SIDELIGHTS ON THE WAR.

Otago Witness, Issue 2626, 13 July 1904, Page 67

SIDELIGHTS ON THE WAR.

ALEXEIEFF v. KOURAPATKIN.

(From Oue Own Correspoxdkxt.)

LONDON, Jure 4

Once more wo are evidently on tlie eve oE great e%cnts 111 the Far Ko.it. The world is waiting impatiently for the rising of the curtain. All wo are allowed to know is that the Japanese ha\ c as d<?cisn jly worsted the Russians on land as they did on the sea, and that, so far as human foresight can discern, the relath ely early fall of Port Arthur is a foregone conclusion. But it is uiieily idle to speculate in this direction. I prefer to deal with some ot the sidelights which are being thrown on the Russo-Japanese war and its circumstances. In the first place let me observe that the situation in Russia is still as I described it in a recent letter. The Czar, deprived through his wife's illness, of the imamable aid ot her keen and powerful intellect, has fallen more and more under the influence of his incompetent, if not corrupt Advisers, and is now in a pitiable state of indecision and vacillation, unable to decide what to do for the best. Alexeieff and Kourapatkin have quarrelled desperately o\er the question of strategy, and have referred their dispute to the Czar himself. Bui Nicholas II is the last man in the world to whom should be referred a dispute between' two strong and determined men. So he hesitates and temporises, and meanwhile events are marching on regardless of his desire for breathing time. Indeed a specially well-informed resident in St. Peter.-burg writes: ''General Kourapatkin is fighting two enemies — one at home and the other in Manchuria. The General's military rivals here represent ths Russian reverses as the outcome of his faulty strategy on the one hand and his neglect to make the needful preparations when he was War Minister on the other. It was General Kourapatkin who counselled the Czar to take Port Arthur, against the advice of other Ministers, and it was he who suggesteu the seizure of Peking and of the Emperor and Empress of China in 1900, against the emphatically-worded warnings of his colleagues. He it was also who was War Minister when Admiial Alexcieff's policy in the Far East was distinctly provocative of war. Yet now he complains of defective artillery and the paucity of troops which it was his duty to prc\ ide. He pleads that Admiral Alexeieff assured the Czar that war was impossible, aud he, therefore, refrained fiom preparations, which would have been costly and needless, bo that the Viceroy ought to bear the responsibility. But his Majesty is growing more and more dissatisfied with General Kourapatkin, whose military refutation is undergoing a terrible ordeal. The Czar would, it is credibly affirmed, dismiss the Viceroy and Commandor-in-Chief if it were not for the unfavourable light which might thus be thrown upon the Government."

The situation thus set forth is> perious enough, but, even so, it is not the whole truth. The most sinister phase of all is the fact that the Czar is wholly shut off from any knowledge of the real state of public feeling throughout Russia. Thus, according to the same writer, from whom I have just quoted, " the general impression in all circles in St. Petersburg is that the fall of Port Arthur, which many st 11 think impossible, ought to end the war. Officials, professors, lawyers, politician 0 , and even men who once occupied very high positiona of trust in the limpire, maintain that it is Russia's interest to make peace if Port Arthur be taken by the Japanese. Uiit nobody in Court circles has the moral courage to make such a suggestion to the Emperor who, confideiif that his people arc thirsting for victory, will not entertain the idea. People now say openly thai a continuation of the campaign will entail useless loss of life, but expression cannot be given to such an opinion in the prcs Privatolv Russians of all classes ask that responsibility should be fixed upon somebody for pursuing a provoeatue policy, which even Ministers asserted would necessarily lead to a needless war. while no preparations were made to wage that war, which has now degenerated hit > a meaningless slaughter. The intelligent classes maintain that a continuation of the campaign after the fall of Port Arthur will entail the necessity of Cternian diplomatic support at the close of tho war, and this means that Gcrma.iy will influence Russia's policy in Eurojfe and Asia. For an agreement exists between Germany and Russia which a c sures to tho latter country the energetic- support of the former, and, if necessary, armed intervention against any attempt on the part of England or America to submit the Far Eastern tjurslion to fhe decision of an international congress. As liboral Russians hate and fear friendship with Gori.iany, they protest against a protraction of the war which will render it neccssjin."

Against iho s:ibj< ct of a Ri --o-CJennan rfipprochemeiit, Russian feel'na is staticl bj' the same wi'tor tv run high, even peasants eli-piayius the c tntnsiont cipoulv \u the provjiices when summoned to send thcr sons to Hie front. Mobilisation throughout South. Rn-va A\as ram-cd out with considerable diPiculty owing to the opposition nmo;io; tho pooplp. l>ci those tlnnsrs wore rarefullv hidden from tl'o C'/.^c, \\\<o s,iw only a profn«o roinifost/itinn of tmbnundod do\rtioii to his ruvson. Tin bulk of Russians thus cnis-,itute an inarticulate opposition whi(ii has ho lil'.M'tv of «-peit'h or notion, uiii'c the RV\o!ut;cnisr-, ccntm.io th.ii aitnny donit" il']i I '] la"<, f'OT ri"u J \vf»d nnd ob>- T iuiito pint- ( ,m, no j,('it uiu-as'iioss 111 (io\(i- -ii nt ( ; h fs T ( .n.i-i, 'I- ("rt.uu >UU. itM . ge nt utkuipt nj blo>,\ uy K-Qii.-

staclt njs the work of tho Revo'uhonaiy Committee}. Had tl'is not been di<-oowred in the nick of time tho mo=t terrible explosion in hi-iury would lunc re-ult^d, and Jvronstadt would ha\p been reduc.-d to a he-ap of mm-. Thou came two attonixits to sink tho no\,- battleship Orel, by opening licl -=<ja-cccKb a. id letting m tho wafer. The lnystTiiou- attempt tn kill the, Mmibcor of the. Interior by an mfciiial macJiinc, which o<p!odccl in the Xoithern Hotel, has now been portly cleared tip. The man, who v. as b'oun Jitorally to picct ■>, and "o part of whom was found except a finger, ;s iisceruiii-ed to ha\e bc-eu named Pokotiloff. and Avn- tho biothc-r of a director of the Jtu-so Clunosc Bank He had como direct from (Ipiim.i, prcuded with an oxrelle.u fVNo jn-M-.t, for tho piupo-o of lairjins; out lii-, not, when tli<? maclmiG ciccidentally cxpitv' <\. Dcpite the vigilance of t. K p pohc" 1 none of bis acofnphces ha\ c hi on Ji~fo\orod. All th's i=; terribly -u^^c-tivc, and it is a-«errpc! tliyt "the ferment :ui>ong a! ola-""* of the Rus-riu ij')))ulntion is gioafcr than n Jki^ e\er been beic re."' In \iew of the- feeling whub is -o strongly pre\aleiit thiotghout Europe that mediation in some -1 upc «h<-u'd •n'-tantl}- follow the expected fall cf Poit Arthur, oxtieme interest attaches to tie impending vi«it of King I'ld'vva'd to Kai~er Wilhplm at Kiel. Deep importance is -ttached to rhi-. \isi(Tn Kngland some fear has bpen expressed that this country nnoht bo cajoled into association with Germany in some undesirable enterprise like tlio^e of Venezuela and Bagc'ad. which followed the Kai-er's last \icit to King Edward. But in Gom any the anxiety is expressed lest the admitiedly unequalled dip'omatic ability of tho English King should pro\-p too much for even his able nephew, and should bring about a sacrifice of German to British interests. It is strongly felt abroad, and is plainly hinted at, that England has been somewhat unduly favoured by pro\ iclence in respect of the succession^ of exceptionally capable men the piesent British generation ha? hail to manage foreign affaiis. It is true that after Lord Beaoonsfield's death theie was a big gap, but then the late Queen «a« able in some degree to minimise the danger to fhe nation of tho Gladstonian forpign policy. Then came in s.ucce«si\ oly Loid Rosebery and Lord Salisbury, both exceptionally able chiefs of the Foreign Office-. And now w 0 have tho King himself as both the real and the osten=iblo manager of our Foreign Affairs. L-ord Lansdowne may be very ■capable and all that, but he has to be strictly subordinate to a Sovereign who began his reisrn w ith the ve-oiution that lie would not be a mere figuro-head or a Venetian Doge. As in th^. case of army reform. King Edward VII will, if need require it, take the course he deem* bt»t i-n the interest of his country. His Ministers mu-r support him in hi- constitutional Ise of bis merogative or must give pace to othoi*. King Edward is resoh ed to dpsrvie the name ho has already won as "The Peacemaker," and not only to nrevpnt his own nation being dragged needlessly into war, but al c o to avert so far as possible that calamity from other nations, and to stop at the earliest possible moment fhe sfrus>q;lp now unhappily ip progie^s In tin-, effoit he has the cordial and outspoken sympathy and Lacking; of Franco, a- well as the moral suppo'-fc of Austria and Italy. It max- n-p'l be that hi^ powerful personality will ori? loner make it«ol f fpit in a wav of which the world in eonpral ha- fis vot nn ap^ieipation. B'lt I mu^t not he- '' tm previous."