MENACING INTERNATIONAL SITUATION.

Otago Witness, Issue 2623, 22 June 1904, Page 79

MENACING INTERNATIONAL SITUATION.

AOOUM ULATTNG COMPLICATIONS. POSSIBLE EUROPEAN COALITION AGAINST JBKiTAIN.

(Ff.om Our Owx Cobhespondext 1 LONDON, May 14.. At last we have received some real " war news." It is, as a , matter of fact, only about the j fourth genuine batch since the RussoJapanese war began three months ago. First, 1 there was the original Port Arthur naval \ affair ; then eamo the Chemulpo and Varyag fight ; next the Petropavlovsk tragedy ; and | now the initial big battle on land, in which ■ the Japanese have gained a brilliant vicj tory. But you have long had by cable | a much clearer and more concise and more i authentic account of these matters than we j poor Londoners and Continentals have eni joyed, our reports being co overlaid and smothered and choked with padding that it ! is a task of fearsome toil to discover the i tiny grain of genuine corn amid all that j mountainous mass of padding-chaff. I I prefer to deal, as usual, rather with tho inwardness and sidelights and portents of this opening land success scored by the Jopanese. And the c .c arc- singularly interesting and instructive, and even momentous. To begin with, I must notice the Russian accounts of the decisive defeat experienced by the Muscovite forces at ths hands of Japan. Thsse would be> utterly laughable in their wild absurdity were not the occasion so grave and portentous;. General Kourapatkin practically represents the rout cf his troops as the successful issruo of a trap set for the Japs, rho object of which was to "lure" them, across the Yalu, when they would fall an easy prey to his forces which awaited them. That word "lure" has already taken its place in tho vocabulary of defeat, which was so plentifully enriched by our own Generals Bull-er and Me-thuen during the South African war, notably with the phrase " regrettable incident " as a synonym for a reverse. But General Kourapatkin utteily out-Hc-rods Herod in this respect. When he has to admit the loss j of over 3000 men and, what is far more ' serious to Russia, no fewer than A 2 guns — j in fact, of virtually the whole of his field artillery, — he asks us to believe in a ''lure, which must have been certainly the- most costly decoy on record. As one critic justly remarks, our own General Buller might as well have pleaded that he was merely entiej ing tho Beers to *' come on " when he lost all his guns, eornpai-ativi ly few, however, at the Tugela. But even on the Continent this very transparent humbug ie utterly ridiculed, save only in Berlin, where at first I the newspapers tried to look as if they believed in it until the absurdity became, too palpable even for them, and they had to confess that Russia had been beaten, not only at rea, but also on land, where she was bc-lieved to be invincible. Naturally, the French, with their tremendous financial interest in Rucsia's stability, strove at first £o think the Russian version might be correct, but the effott has long since died away, and France looks on almost stupefied with amazed horror as tho prestige of her great and suppcsedly-all-powerful ally receives blow after blow, and appears on the high road to destruction. The new Russian -loau, whioh only France -will even look at, is meeting with a cold reception in Paris, but a financial syndicate has been formed to take it up if possible, albeit at a heavy discount, whereas the new Japanese loan is already at a premium. "There's nothing so successful as success." and so the Japs are beginning to discover. The Hussions, on their part, are finding out to their ■severe cost that even temporary failure in war is a. very expensive, not to say disastrous, thing, and that wholesale corruption m the administration of public affairs, does not pay even the peculators in the long run, while to the nation its eonsequenoe-s are simply ruin and destruction ! Of course Rus=ia is rot yet definitely Leat.cn — perhaps neve-r will be. Her resources ai~e too enormous "to be readily ex-hau.-ted, even with the aid of the grossest maladministration. In herself — that is to say in Russia proper — she is impregnable, as the First Napoleon found to his cost, and as the Japanese would find w r ere they so misguided as to attempt invasion. Indrfd, Russia's best hope — at present apparently her only hope — is that she may be able really to ''lure" them far into her territory, into Northern Manchuria, or even into Siberia. Th© fato of Japan would bo sealed in that case. But it is difficult ' to believe that the Japanese, who hitherto i Lave shown, themselves such singularly able and clear-sighted and far-seeing tacticians, will fall into so fatal an error. The greater probability is that they will almost force Russia to commit the converse- misi take of bringing force after force toward a frontier several thousands of miles from I their base, to" be destroyed in detail by an I enemy who has a firm and safe base* always clo«e" behind. Still it would bo most rash tD sssurne that Russia must necessarily b3 worsted in the long- run. There are yet many words to that question. So far Japan has had it all her own way, but the uncertainty of th*; future of war is provcibial, and it is still terribly early for

Japan to reckon th".t "all is over but the sl-cuting." Indeed, I am convinced that tlcy therpselv.es are far too shrewd r.nd sensible to think so for a moment. It is only their indiscreet and none-too-well-informed sympathisers m this couniry who talk such nc;nseii~.3 as that.

Yet the time undoubtedly approaches, if it has not alrefdy come, when Kuropo in general and England in particular must firmly face- the formidable problem— Apreb .' What is to happen after the present war is over, whichever way its fortunes may go? That is what thinking men are beginning to ask daily, with graver and graver faces. And the. answer is the re\crse of an et.sy one to arrive at. One of our shrewdest and most thoughtful writers. Mr Frederick Greenwood, has faced the problem with his usual steadiness of view and clearness of vision. I may rdd that, also, as usual, he takes a distinctly pessimistic view of the situation, present and prospective. He points out that: "One consequence was everywhere believed to be certain. If left alone together to fight it out (and that was the original proposal) either Japan or Russia must undergo absolute defeat. The conditions were such that the. two nations could pot live together in the East either as frieiida or enemies Victory would to worthless for Japan if it failed to break dew n the Russian power once for all. There could be no wctory for Russia short of the absolute crushing- of Japan. So much was commonly understood before ttao \wiv began , but very lir.tle attention was p! lowed to what followed from this state of things. Yet it was rothing less than that a resounding triumph for either combatant would give him, if unintcrfered with, -the complete masteiy of Eastern Asia ; which was never intended- In any event that result could be endured by none of the great commercial nations." But lie offers reasons for holding that the "crumpling up" of Russia by Japan must have far more formidable consequences for Europe than would be the disarming of Japan by Russia. The disarming of Japan by Russia might fairly be said to have none but local con&equences ; while, as for the domination of Russia, the interests and ambitions of Germany, France, the United States, and Great Britain are so imperative that they would certainly limit it. Without necessarily working together, they would work to the same end upon a war-worn Power too fatigued to defy them ; unless, indeed, by circular. Mr Greenwood contends, however, that " the crumpling up of Russia by Japan cannot be done without extreme risk of universal upset. Ruined in Asia as by the breath of a newly-risen Asiatic people — a people already on tlie way to be thought rpdemptionist and endow-pJ _ with mystic powers, — Russia may expect insurrection throughout her Asiatic provinces. What is next to be expected is such a fall from her high place in Europe as would derange the whole Continental system; and it would be strange if, at the same time, far worse derangements did not ensue from a general revolt of those Far Eastern races against European proprieiorship." Such, he points out, is the difference between the natural consequence.-. •'' the smashing of Japan by Russia and tho smashing of Rae^ia by Japan. " A difference, this, which was not much considered where and when the end of the war was ihought to bo two or three years off, and that the last blow would be Russia's; while, with us, ii"was ejee'ed from consideration by aa enthusiasm for Japan passionate as young love. Abi'oad, it seemed too soon to calculate; it home, too execrably sordid."

Now comes the point of the international situation as it presents iiself to the calm, unbiassed view of this experienced observer and most thousrhtful writer. He says: '" The merits of the Jppance as a conquering people have now been so magnificently displayed at all points, in all ways, and w r ith a quickness in itself co significant that- Europe begins to stir regardless of the Russian circular. The Japanese demonstration may not be complete even yet, but it is complete enough. Effects so decisive in appearance were not expected on cither side for many a month, to say the least ; and, by the surprise of them in Europe, the sensation they create in As ; a far and near may be judged. That is a point which only a very romantic or helpless partisanship will belittle ; for what it signifies is that, starting in immense streugth, the ferment spreadingthroughout the East from Manchuria will take no check till — when? Not, at any rate, till Russia has had time to gather her forces and strike a heavy return blow, which is not expected soon. We may be sure that for Germany and France, who have great possessions and greater ambitions in the Far East, this alone is enough to quicken their interest in the war, to Tn-ing- up before them the differing consequences of an Asian triumph for Russia, for Japan, and to lead them already to consider what action they should take and what oppose. Though its interests in the Near East are not primarily in Eastern A6ia. the same thing may be .^aid of the Austrian Government, which was the first to declare its belief in a real danger from an Anglo-American-Japanese coalition."

If, then, this be, us it undoubtedly is, a true account of the present "situation, should we not ask ourselves betimes whether the Cent mental nations are not entering into on© drift, England being set in another? It is believed that an agreement lately concliu'ed has changed our relations with France very much for the better. But France has a large stake in Indo-Ohiiia. and a _ long-cherished hope of substantial acquisition in the southernmost province of China itself. Her financial interest in the stability of the Russian Empire is immense, and it is a severe shock to her that an alliance which has been so greatly feiviceable to her should suddenly become a broken reed. Russia, once interposed to save her from destructioai. That was an act friendly to France, though based on bala.ncc-of-power considerations ; there is also the yet standing alliance with Russia, and the particular obligations to that country which were entered into when the Auglo-Japane-se alliance became known. Tho Germa i Government was virtually a paltrier in that understanding, but in case of a Japanese succ-ess. a« it is so far, Germany stands to lose cno of the richest province? in China. No Government is =o .nervous as that of Germany at the prosoect of inirs Mongolian " awakening," and though a weakened Rric-ia might not be displeasing to the German States, a destroyed Russia is by no means desired. Austria, again, was earliest in the discovery of danger in the AngloJapanese Alliaace. Thus, as there is such a thing as a European wn'tim&nt, to which England is often accused of being treacherous, there skeins 'good and sound neasons for

believing that the whole of Continental Euiopo is in a drift of helpfuhip-s to Russia. Such are tiio momentous co'-'.clu^ia-ns w'lieh Mr Gre-onwocd clabo.ateiy w-orks out from undi'pulable premises. His deduction is that Eng and i-= s.eadily drifting to o position of ; !i!a«on.«m towards United Europe, from v. h'ch thci-o may be no e-eipo unle-s the fact be recognised betimes. H-e ! ridicule a * tlvc wildest of dreams the idea | of America joining in a fighting coalition ' y/ith Btitam and Japan. And ho asks: r- Is I k so very clear that the eviction of European authority from Eastern A^ia. dops noc j mean the c\ietioi of English authonty tliere, and cpainot go on to it? T'ne=e aiv questions which a practical people "ho aid ask first," he continues " and, if possible-, i }>c enthusiastic afterward 1 ;. But wo ait a j changed people, and pride our-ehes on the i excess of our uucalculatiai.g- emotions. We ! are enthusiastic first, con=ide.iate afterward. I But too much is unconpidered when, sweep- ! inj aside all such questions as are sampled above, the country dashes into a course of I policy which can neither be dropped with- . out humiliation nor eontimied without Jisk ' of bc-ing- forced into a perilous anti-Euro-poan war. True, we arc not y-et actually ■ ai.d visibly in that plight. But w-e a.re or the vege of it. The war has only to go- on upon its prPFent course a li-t-tle further, and our joy at its victories to rise accordingly, and we shall find that we have drifted into a very undesirable position of antagonism. These ore very serious reflections, and earnest hopes are being freely expressed that the British Government has already given the .matter most careful and exhaustive cons. deration. After th& South African war reflations this seems hoping a good deal more than those disclonucs warrant. But, on the other hand, the spirited . and admiiable action of practically the- same , Ministry in the Fashoda affair may be. rej membered as a reason for a sanguine I of the present case. i It is significant that the strong desire for a rapprochement; with England — on a basis sim lar to that of the Anglo-French , entente — wlveh was show n in Russia a week ' or two back. c ,pems now to be rapidly disappearing. Rus3ia's severe and humiliating land reverse on the Yalu has greatly cm- ( bittcrpd the nation, and the idea that somehow England is responsible for it p : <her as instigator or abettor of the so-called Japanese afrgrrsMon is reviving with ou'ianc^O ncutcn-:>s. This nay .vet mem mischief. ' The -unfriendly sentiment is not rnalcn'allv accentuated by the splendid reception which ' tho new Japanese loan has met wkh in the , London market. Personally, however, I entertain no doubt that Germany actually 1 :s performing in Russia the precise part j which she and Ri-ssia untruly accuse Eng- ! lanJ of performing in Japan. That is to ' «ay. Germany is persistently inculcating ' AnglnplioVNn-i in Russia, where-, indeed, that sentiment is too normal to need much stimulation. I have good reason for holding fcV's opinion. It is founded upon secret, but wholly trustworthy, information. i Tndrcd, there a y e sinister rumours afloat as to cc.tain schemes contemplated by Germany for our special bonenr. One is that if England could be " Ji'red" into ncthe inlervcntion, cr any anti-Russian act in the Far 7-a-t. Germany would suddenly declare herself Russia's ally, and, following the precedent adopted — but not originated — by Japan, xroulJ «iimiltaneously justify the apprehension once- uttered by the late. Lord Salisbury, and " striking England a c'eadlvblov o\er the heart. " ! Tho German Chancellor ha= nlreadv stated openly that the British naw i-, "beeomjnp- a danger io Germany." "Becoming!!" — but no matter! The peint is that Germany openly proclaims her intention to have a navy as strong as that of Britain within n very few years' t-inic, and meanwhile she is stealthily manoeuvring hcr&eif into si naval position in which she wc.uld have an exceedingly good chance of fiilfiUing- Lord Salisbury's prediction as to . that " deadly blow over the heart." She has assembled three powerful fleets at as many different German ports within a , comparatively few hours' steaming from ■ tho east coast of Britain, and aggregating a vastly greater navil force than England cculd possibly bring up in time to imect j a hostile move. I Meanwhile England is dallying and dawdling as usual. That important site near the mouth of the Forth for defensive woiks has been bought and pa-id for, but ne\er yet utilised, or even initial steps taken in that direction That national bulwark was admittedly intended for the siieoial benefit of Germany, or rather as a check to her. But now the gra\e question arises whether, as Germany is perfectly v. ell aware of its object, she will await Ibe completion of the new fortress and naval station before utilising the great naval forcewhich she has now assembled in the nearest German ports whence a descent on the British coast could most readily be made. 1 There are those who " smell mischief in the air" just now, and in view of all the kpewn facts it is not easy to dismiss their views as those of mere alarmists.

licen-Jng poll would be laken. am! the contiiigetic/ that theie world be r.n po! 1 , or thai a poll would be ion 1 , seemed to their Lore, snips to bn co-.erc-d by section 8 In connection with this section th^re was nothme i-pccially applicable to " new district*."' The act spoke of the district, but the li.teipiotalion Act refe-rrecl to make* it applicable tone or more districts. What was aimed at by the Legislature was plainly apparent It was to continue ;n c-\&iy district, and m a new district, licenses until a poll had decided one of three, courses — (1) Whether licenses* should continue; (2 whether they (should be increased ; and (3) whether they should ho reduced. Their Lordships eculd not ignoiv this, and trm, defeat the intention of tho Legislature, and would, therefore, ad\i B e his Majesty to allow the appeal, r,nd to order a mandamus to bo submitted to the Licensing Committee. They ordered the respondents, with the exception of Mi' M 'Arthur, who wa« a majiirtrate, to pay ths costs of the action and of the appeal.

Mr Dankvrerts, X.C.. for t' c appe-lla\ts, asked leave to cable the judgment to New Zealand.

Lord Lindley said tbe judgment wou'd be confirmed by the* Piny Council on Monday, and there would bo- no objection to eab'iiijf after then.