OUR PUBLIC SCHOOLS CORNER

Otago Witness, Issue 2623, 22 June 1904, Page 78

OUR PUBLIC SCHOOLS CORNER

FOR BOYS AND GIRLS.

(Conducted by " Magister," to whom all commuiuications must be addres ; ed.)

WATERLOO

As Saturday was Waterloo Day — the 90th anniversary — I present you with a couple of plans of the Waterloo campaign taken from Gardiner's School Atlas of English History, and propose to give you a general outline of that great battl<\ what led up to it, and what was the result. Last week's Witness contains a series of interesting pictures, and an interesting article by " Colonia " on the same subject. Add the chapters on "King-making Waterloo" in the sixpenny edition of the Rev. W. H. Fitchett's "Deeds that Won the Empire"; an acquaintance with the fourth volume of that gentleman's larger work, " How England Saved Europe; as a counterblast "Victor Hugo's description from a French point of view as given in Imperial Reader; and finish off with Byron's "Waterloo " and Tennyson's " Ode on the Death of the Duke of Wellington "—then, as a Sixth Standard boy, you may consider yourself as having a fair idea of Waterloo and its men.

Pkeliminakt.

A word or two on events immediately preceding Waterloo will make things clearer. Wellington's presence in the Peninsula held 300,000 French =oldiers there, and by reducing Napoleon's numbers at Leipzig made his defeat possible there. Following Napoleon's retreat from Leipzig came Wellington's eruption into Southern France with about 100,000 men, and the appearance on France's north-ea&tern border of pretty well a million of men ready to make a descent upon Paris. Napoleon abdicated, and was packed off to Elba. Then there assembled at Vienna representatives of tho principal Powers; but, with the arch-enemy safe- out of harm's way, as they thought, their petty jealousies and greed caused them to wrangle. But the sudden reappearance of Napoleon hushed all strife, and the five Great Powers pledged themselves to make common cause against him as the enemy of the peace of the world. "The League of Chaumont was formally renewed, the four Great Powers binding themselves to con-

1 iviL'ite 150,000 men <scii, and noi; io lavdown their arms> without joint consent, and j only when Bonaparte should be unable to j give further trouble. All the smaller States added themselves, one by one, to this league, Great Britain taking its familiar office of paymaster and agreeing to subsidies amountj ing in the aggregate to £11,000,000." When 1 forces were summed up it was found that there were about three-quarters of a million of men at command to undertake the crushing of Napoleon. " The whole European I landscape was, so to speak, streaked with ; vast bodies of armed men converging on a I common centre — Paris." But of these there were only two armies immediately available — Wellington's, " of 106,000, a mixed multitude of British, Nassauers, Belgians, Hanoverians, etc., in the Low Countries; and Bluchers 155,000 on the Lower Rhine." Napoleon had already gathered up "a force of 240,000 of the line, and nearly 50,000 of the. Imperial Guard." Nafoleon's Strategy. i Napoleon crossed the Sambre with 128,000 on June 15, says Fitchett, and I might just as well say that this writer is my authority for nearly all I am writing. His object was to prevent the junction of the two generals, and_ at this point the plan illustrating the Waterloo campaign, and a map of Belgium, may be consulted with advantage. Napoleon being tho attacker, and having several routes to choose from, had the advantage. Wellington wae expecting him to come along the road from Mens through Soignies' and Hal, because this was the sSortest and easiest road to Brussels, J , and had his men extended in that direction. i But Napoleon crossed the Sambre near or . 1 at Charleroi, to advance via Gemappe. Even ! when Wellington heard of Napoleon in this ' direction he was slow in drawing in his right, for he didn't know whether Napoleon would come on through Quatre Brae or Nivelles. Napoleon's object was supposed to have been to hold Wellington engaged at Quatre Bras with sufficient force to J prevent him from assisting Blucher at Ligny. He then intended to hurl all available troops j upon Blucher, and to drive him back upon 1 his base, the River Rhine ; and, this being j accomplished, it was an easy matter to ] swing round and drive the British into the i 6ea. Had he taken Ike road Wellington j anticipated, he would have given every facility for the two armies to unite: the ) very thing he wished fo prevent. In this ' general plan Napoleon also took into account the characters of the two generals opposed to him. He knew that Wellington, a cautious general, would be slow in calling in the troops on his right wing ; and he ■ knew that Blucher, "a hussar general," was

an impu .->i\ j wa, , m,!, ui./u._4ii past thei throe score and t'»ii years of man's allotted life, had the fighting blood running riot in hiis veins. And he calculated eorreetlvQuatre Bras and Ligny were fought on the loth, yet it was only by accident that Wellington had any men on the ground in the morning. Prince Bernhardt, when he realised that the French were at Charleroi, seeing that Quatre Bras was a strategic* position maintaining communication between the two armies, occupied it on the afternoon before the battle. Late that nigho the order camo for the division, of which Bernhardt's brigade was a part, to proceed to Nivelles. The divisional commander, however, disobeyed the order, and pushed the whole division into Quatre Bras. B'ucher also fulfilled Napoleon's expectations — except in one important respect. He fought like a demon, but, when forced to retire beaten, instead of retiring on his base as Napoleon expected, he retired to Wavre. This was one causo of Napoleon's failure. But there ivere others. The reflection of the French camp-fires behind the hills of Charleroi on> the evening of the 15th betrayed the presence of the French, and instead of tho Prussians being in small force at Ligny Napoleon_ found 80,000 waiting him. Then, both he and Ney were unaccountably slow in attacking, and this gave both Wellington, opposed to Ney at Quatre Bras, and Blucher, opposed to Napoleon at ijigny, more time to organise an effective opposition. QITATEE BHAS. jCs I have *aid, Wellington did not expect Napoleon via Charleroi, and it was purely a chance, as far ."vs Wellington was concerned, that there were any troops in 23°sition at all at Quatre Bras on the morning? of rho fight. Indeed, in the morning, Wellington was still ignorant of the nearness* of the French to that position. In any case, Wellington did not want to concentrate on Quatre Bras, because it was too near the enemy to bo a safe gathering-place for hi<3 scattered forces. He would have preferred Nivelle. When the battle began, Ney, who had! loitered long, and had not even, then concentrated his forces, was attacking with only about 20,000 men and 40 guns; but he had opposed to him only some 7000 men and less than 20 guns. Wellington, summing up the position when ho cam© upon the scene, played a game- of bluff which deceived the French and stayed their onslaught ; nor did the French perceive the deception practised! upon them until Picton's division had opportunely appeared upon the scene. " Picton's men had left Brussels at 5 o'clock in the morning, had halted to cook their dinners at

noon, when news tamo to the resting troops of- the peril at Quaire Bras. They flung . c.way 'their dinners, and, pressing forward, -reached Quatre Bras a little alter 3 o'clock, ■ having marched 21 miles practically without food." But, says Fifche-tt, though successive reinforcements by the tmio the battle had ended had transformed the advantage in numbers to Wellington, yet the manner in ■which tho reinforcements arrivc<l — at distant 'intervals, m sraali bodies, and nearly all exhausted with long marches — told greatly to the disadvantage of the British. Again, Wellington was weak in artillery, had no cavalry, and half of his infantry was either poor in soldiership or of doubtful loyalty. Indeed, a battalion of B-e'gian infantry " as often as the word ' March' was given, stood stock still, and broke into a wild firing into space — a firing whioh smote the nearest British, but was quit© harmless to the distant French. After repeated experiments, it, was found that these extraordinary troops weio more dangerous to their allies than to the enemy, and they were allowed to stand back from the lino, silent and safe : their contribution to the struggle consisted merely in the moral effect their presence might have on the French!" If my young readers want to read about Quatre Bras in more detail, I recommend them to get the fourth volume of " How England Saved Europe " from the Athenasum — or, better still, buy the set if possible. I simply add that the arrival of the Guards decisively turned the scale, in favour of the British. "" Most of the British troops that took part in the fight at Quatre Bras had marched and fought for 17 suc.cessive hours, under a heat so great that even^from the hardy ranks of the Rides n.en fell slain by the sun. Wellington's loss in "tilled 1 and wounded reached about 4500, of 'whom one-half were British. " Quatre Bras was thus a Frerioh defeat, but it might have been turned into a French victory." N<*y had 20,000 men -under D'Er'on who could 'have been made- use of, but these oscillated tetween Ney and Napoleon and helped neither.

While Ney was keepins: "Wellington encased at Quatre Bras, Napoleon was engaging Bhicher. Like Ney, Napoleon was slowin giving battle ; he was also dp-reived es to the number of men Blucher had. Napoleon expected to meet 40,000; the number was much nearer 100,000. Details I'll not go into. In the end, Blucher used up all his reserves, and led his iem.simng cavalry in one furious attack upo-i the French. His horse was shot, and over his fallen body th& galloping- cuirassiers swept. His aide-ce-camp saveel him by conce-aling his body with his coat till the rush had pa.seed. Pre-s-ently_, the cuirassiers, wished fiercely by Prussian lancers, ebbed back in retreat; and Blucher, soreljr bruised and shaken, was ricked up and carried off by bis horsemen." Nothing, however, could withstand the Old Guard. Night left the French in pose^tsion of the field. The Prussians lost about 12,000. and the French about as many. In ths darkness the Prussians stola «way — where? Napoleon didn't know; but he was soon to know that he had failed in hi<? purpose. Now I have already far exceeded my space, and I must let "Wavre and Waterloo stand over until next week.