficulties _ in the wav of agreement upon these points the political horizon might perhaps bo scanned with better hope by thoso who pray, but can at this moment hardly venture to expect, that the new year may bring ua & fasting and honourablo peace."